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Abstract 
 
Biobank-based genomic research is considered instrumental to realize Personalised 
Medicine and considerable benefits for diagnosis and therapy of many common complex 
diseases. It raises manifold ethical and regulatory challenges which are discussed 
extensively, the main focus being on adaptations of Informed Consent to the emerging 
research context. This study highlights challenges to the strongly individualistic focus of 
classical research ethics in confrontation with biobank development. The debate on 
adequate protections for individual donor-participants tends towards deflationary accounts 
of participant rights, in which in particular the dimension of potential property in human 
tissue and genomic information is undervalued. Criticizing the common bioethical and 
legal stance that there can and should be no property in the human body and its parts, the 
close conceptual connections between privacy, property and consent underlying the 
protection of a more substantive version of participant integrity are emphasized. While 
ultimately the framework of traditional, in particular individual property rights is ill-suited 
to safeguard participant and public interests in research, property discourse is fundamental 
to advance discussion on the direction biobank ethics and governance should take by 1) 
taking serious the reordering of individual, group and societal interests in biobank research, 
2) clarifying strength and limits of claims to “autonomy” and 3) refocusing to public or 
common goods biobank research should provide. These foundational insights are applied 
to an emerging normative model beneath biobank governance in which implications for the 
future role of consent and participant involvement in large-scale digitalized research 
projects are outlined. 
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Introduction  
 
This thesis focuses on a major development in recent biomedicine and its ethical 
implications, the spreading of biobanks for genomic research, which is considered a key 
enabling factor in the movement to Personalised Medicine. While collections of human 
tissue for research purposes have existed for centuries, these new biobanks have particular 
features both in the way they are organized and in the ethical and regulatory issues raised 
by the involvement of large populations of donors that provide tissue samples. 
In many ways, biobanks are a crossroad of developments in biomedicine and more general 
technological and social developments towards research on massive digitalized datasets, 
ever-faster sequencing and better technologies to map and understand the interaction of 
genetic and non-genetic factors in the constitution of health and disease of individuals. 
Not the least, biobanks, as the term suggests, have drawn a lot of attention in academic, in 
particular bioethical discourse because they have particular institutional and organizational 
characteristics which show indeed similarities to corporate entities in terms of banks and 
accounts, and include intricate governance structures. Biobanks are emblematic of the 
bioeconomy, and the results – a better understanding of the factors that contribute to 
common complex diseases – are anticipated to be necessary to maintain public health in 
times of shrinking resources of publicly maintained healthcare systems. 
Indeed a main peculiarity of biobanks from the ethical point of view is their hybrid nature 
between often publicly initiated and supported public health research resources and the 
envisioned networking with the databases of public health care systems, new data 
collections established in the course of research, as well private actors and pharmaceutical 
companies. While the biobanks I will focus on in this study do not in the traditional sense 
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deal in human tissue and genomic data, it is within the philosophy underpinning biobank 
research that they are neither a clear-cut public healthcare intervention or project. At the 
same time, promises of public benefits in terms of better diagnostic tools and therapies in 
the future are very important as part of the public promotion of this new form of research. 
The ethical discussion has taken up this politically informed stance on the matter for the 
most part only indirectly, and an important thread in the literature has advocated a new age 
of bioethics that would be particularly exemplified in genomics, and by extension within 
biobanks and genetic databases: the age of genetic solidarity and new forms of altruism 
and benefit-sharing that would overcome a presumed overemphasis on individual and 
merely private interests of tissue donors and research participants – in particular the strong 
bioethical focus on respect for individual autonomy in all matters healthcare and research, 
which should prevail over the interests of science and society. 
Differently from many authors in this debate, I disagree that there can be an easy transition 
to a new age of genetic solidarity and altruism with the implementation of large-scale 
genomic research projects. Indeed this thesis is designed to contribute towards the 
elucidation of some of the theoretical issues that are intersecting here: from the focus on 
individual rights of moral integrity and autonomy to private interests, sustained by indirect 
social pressures suggesting that in particular rights to genetic privacy might have to be 
limited to reach the high-staked aims of the new public health.  
Genomics covers a vast part of traditional topics of bioethics and its key concepts, and so 
some selection has to ensue. In the mainstream debate, there are two contrasting positions 
in the quest to deal with biobank research. On the one hand, donation of bodily material 
and participation in research is conceptualized around Informed Consent. However, as will 
be analyzed in more detail below, the concept of consent and the context for which it was 
designed fits rather poorly with the large-scale, data-intensive research we are facing 
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today, and can be anticipated to be facing in the future. This has many reasons, the main 
ones centring around the supra-individualistic nature of genetic/ genomic information vs. 
the concepts of classical health research ethics centring on individuals, and the structural 
and institutional features of this research which do not allow for a simple picture of 
research benefitting ‘the public’. Indeed the ethics of biobanks is closely tied to the general 
incorporation of governance approaches into bioethical matters. By governance I will mean 
multi-faceted and often informal approaches to conceptualize, order and influence human 
behavior that differ in their complexity from regulation and law. Instead, they encompass 
soft law, guidelines, the expertise of advisory boards and policy fora, of professional 
values and trends in general culture. This development is closely related to the 
fragmentation of science policy as top-down state imposed in an effort to enable research 
in an international and global context (cf. European Commission 2012
1
). The move to 
governance is fraught with ambiguities that I hope will also become apparent in what 
follows, since it introduces a political element into bioethical discourse, and at the same 
time denotes a technocracy, in which ethical issues and decision-making are distanced 
from the public and devolved to experts (cf. Gottweis and Lauss 2010). 
For the present study, this should imply clearly that neither individualistic ethics – as more 
appropriate for the clinical contexts and traditional clinical trials – nor public health ethics 
– being traditionally concerned with issues such as epidemic control – provide 
straightforwardly the conceptual resources to deal with the limitations of making ethical 
choices in the face of genomic research. Instead, I propose here a piece-meal 
transformation of part of this debate using sources that have been largely disregarded in 
bioethical discourse. In particular, I argue that the debate on donor recruitment and 
research participation has not only prematurely moved to an over-individualistic approach 
                                                          
1
 European Commission. EUR 25302. 2012. Biobanks for Europe: A Challenge for Governance. Report of 
the Expert Group on Dealing with Ethical and Regulatory Challenges of International Biobank Research. 
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– and therefore actually shows paternalistic features within the sheepskin of enhancing 
‘autonomy’– but thereby has more or less explicitly turned the classic order of priority of 
research ethics on its head, without, however, adequate consultation of the public itself. At 
the same time, social dimensions and long-term effects of implementing new research 
agendas tend to be neglected by downplaying the dis-analogies between traditional clinical 
context research and globalized genomics. The result is that though there is extensive 
debate on ethics in terms of consent, not much of its ethical force seems to be left, while 
controversial aspects are transferred to a technocracy-oriented reasoning in terms of 
governance. In this approach, the language of rights to autonomy, privacy and – perhaps – 
property in tissue for research is devalued, and instead less stringent moral interests
2
 are 
“balanced” and efficiency of research trumps more communally oriented decision-making 
about future technology scenarios and its impact on healthcare.  
If, then, biobank research represents an innovative form of research, i.e. it simultaneously 
represents a new kind of ‘ethical subject’ and social institution in the making (cf. Cordell 
2011), and the transformation of public and private sector research is crucial to this 
development, it would seem to follow that the ownership of the resources involved is the 
central issue of controversy. Indeed Knoppers and Sallée have stated explicitly that the 
ultimate issue of contention is the ownership of DNA, in particular in an increasingly 
commercialized environment (cf. Bauer et al. 2004). Yet, most guidelines as well as the 
bioethical debate avoid mentioning and discussing the problem in more detail (cf. Kaye et 
al. 2004). Nonetheless, new forms of informal property conceptualizations and 
arrangements are proposed, focusing in particular on shared, ‘public’ goods, the genome as 
a ‘common heritage of mankind’ and appeals to ‘benefit-sharing’ of the results of 
genomics (Kaye et al. 2004; Knoppers and Sallée 2005; Ossorio 2007). 
                                                          
2
 This development has been documented in the analysis of recent ethical guidelines for genomic research by 
Elger 2010. 
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The transition to Personalised Medicine presupposes that ideally, most sections of the 
population, at least in the wealthy and technologically advanced states, provide a ‘piece of 
themselves’, the information that it contains, and preferably some additional health-related 
information to such a research project. Before there will be Personalised Medicine, we 
have to be altruistic, and participate in research for the common good. According to some, 
we seem indeed to have a stringent moral duty to lay open our ‘body bank account’3.  
Or do we? Do I ‘own’ the minute snippets of my body that are required here, and what 
does that mean? Who, if anybody, has the ultimate control over these parts and the 
information they contain, which has now risen to new importance – from waste to, at least 
potentially, a ‘future diary’4 (Annas 1993) and, sometimes, a valuable market asset? 
Although the topic of ownership of DNA and genetic information has public appeal –or at 
least, some aspects of it, such as the ‘patenting of life’ and concerns about the 
‘commodification’ of embryonic tissue for instance in stem cell research – its ethical 
relevance and implications remain opaque. Here, my aim is to bring the issue of the moral 
importance of claims over human tissue for research that fall squarely within the 
conceptual domain of property and ownership into closer connection with the mainstream 
of bioethics. I argue that this is necessary in the interest of an ethics that reflects factual 
developments situated in real social and political contexts, and because of the conceptual 
and ethical importance of the issue. Property is important, because in biobank ethics 
control and decision powers over bodily material and its informational content is a primary 
and deeply normatively charged problem. This is the larger thesis I try to ground and 
plausibilize. The issue of informed consent to ‘authorize’ research will remain vital, but an 
                                                          
3
 In 2009, biobanks were named as one of ‘10 ideas changing the world right now’, using the metaphor I 
reframe here (TIME 2009).  
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exclusive focus on it has led to distortions and misrepresentations which are not defensible, 
if not for a narrow idea of donor-participant welfare and the risks involved in genomics.  
As the domain of property is vast, I cannot hope to answer the question in its fullness. 
Instead, I will concentrate on the individuals that donate or participate in a project and that 
in the following will be sometimes called the ‘supply side’ to emphasis the transactional 
and economic character the phenomenon studied here expresses. I argue that very 
plausibly, the requirement of consent, and the priority of the person and her subjectivity in 
research ethics, requires the acknowledgement of a moral ‘ownership’ of bodily material 
that remains connections to this subjectivity, and this is the case with DNA samples and 
tissues used for genomic biobanking. The transfer of tissues into a vaguely defined sphere 
of ‘common property’ and ‘public good’, on the other hand, is ambivalent and weak, 
specifically in combination with a focus on consent which, by necessity, would seem to 
imply a moral primacy of individual human rights. This latter claim is analytically 
independent from, for example, problems of intellectual property and patents on genetic 
sequences and research products involving larger issues in innovation policies which 
cannot be dealt with here in detail. I emphasize, however, that the issue of moral property 
in human tissue cannot strictly separate claims on tissue as material from claims on 
information and data, because the morally legitimate claims span both spheres.  
I also call, as a consequence, for a recovering of the material basis of genomics, and that 
means the basis of research in the parts of human persons and their bodies. There is a 
tendency to consider the moral interests of participants merely in informational terms, as 
what might be termed ‘data persons’. Data persons or data resources, indeed, have limited 
moral interests in research, and risks of research can be technologically managed. Perhaps 
these risks are actually so low as to appear negligible, and therefore consent or other 
ethical safeguards are not necessary. This is a view that I criticize as morally unstable. It is 
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not well grounded, because the requirement of consent is based on a more comprehensive 
picture of rights and interests than many authors in recent biobank ethics suggest.  
Having recovered firmer ground of the requirement of consent by an analysis in terms of 
property, autonomy and control, we must ask how a moral ownership of tissue might fit 
within the traditional requirements of research ethics and the practical limitations of 
research in large-scale digitalized environments. Indeed one reason for the disregard of 
property seems to be that it is not easily translatable into the conceptual categories of law. 
Moral ownership ‘rights’, however, do not need to include alienability and therefore 
commodifiability of tissue. I argue that this line of reasoning, compatible with the human 
rights and liberal foundations of the traditional account and also the new research context, 
suggests that we should rather foster possibilities of donors to become engaged research 
participants in the sense of a co-ownership of genomic resources. Importantly, individuals 
should be engaged in genomics in a coherent picture of Personalised Medicine as a not 
merely technocratic imposition, in which the promise of future health care benefits must 
foreclose the privacy and moral property rights of current and middle-term publics. New 
forms of ‘dynamicizing’ consent and patient engagement could be a remedy to this effect if 
they reach populations in a more commensurate form to the research undertaken. 
The proposed argument proceeds as follows. 
Chapter 1 provides background on the sociological, political and scientific framing in 
which biobanks have become a focus for ethical debates. I introduce a working definition 
for the type of research that shall be investigated, outline some features of the movement of 
Personalised Medicine and how biobanks are promoted as instrumental towards the 
fulfillment of its promises, and draw attention to some peculiar features that likely will 
become even more important in the future. Notwithstanding these, some of which plainly 
are ethically worrisome, I suggest that the response of policy has been insufficient in 
  
viii 
 
realizing the scope and depth of challenges involved, and produced conflicting and 
unconcerted guidance. 
In Chapter 2, I aim at analyzing in more detail the sources of this incomplete and partly 
inadequate response, and for this purpose move to the level of the moral concepts and 
principles that traditionally guide reflection in research ethics. I propose to approach the 
issue from three main conceptual pillars of this framework: the universal requirement of 
informed consent in healthcare and biomedical research, the protection of confidentiality 
and privacy of the individual, and an overarching ideal of non-commercialization and 
altruistic donation of human bodily material for therapy and research. As concerns consent, 
it can be shown that there have been many attempts to fit the traditional doctrine into the 
biobank context. I argue that many of these are primarily pragmatically oriented and 
inspired by utilitarian ethics, and that they misrepresent the requirements of autonomy one-
dimensionally and skewed towards a liberistic choice-model.  
Though I suggest that this is morally inadequate, I do not advocate stricter consent 
requirements, but instead emphasize that framing all the moral issues in terms of providing 
information to participants is misleading and unhelpful, in particular in contexts in which 
epistemic insecurity is by definition high. Following the diagnosis that the meaning and 
value of individual autonomy in a general and traditional form is of very limited use taking 
account of the context of genomics, I sketch some of the challenges to the protection of 
privacy for research participants and donors, which intersect with the protection of 
autonomy and moral integrity via consent. The last section of the chapter focuses on the 
relevance of the appeals to altruism and non-commercialization, originating from 
transplantation medicine, but that nonetheless exert an ambivalent influence in the ethics of 
biobanks with the advent of increasingly commercialized research environments.  
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Chapter 3 is the heart of the contribution this work aims to achieve. I propose to extend 
and complement the assessment of the limitations to the traditional approach with a 
discussion of participant interests and rights in terms of property and ownership. To this 
end, I provide a preliminary cartography of the place of the issue in the conceptual domain 
of property in the human body, which is an intricate and persisting problem in both law and 
philosophy. Answering the question of ownership in the body requires some theory of what 
property is, and while I do not defend a fully developed theory here, it is suggested that 
property rights are not ‘natural’ and stable, the moral implications of which are often not 
recognized in both legal and philosophical debate. Or rather, legal theorists are sympathetic 
to constructivist approaches to property rights, but tend to undervalue the moral claims that 
attach to these rights, or what kinds of moral interests they should actually express. 
Bioethicists, instead, have settled on an over-general ‘no-property rule’ – or alternatively a 
presumed evidence of ‘self-ownership’ – that both tend to associate property rights 
exclusively with the topos of commodification and market valorization of an object of 
property rights.  
Again, the moral dimension of potential property rights is underexplored. I also show that 
the philosophical justifications for anti-commercialization policies to human tissue for 
research are not straightforwardly supported by Kantian considerations of anti-
commodification of tissue. Kantian concerns, that also feature in the substantive 
interpretation of the justification for informed consent I defend in Chapter 2, are instead 
addressed to the moral standing of persons. This is compatible with a gradual model of 
commercialization – or rather, propertization5 – and a constructivist approach to property 
rights. Property rights in tissue and DNA accordingly could be designed to serve particular 
purposes, as some authors such as Donna Dickenson and Graeme Laurie have proposed for 
                                                          
5
 By ‘propertization’ I will mean the use of notions, metaphors and moral claims associated with ‘property’ 
and ‘ownership’. 
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the context of genomics and protection of participant rights. Though it would be 
theoretically possible to conceptually construct in particular ‘control rights’ for individuals 
that confer greater powers to them than the negative ones of consent as authorization and 
privacy, there are limitations in making these approaches effective. Notwithstanding these 
complications, the ownership-like interests in tissue are thereby not reducible to mere 
symbolism, and this implies in conjunction with the weakness of consent and privacy that 
they have to be accounted for in innovative ways.  
Some steps towards such an implementation for biobank governance are discussed in 
Chapter 4. I present the model of a ‘tissue trust’ that might provide a conceptual space 
between marketization and strict-anticommercialization approaches in the sense of 
stewardship. This model is prima facie morally neutralizing, while ownership-like rights 
should help to safeguard possibilities of control, transparency and democratic 
accountability, in short, moral agency in a liberal and democratic research governance 
system. The recent approach of a participant-centrism for genomics and tissue research 
might be employed to this end. Finally, I discuss some criticism of this approach that 
recalls the ambivalent policies of simultaneously fostering ‘autonomy’ and detachment of 
research subjects and tissue donors from larger aims of biomedical inquiry, and consider 
some possibilities for the future role of informed consent in this context.  
  
A Note on Methodology 
This is a thesis in applied, normative philosophy. Its subject is an emerging biomedical and 
biotechnological development that seems to embody larger transformations in research 
organization and the ethics of science in democratic societies, and it is because of this 
transitional nature of the research subject, the biobank, that the study does not easily 
qualify as bioethics as it has been carved out from the 1960s onwards. In a more traditional 
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picture of bioethics, principled moral theories can be applied to moral controversy, in 
particular to issues in clinical medicine and research, particularly clinical trials. Bioethics 
is therefore indeed infused with the definition and safeguarding of individual rights in the 
face of powerful societal and state agendas.  
This picture has changed rather dramatically with genomics, and in the course of the 
stabilization of a newer field of bioethical inquiry, public health ethics. The latter deals 
with what has typically been public health policies of individual nation states, regarding 
the organization and responsibilities of these systems towards individuals and the duties of 
individuals to promote public health in turn. 
In my view, a stark opposition between principles that would apply either to the clinical 
context or the public context – autonomy vs. solidarity, for example – is indefensible with 
regard to genomics and leads to the academic consolidation of blind spots in ethics and an 
artificial separation of phenomena. Biobanks as part of international networks and as 
public-private partnerships do not fit this categorization, and also the interests and rights of 
participants are not plausibly only individualistic or altruistic.  
Property, moreover, is a topic that spans the fields of moral, legal and political theory, and 
all these fields are relevant for biobank ethics and governance. This is a contention that I 
hope to convey in this work as of importance even in case the more imminent emphasis is 
on moral issues. The idea is, while focusing on moral theory and the clarification of 
theoretical concepts and argumentation, not to lose sight of the real-world constraints of 
these considerations and the prospects of normative claims to be transformed into policy. 
The ambition is, in short, the rational clarification, ordering and enlightening of an 
emerging scientific and social phenomenon, as a philosophical task of moral importance in 
itself, and also to potentially inform public debate. As for the latter, while biobanking 
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ethics has from the beginning been cast in terms of governance, this political stance is not 
reflected in the bioethical debate, which seems often detached from political reality.  
To approach the objective of elucidating the conceptual and moral importance of 
ownership and property claims with respect to biobanks, I have to make use of many 
resources that fall within the academic scope of law and legal theory, as well as political 
theory. As concerns law, in the form of in particular soft law and legal commentary, it will 
be used for mainly illustrative purposes, and not aim to be in any way exhaustive. Though 
case examples from different jurisdictions are used, the focus is largely on developments of 
ethics and governance in a European context. By making use of these different resources 
and in emphasizing scientific and social constraints, I hope that this work, to some extent, 
can count as an interdisciplinary effort, inspired by the holistic approach of the PhD 
programme in “Foundations and Ethics of the Life Sciences” in the ambit of which it has 
been conceptualized. 
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1. The Promise of Personalised Medicine and the Role of Biobank-Based 
Research 
 
1.1 The Proliferation of Genomic Biobanks 
At least since the completion of the Human Genome project, a new form of genomic 
research has emerged all around the world. This form of research, the so-called ‘banking’ 
of human tissue, is, in a first approximation, the systematic collection of human tissue and 
associated data to study the interactions of genetic and environmental factors in the 
aetiology and prevalence of common disease such as cardiovascular disease, cancer, and 
diabetes.  
The sequence of the human genome, the draft of which was completed in 2000, provided 
the background map, which is combined with a long-term oriented approach of 
establishing physical and digitalized libraries in which, so the expectation goes, one day 
we will be able to read the natural history of disease and, in some cases, observe their 
progression in real-time. This development is closely related to the emergence of the 
philosophy of Personalised Medicine that will be introduced in the next section.  
It has been established by now that  
responsible biobanking is desirable as a means to make – actually, a prerequisite for making – 
medical sense out of the map of the human genome. 
         (Malinowski 2005: 54) 
Though there have been collections of tissue or tissue ‘banks’ for a long time, currently an 
unprecedented proliferation can be observed. Traditionally, pathology sections of hospitals 
kept specimen of various tissues, an approach that has been developed more systematically 
and more recently in multi-tissue banks serving both research and therapeutic needs, 
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including for example bone, brain, and eye banks, as well as tumor tissue banks. An 
important trend is also the private and public banking of cord blood and stem cells, for 
example for the treatment of leukaemias and anaemias. There are also various biobanks 
that study particular diseases. 
Overall, biobanks can be differentiated with reference to a number of parameters, such as 
number of samples retained, type of sample, disease-specific vs. general or ‘exploratory’, 
prospective or archival, according to population studied, the identifiability of samples, and 
various organizational factors such as scope of use in research and context including 
clinical, research and forensic context and status of organizers in charge, such as a public 
university or a commercial enterprise.  
These are all in a sense biobanks, but they will not be at the centre of attention here, even 
though clearly many aspects of their regulation and ethics are overlapping. Here, I will 
focus on a generic type of biobank as a collection of tissue and associated personal data in 
particular for the prospective and exploratory study of various diseases. This approach of 
biobanks has first been established following the development of sequencing technologies 
and improved bioinformatics analysis around the turn of the century and in national 
contexts or across larger populations in which measurable effects of heritability in 
particular sectors of a study population can be expected. Population biobanks are defined 
within the European context as follows: 
Article 17 
A population biobank is a collection of biological materials that has the following 
characteristics: 
i. The collection has a population basis; 
ii. It is established, or has been converted, to supply biological materials or data derived 
therefrom for multiple future research projects; 
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iii. It contains biological materials and associated personal data, which may include or be 
linked to genealogical, medical and lifestyle data and which may be regularly updated; 
iv. It receives and supplies materials in an organized manner.
6
  
 
The biobank as an object of study here is, however, not necessarily a national project, and 
it will become clear in what follows why a narrow focus on a particular type of biobank is 
not useful in the extremely dynamic field of genomics. Nonetheless, particular features of 
genomic biobanks in relation to traditional pre-genomic research abound. To study 
complex common diseases it is anticipated that research must connect biomaterials, in 
particular blood samples, provided increasingly by as of yet healthy participants with 
extensive health and lifestyle information provided by participants themselves and by 
medical registries and health system databases. These encompass clinical, genotype or 
sequence and phenotype data.  
The idea of research behind genomic biobanking has a number of characteristics that seem 
to justify referring to it as a new level in terms of both quantity and quality, indeed, as a 
paradigm shift in medical research. But first, let us take a look at some of these projects. 
While initially nationally planned, these projects are also increasingly linked with various 
networking structures, and they exist on all continents.
7
 
The first large-scale national biobank was the 1996 deCODE-associated Icelandic biobank 
in cooperation with the Pharmagene company. In 2002, the Estonian Genome Project 
followed, in 2003 UK Biobank, in 2007 the Norwegian HUNT Biobank,
8
 and in 2008, the 
BBMRI (Biobanking and Biomolecular Ressources Research Infrastructure), a network of 
biobanks and biobank services, was established. Other biobanks of larger dimensions can 
                                                          
6
 Recommendation on Research on Biological Materials of Human Origin. Rec(2006)4. 
7
 For a recent overview of major international biobank projects cf. Scott et al. 2012. 
8
 Cf. in particular Steinsbekk et al. 2009.  
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be found in France, Sweden, Austria and other European countries (cf. European 
Commission 2012
9
; Hewitt 2011; Scott et al. 2012). 
While the landscape of biobanking even within Europe is very heterogeneous, the two 
biobanks that are most often referred to in the literature concerning governance and ethical 
aspects are the Icelandic and British Project, which will also be used here for illustrative 
purposes. Their set up has indeed interesting, contrasting features for thinking about the 
regulatory issues involved. The early Icelandic project
10
 directed by the private company 
deCode Genetics involved the first national project of this kind. The project was to connect 
a genealogy database, a health database and a DNA database, aimed at comprising samples 
from approximately 270.000 individuals. The endeavour soon made headlines not only 
because of its novelty in scientific terms, but because deCODE held exclusive rights over 
the database. 
The Icelandic Act on Biobanks in 2000 was opposed by public initiatives for controversies 
surrounding presumed consent of donor-participants to tissue and data provision and issues 
relating to their commercialization. This spurred a heated and long-term debate still 
influencing the bioethical framing and in particular the question which form of consent 
such a project should employ. In the Icelandic case, insecurities and concerns over 
transparency eventually led more than 20.000 people to opt out, and the law on Biobanks 
was changed (Santosuosso 2002; Cambon-Thomsen 2004; Rose 2006). 
The UK Biobank
11
 instead is a not-for-profit charity, the central objective of which is to 
create a major research resource containing biospecimen and associated information as 
described above from around 500.000 people in the UK, aged between 40 and 69. With the 
aim of supporting research, both in the UK and abroad, UK Biobank hopes to contribute to 
                                                          
9
 European Commission. EUR 25302. 2012. Biobanks for Europe: A Challenge for Governance. Report of 
the Expert Group on Dealing with Ethical and Regulatory Challenges of International Biobank Research. 
10
 www.decode.com. 
11
  www.ukbiobank.ac.uk. 
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better health outcomes for the generations to come. Partly in reaction to the Icelandic 
experience, particular attention was given to an appropriate ethics and governance 
framework which could incorporate issues of consent, privacy, as well as questions relating 
to cooperation with commercial partners. An independent Ethics and Governance Council 
was established to this effect.  
The projects to be looked at here will all share features with these two examples, in 
particular, biosamples will often be taken in a non-therapeutic context, i.e. tissue donors or 
research participants will have to be specifically recruited for cohort studies or population 
biobanks and they will be asked to consent to a linkage of these with health databases and 
other databases to be established.  
Biobanks for epidemiological, genomic research are not only a novelty in terms of 
institutional structure, by pooling samples and data from various sources that can then be 
analyzed and connected for various and future research uses. Behind the proliferation of 
genomic biobanks is a significant turn to preventive medicine that it is useful to outline to 
understand the ethical and regulatory complexities involved. While biobanks and sample 
collections, for the time being, extend to large and varied populations, the final aim is one 
of a highly individualized, indeed personally tailored future of healthcare and therapy.  
 
1.2 A Tool for Personalised Medicine 
One crucial aim of biobank-based research employing –omics technologies is the 
elucidation of the interactions between lower-penetrance gene variants and environmental 
and modifiable lifestyle factors which contribute to elevate disease risk. Statistically 
relevant varieties, SNPs, copy number variants (CNVs) and haplotypes on population level 
can be systematically investigated using massive and long-term oriented databases.  
  
6 
 
Research of this kind can identify and characterize heritable components of disease, 
contribute to understanding of molecular mechanisms and lead to improved diagnostic 
tools and new therapies. To this end, the genomes of hundreds and thousands of 
individuals are anticipated to be the key to these applications, in particular as the relevant 
technologies become more affordable. 
Biobank-based research is expected to improve on the biases inherent in traditional-case 
control studies, by advancing statistical power, diminishing false positives and helping to 
systematize new stratification efforts in a given population. It is also anticipated that this 
will lead to a better and more accurate representation of minority disease populations 
(O’Brien 2009: 195). 
Genotype-informed medical treatments are the scientific vision implied in Personalised 
Medicine, i.e. custom-made diagnostics and treatment to a particular genotype that helps to 
predict efficacy and risk of pharmaceutical compounds (pharmacogenomics) (cf. Laberge 
2003). 
Advances in bioinformatics have enabled countries or regions, in particular the ones with 
existing archived health information from public healthcare systems such as in the UK, 
Iceland and Estonia, to literally mine these data and link them with one another and 
emerging research projects.  
The link between this scientific and healthcare-service oriented vision and the expected 
impact on population or public health as well as the larger bio-economy surrounding it is 
the movement and philosophy of Personalised Medicine which acts as a motor and 
advertiser also of biobank endeavours, including in the ethical and regulatory discourse. 
Personalised Medicine more generally can be defined as the use of genomic and other 
biotechnologies to derive data about an individual that could be used to inform types of 
health interventions that would best suit that individual, predict disease development, and 
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could influence and help adapt decisions about choice of lifestyle, or to tailor medical 
treatment options for a particular individual (cf. Savard 2013). Genetic testing is therefore 
crucial to Personalised Medicine and includes the increasing use of these tests through 
health care providers or direct-to-consumer services. 
Personalised Medicine is also part of a larger healthcare and research strategy implemented 
by the European institutions and a restructuring – some would argue dismantling – of the 
traditional, now seen as too ineffective, public health care systems. Clearly, research 
results and products derived from this research are strategically envisioned to strengthen 
Europe as part of the leading global players in the bioeconomy. Biobanks in their various 
shapes are considered “essential elements of particular European strength that may ensure 
a continued leading role for Europe in the area of Personalised Medicine” (European 
Science Foundation 2011: 2). Indeed the priorities of the new funding framework “Horizon 
2020” prominently include health and the bioeconomy (European Commission 201112; cf. 
Editorial Nature Genetics 2013). Biobank initiatives are therefore also created in response 
to a perceived commercial potential of such resources (cf. Einsiedel and Sheremeta 2005). 
The persistence of data, their widespread sharing and analysis should help to advise 
ordinary people on risk factors, help to advance healthy behavior and make people 
participate more actively in healthcare – and perhaps research. There is a strong emphasis 
on prevention and prediction in the movement to Personalised Medicine, which has also 
been called “asymptomatic medicine”. The individual is seen as a ‘future patient’ who 
should therefore take increasing responsibility for his physical and mental condition. 
Before personalised therapies, however, there have to be data for personalisation derived 
from biobanks, which has been expressed in the ‘Paradox of Personalised Medicine’:  
 
                                                          
12
 European Commission. Horizon 2020 – The Framework Programme for Research and Innovation. 
COM(2011) 808 final. 
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personalised medicine requires the involvement of many. This in turn raises important 
questions about public participation in science and the goals of health care and equity. For if 
Personalised Medicine relies upon populations contributing data and bio-specimens, then it 
would seem appropriate that the public should expect to benefit from the insights of 
personalised medicine and that the “goods” of Personalised Medicine should be accessible and 
should be distributed justly and fairly.  
(Savard 2013: 201) 
‘Justly and fairly’ refers also to the risks that people volunteering now might face in terms 
of privacy and property concerning their ‘donations’, but also to the incremental changes 
on research and research ethics culture that can be expected with an eye on the current 
development.  
 
1.3 Trends, Hopes, and the Lack of Directed Governance 
A number of developments can be envisioned to be of particular relevance in regard to the 
future of biobank-based genomics and its effect on the way the participation of individuals 
is to be guided by ethical reflection and overarching governance. Some particular trends 
seem worth highlighting:  
(1) Informatization/Digitalization: increasing use of web based-computing and 
‘cyberbanks’, escalation in number and power of associated databases (Majumder 2005; 
Sensen 2005; Thorisson et al. 2009). 
(2) Networking: formation of consortia in international and global contexts; merging of 
research projects and infrastructures, leading to the biobank as a platform and resource 
including ‘biolibraries’ for research; linking of larger and smaller biobanks, including 
within the context of clinical trials; encouragement of regulatory harmonization (Yuille et 
al. 2007; Riegman et al. 2008; Elger and Biller-Andorno 2011; Austin, Hair and Fullerton 
2012).  
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The Public Population Project in Genomics (P³G),
13
 for example, is an international, non-
profit consortium to promote collaboration between different projects and all the 
stakeholders involved, mainly focusing on the sharing of expertise including guidelines 
and operational procedures. The aim of the European flagship project BBMRI
14
 is “the 
construction of a pan-European infrastructure for biomedical and biological research in 
Europe and worldwide, building on existing infrastructures, resources, and technologies, 
specifically complemented with innovative components and properly embedded into 
European ethical, legal and societal frameworks” (European Commission 2012: 2115). 
(3) Data-Sharing Policies and Involvement of Increasing Numbers of Stakeholders:  
In June 2013, Global Alliance was launched, connecting 69 institutions in 13 countries to 
develop a data-sharing policy and encourage DNA sequence and clinical information 
sharing and also technical cooperation through cloud computing and similar developments 
(Hayden 2013). 
(4) Public-Private Partnerships: 
Gottweis and Lauss distinguish three broad models with reference to financing: an 
entrepreneurial model , i.e. a public-private partnership between a commercially oriented 
entity and different state institutions; a ‘biosocial’ model which is supported by patient 
advocacy groups; and a public biobank model in which biobank networks are financed 
primarily with money of taxpayers and through support of not-for-profit funding 
organizations (Gottweis and Lauss 2012). In an increasingly commercialized research 
environment strict distinctions between ‘public’ and ‘private’ biobanks do, however, not 
seem to map reality adequately (Einsiedel and Sheremeta 2005; Steinsbekk et al. 2009), 
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 www.p3g.org. 
14
 www.bbmri.eu. 
15
 European Commission. EUR 25302. 2012. Biobanks for Europe: A Challenge for Governance. Report of 
the Expert Group on Dealing with Ethical and Regulatory Challenges of International Biobank Research. 
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and there is a clear political move to foster in particular the first model, testified for 
instance in a recent European Union science policy report (European Commission 2013),
16
 
which underscores the importance of ownership issues for the ethical assessment of 
governance approaches in this field. 
Hopes and investments in biobank-based genomics and Personalised Medicine are 
evidently very high (Scott et al. 2012). Some authors, nonetheless, express doubt 
concerning the pervasiveness with which biobank-structures are implemented without 
more in-depth consideration of alternative and complementary approaches to future 
healthcare. This critique is spelled out for instance in terms of an overly reductionist, in 
particular molecular reductionist philosophy of medicine, and a partly socially and 
commercially created need for Personalised Medicine, which are seen to be related (cf. 
Schneider 2003; Williams 2005; Savard 2013). 
The first kind of skepticism revolves around an overemphasis on genetic factors in 
understanding and promoting health or even, in a wider sense, the promotion of a genetic 
conception of the human self for all kinds of diseases, including the ones that are in actual 
fact known to be strongly influenced by other factors such as the so-called social 
determinants of health. Williams criticizes that a consistent approach to mapping the 
complexity of common disease would have to take into account more than is the case 
environmental, non-genetic conditions, and involve monitoring of the ‘future patients’ 
from childhood onwards (Williams 2005). This involves a concern that ‘technological’ and 
pharmaceutical solutions to population health are envisioned as primary, relying on 
benefits from commercialization of the body and genetic knowledge.  
Overall, Personalised Medicine, to which research biobanking and genomics are 
instrumental, are considered to represent a tremendous challenge in biomedicine and 
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 European Commission. Public-Private Partnerships in Horizon 2020: A Powerful Tool to Deliver on 
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healthcare, the ethical implications of which are to be carefully evaluated (Rothstein 2005; 
Gottweis and Laus 2010; Karlsen et al. 2011). 
In some respects, it is evident that biobank-based research is sui generis, in that it does not 
qualify straightforwardly as human subjects research, even though identifiable bodily 
material retains its human dimension (cf. Harmon 2009). Judith Kissell has instead coined 
the term “human non-subject research” which she characterizes in the following way:  
Emerging biotechnology is producing a genre of cases that, while not quite “human-subject 
research” – not about subjects – clearly engages the human, evoking considerations of 
embodiment, rights, privacy, dignity, personhood, physical integrity and respect. […] Human 
non-subject research encompasses any experimentation or procedure that deals with human 
material – nucleic acid, sequences, genes, cells, organs, etc., that does not, however, affect the 
personal-physiological functioning of its donor-source. […] some ambiguous continuity exists 
between personhood and human material, however indeterminate this connection, and even 
though personhood seems in these cases to be distinguished from subjectivity. 
(Kissell 1998: 279/280) 
Human non-subject research is not easy to place within existing law and ethics for 
biomedical research. Indeed an overarching international binding law does not yet exist 
and the ethics underpinning the many guidelines, recommendations and soft-law 
instruments tries to adapt norms from other fields, mainly traditional research on human 
subjects in clinical contexts as well as research on anonymous biomaterial. The result, 
however, has been mosaic-like and piecemeal, leaving many details unresolved (cf. Kaye 
et al. 2004; Rynning 2009; Wagstaff 2011; European Commission 2012
17
; Sándor et al. 
2012).
18
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 European Commission. EUR 25302. 2012. Biobanks for Europe: A Challenge for Governance. Report of 
the Expert Group on Dealing with Ethical and Regulatory Challenges of International Biobank Research. 
18
 For an overview listing the various forms of consent promoted in different national and international 
contexts cf. Scott et al. 2012. 
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2. Applying Traditional Research Ethics to Biobank Recruitment and Research 
Use 
 
2.1 The “Ethical Centre of Gravity”: Informed Consent19 
 
2.1.1 Key Elements of the Received View  
Descriptively, there is no doubt that the requirement of what has become known as the 
doctrine of informed consent is the main pillar of research ethics around which questions 
pertaining to the treatment of competent human beings in relation to health care and 
research revolve. The doctrine in fact has been enshrined in all the important declarations, 
guidelines and policy documents in the area in the second half of the 20
th
 century, 
following in particular the abuses of human beings in medical experiments during the Nazi 
regime (cf. Beauchamp and Childress 2012: 120).  
Here, we can make reference only to some, which are also a primary point of orientation in 
the application to biobank research. The Declaration of Helsinki proclaims 
6. In medical research involving human subjects, the well-being of the individual research 
subject must take precedence over all other interests. 
24. In medical research involving competent human subjects, each potential subject must be 
adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of 
interest, institutional affiliations of the researcher, the anticipated benefits and potential 
risks of the study and the discomfort it may entail, and any other relevant aspects of the study. 
The potential subject must be informed of the right to refuse to participate in the study or to 
withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal. Special attention should be given 
to the specific information needs of individual potential subjects as well as to the methods used 
to deliver the information. After ensuring that the potential subject has understood the 
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 Adapted from Brekke and Sirnes 2006. Cf. Høyer 2008 and Budimir et al. 2011 for more on the socio-
political background and empirical data. 
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information, the physician or another appropriately qualified individual must then seek the 
potential subject’s freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot 
be expressed in writing, the non-written consent must be formally documented and witnessed.  
 
25. For medical research using identifiable human material or data, physicians must 
normally seek consent for the collection, analysis, storage and/or reuse. There may be situations 
where consent would be impossible or impractical to obtain for such research or would pose a 
threat to the validity of the research. In such situations the research may be done only after 
consideration and approval of a research ethics committee.
20
 
 
 
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (also known as Oviedo Convention) 
reads: 
Article 5 – General rule 
An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given 
freeand informed consent to it. 
This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of 
the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks. 
The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time. 
Chapter V – Scientific research 
Article 16 – Protection of persons undergoing research 
v. the necessary consent as provided for under Article 5 has been given expressly, 
specifically and is documented. Such consent may be freely withdrawn at any time.
21
 
 
The Guidelines of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS) and the World Health Organization (WHO) consider consent generally and 
biospecimen research, but not the peculiarities of biobank research as described here:  
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 World Medical Association. 2013 [1964]. Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects. 
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Guideline 4: Individual informed consent 
For all biomedical research involving humans the investigator must obtain the voluntary 
informed consent of the prospective subject or, in the case of an individual who is not capable 
of giving informed consent, the permission of a legally authorized representative in accordance 
with applicable law. Waiver of informed consent is to be regarded as uncommon and 
exceptional, and must in all cases be approved by an ethical review committee. 
 
Use of medical records and biological specimens. Medical records and biological specimens 
taken in the course of clinical care may be used for research without the consent of the 
patients/subjects only if an ethical review committee has determined that the research poses 
minimal risk, that the rights or interests of the patients will not be violated, that their privacy 
and confidentiality or anonymity are assured, and that the research is designed to answer an 
important question and would be impracticable if the requirement for informed consent were to 
be imposed. Patients have a right to know that their records or specimens may be used for 
research. Refusal or reluctance of individuals to agree to participate would not be evidence of 
impracticability sufficient to warrant waiving informed consent. Records and specimens of 
individuals who have specifically rejected such uses in the past may be used only in the case of 
public health emergencies.  
(CIOMS 2002) 
 
 
Finally, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights confirms under article 3, point 2: “The 
interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole interest of science 
or society” and also the requirement of prior, free, express and informed consent for all 
scientific research (Article 6, UNESCO 2005). 
 
In their highly influential Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress refer 
to general “building blocks of a definition of informed consent: A person gives an 
informed consent to an intervention if (and perhaps only if) he or she is competent to act, 
receives a thorough disclosure, comprehends the disclosure, acts voluntarily, and consents 
to the intervention” (Beauchamp and Childress 2012: 124). 
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According to Beauchamp and Childress, informed consent is a process encompassing the 
following elements: 
I. Threshold elements (preconditions) 
1. Competence (to understand and decide) 
2. Voluntariness (in deciding) 
II. Information elements 
3. Disclosure (of material information) 
4. Recommendation (of a plan) 
5. Understanding (of 3 and 4) 
III. Consent element 
6. Decision (in favor of a plan) 
7. Authorization (of the chosen plan)  
(Beauchamp and Childress 2012: 124)
22
  
Many commentators consider the legal and moral right to informed consent a very strong 
right, perhaps inalienable (McConnell 2000), so that allowing and justifying waivers – 
intentionally and voluntarily relinquishing a right – is considered problematic (e.g. 
Beauchamp and Childress 2012: 137).
23
 Waiver of consent is not an infringement of 
autonomy according to another influential account by Dworkin (Dworkin 1988), but then, 
as we will see, ‘autonomy’ does not seem to be the sole justification for the requirement of 
consent. Apart from this fundamental debate, and the related issue of waiving consent due 
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 The authors specify that their model allows for the possibility of an ‘informed refusal’ and that element 4. 
– recommendation of a plan – should not apply to potential participants in research. Beauchamp and 
Childress 2012: 124. 
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 Strikingly though, Manson and O’Neill (2007), for example, interpret the primary function of consenting 
as waiving of rights. Beauchamp and Childress comment that “Although this interpretation is not incorrect, it 
is often more illuminating to describe informed consent as an exercise of rights rather than a waiver of 
rights.” Beauchamp and Childress 2012: 148. 
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to therapeutic privilege, exceptions to requiring consent would be emergency situations 
and clear cases of incompetence. 
Consent and its potential waiving are a matter of individual rights, decidedly constructed as 
an application of human rights for the context of healthcare and clinical trials. As Caulfield 
and Brownsword highlight,  
The requirement to obtain consent is one of the most fundamental in health law and bioethics. It 
flows directly, although not exclusively, from a rights-based concept of human dignity, such as 
that typified by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
       (Caulfield and Brownsword 2006: 73) 
There is, however, a wide spectrum of moral and practical considerations and ideals 
underlying the requirement of informed consent and the correlative duties of disclosure of 
healthcare providers – dignity, non-instrumentalization, protection of life, health and 
against risks, the right to self-determination, respect for personal integrity and agency (cf. 
Bobbert 2007: 239/240) – and the relationship between autonomy and consent therefore 
more nuanced and complex than often asserted (cf. McLean 2010: 3). 
Nonetheless, in terms of moral justification, in the history of informed consent regimes, 
there has been a shift from the assumption of a more protective function of consent as 
minimization of harm towards the protection or fostering of autonomy (Faden and 
Beauchamp 1986; Manson and O’Neill 2007: Chapter 1; McLean 2010: Chapter 1; 
Beauchamp and Childress 2012: 121). 
The philosophically oriented debate of academic bioethics has, indeed, focused on the 
value and meaning of ‘autonomy’. In particular the work of Beauchamp and Childress has 
lend support to the prominent place of the so-called “principle of respect for autonomy” in 
bioethical scholarship, even though the authors clarify in reaction to criticism that this 
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principle does not always have priority over other moral considerations (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2012: 101).  
Beauchamp and Childress explicitly focus on autonomous choice in non-ideal conditions 
rather than general conditions of self-governance – the literal meaning of ‘autonomy’ – and 
yet, the principle of respect for autonomy is also described as encompassing both negative 
and positive obligations, freedom from external influence and enhancement of autonomy:  
The principle of respect for autonomy consists of respecting an agents’ right to hold views, to 
make choices, and to take actions based on their values and beliefs. Such respect involves 
respectful action, not merely a respectful attitude. It also requires more than noninterference in 
others’ personal affairs. It includes, in some contexts, building up or maintaining others’ 
capacities for autonomous choice while helping to allay fears and other conditions that destroy 
or disrupt autonomous action. Respect, so understood, involves acknowledging the value and 
decision-making rights of autonomous persons and enabling them to act autonomously, 
whereas disrespect for autonomy involves attitudes and actions that ignore, insult, demean, or 
are inattentive to others’ rights of autonomous action.  
                                                                       (Beauchamp and Childress 2012: 106/107) 
 
Their theory depicts autonomy in terms of the three basic conditions of intentionality, 
understanding, and non-control, while simultaneously stressing that context will be crucial 
to specify the appropriate criteria for substantial autonomy (ibid.: 104/105). 
The specific normative commitments of this view continue to be discussed, and are 
sometimes criticized as shallow (O’Neill 2004a; cf. also Wilson 2007), sometimes 
described as a middle or standard position (cf. Bobbert 2007). It is probably fair to say that 
Beauchamp and Childress’ model is based on a bundle of normative and practical 
considerations that should make it both conceptually resistant and also applicable as a 
practical reference in bioethical matters across the spectrum of healthcare and research.  
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Given that their account would be the standard, deviations can be categorized in the more 
minimalistic form as ‘informed choice’ with focus on liberty as independence from 
external control, and a more demanding account of e.g. substantive or ‘relational’ 
autonomy, which is then correlated to what is the final moral aspiration in the requirement 
of consent.  
Though the overarching importance of autonomy as a value in itself and the Beauchampian 
principle of respect for autonomy have long been hailed as a triumph over traditional 
medical paternalism and the societal authority of science, recently there has been a 
reconsideration of this quasi-dogmatic status in which respect for autonomy as the main 
guiding principle is questioned (Caplan 2009; 2012). Some commentators have even 
referred to a “bioethical paternalism of autonomy” (Stirrat and Gill 2005; cf. Hofmann 
2004). This phenomenon has also a certain importance for the issue of biobanking ethics as 
part of the rise of new forms of public health initiatives which challenge the traditionally 
strong concern with clinical ethics, and I will try to explicate in the following which parts 
of this critique of the general doctrine of personal autonomy are to be taken seriously.  
Another influential account by Onora O’Neill and Manson and O’Neill claims that the 
relation between autonomy and informed consent in the preceding decades has largely 
been misconstrued, concluding that “standard accounts of informed consent, standard 
arguments for requiring consent in clinical and research practice and standard ways of 
implementing consent requirements lead to intractable problems” (Manson and O’Neill 
2007: viii). They propose a less demanding theory in which informed consent serves 
mainly to avoid coercion and deception.
24
 While O’Neill’s and Mansons’ critique 
concerning the justification of consent is not shared here, another feature of their analysis 
is relevant to the application of informed consent in the bioethical debate on involvement 
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of participants in genomics and ‘donating’ parts of their bodies. They rightly point out that 
the so-called ‘Conduit-container model’ in which information provision has a pivotal role 
applied to all kinds of health care and research contexts is unhelpful, and even dangerous 
since 
they encourage us to think of information in abstraction from human activity, and specifically 
in abstraction from the normative framework that governs successful communicative 
transactions between people.  
(Manson and O’Neill 2007: ix) 
As a result, there is often too much focus on consent, and the disclosing of information and 
processing of data. This in turn leads to what Manson and O’Neill term “drift from 
agency”, a phenomenon I claim can also be discerned in the ethical discussion surrounding 
biobank initiatives (cf. Brekke and Sirnes 2006).  
As Paula Boddington points out in her recent book “Ethical Challenges in Genomics 
Research”, another problem to be addressed as part of this critique, particularly if we think 
of new information technologies, is that the domain of autonomy and therefore control 
over it is dazzlingly large, covering selfhood, the body, as well as life in biological and life 
in informational constitution (cf. Boddington 2012: 112). This is obviously also related to 
the question of human identity and how we conceive of it with reference to the 
conceptualization of control over parts of the body, in particular if personal information is 
tied to it: is autonomy important to the self mainly insofar it concerns the bodily sphere, 
and where are the moral and practical limits of this conception of the self? 
Just as with autonomy, however, one should avoid an idealization of a general concept of 
informed consent as a panacea, since it apparently has never been the ultimate solution to 
the philosophical puzzle of ‘true’ autonomy, and in any case is to be pragmatically adapted 
to context (cf. Ursin 2010b; cf. Beauchamp 2011). This implies that a contextualized 
discussion of what kind of form and content of consent is required will be necessary. In 
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addition, two further assumptions will undergird the ensuing discussion of adapting 
consent to biobank research: First, even though the specific deontological sources can a be 
a matter of debate, the requirement of consent is here conceived of as having both a 
protective and a liberating – or perhaps, ‘empowering’ – function, which stem from the 
origin of the doctrine of informed consent in the tradition of human rights thinking (cf. 
Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001; Brownsword 2003).  
As a result, what is often referred to as a generic standard account of the requirement of 
informed consent to ‘protect’ autonomy is, in actual fact, even prima facie rather 
demanding, since it includes not only the process of direct and final authorization by a 
patient and/or research participant, but a procedure of surrounding considerations, such as 
a risk-benefit assessment of health care professionals and/or a research ethics committee, 
guided by the duty to protect against harm and the expectation that the invention or 
research will be beneficial, plus an overall embeddedness in a relation of trust, enabling all 
in all a meaningful implementation of respect for the person. Moreover, often 
understanding of provided information as well as situated and contextualized competences 
of decision-making are specifically emphasized (Bobbert 2007) as well as the weighing 
with competing principles and values (Beauchamp and Childress 2012). 
Concerning research that is not of benefit to the donor or participant, only research aims 
that qualify as good and just are justified if risk is minimal. Informed consent by itself, 
therefore, legitimizes only the invasion of the private sphere of an individual in a broad 
sense, but – being about individual rights – cannot ‘legitimize’ the quality or particular 
contribution of a research project or societal research agenda to some common good. 
This problem of the reach and meaning of consent is a key issue in the bioethical debate 
about the rights and interests of biobank participants. Brownsword and Caulfield observe 
that  
  
21 
 
most of the policy reforms that have been suggested to address this consent issue involve a 
departure and, in some cases, an erosion of traditional consent norms — such as the use of a 
blanket consent or, as in Iceland, the creation of a system of presumed consent.  
(Caulfield and Brownsword 2006: 73)  
Hence, the issue of a potential ‘dilution’ of consent will be the entry point into the present 
debate on the rights and interests at stake for persons who are asked and motivated to 
transfer bodily material and/or DNA to a research project.  
Second, it is important to stress that with the universal requirement of consent comes the 
idea of the primacy of the individual human being or respectively, the non-
instrumentalization of the person as a guiding ideal in biomedicine. This idea is central to 
the whole endeavour of research ethics (cf. Jonas 1969), however – with the 
implementation of large-scale public health research projects in digital environments, 
largely lacking close interaction with donors, patients and the public – it has come under 
some strain.
25
  
 
2.1.2 Outlining the Challenges  
This section examines limitations in the application of consent doctrines and their various 
justifications to biobank ethics. In particular, I aim at clarifying some implicit or hidden 
normative assumptions in a systemic way, which is not usually done within the scope of 
the main bioethical articles pertaining to the subject. This task is of particular importance 
since also the many regulatory guidelines make appeal to principles and values without 
further discussion. The focus will be on the question if there are any significant ethical 
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 Sometimes, this ‘primacy-principle’ is now considered outright wrong or too vague to be of any ethical 
guidance, cf. Helgesson and Eriksson 2008; 2011 who claim it should be abolished, and the critique by 
Parker 2010.  
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costs with reference to the new application and how the underlying rights change or have 
to be adapted.  
In general, challenges in adapting informed consent to the context of biobanks concern 
issues deriving from two overlapping sources, the genetic/ genomic nature of the research 
as well as the unique organizational structure of biobanks (cf. Kegley 2004; Harmon 
2009). Firstly, the concept of a well-informed consent as required by e.g. UNESCO’s 
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data stating that “clear, balanced, adequate 
and appropriate information shall be provided to the person whose prior, free, informed 
and express consent is sought” raises questions in both medical practice and research on 
tissue and health information. As high-throughput sequencing is used increasingly, a 
wealth of potentially relevant information for researchers and patients is accumulated. The 
complexity of genetic information complicates the process of establishing the causal 
influence in determining disease or susceptibility to disease.  
If a threshold of clinical relevance can be established, it must be considered that this 
information will be potentially relevant beyond the individual level. The information that a 
person carries the BRCA1/ BRCA2 mutation, for instance, will be important for family 
members and in some cases, reproductive decision-making, which raises the question if 
there is a duty to inform patients and/or return genetic/ genomic results, and how its 
demands can be specified. Informed consent to genetic tests and research, in any case, 
applies only to an individual. Although presently this is an issue mainly for what concerns 
the provision of tests in the clinical context, it might very soon also concern participants in 
so far prima facie only-research contexts. While most larger-scale genomic studies are 
likely still at the stage of exploration rather than confirmation concerning gene-disease and 
gene-environment interaction, the disclosure of relevant research results and so-called 
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incidental findings to participants will be a key challenge (cf. Beskow et al. 2001; Berg et 
al. 2011).  
Under which conditions disclosure is appropriate, however, is contentious. Fundamental 
problems include the epistemological and statistical conditions of assessing disease 
susceptibility as well as a potentially necessary independent confirmation of the result. 
Even if a result is valid, duties of disclosure might hinge on circumstances, such as the 
availability of treatments. And what is the role of the researchers who so far have no 
recognized duties to act in the best interest of study participants as doctors have towards 
patients (Beskow et al. 2001: 2320)? While there seems greater consensus on researchers’ 
duties in this regard, the demandingness and concrete implementation as an enforceable 
positive duty remain a matter of debate (Wolf et al. 2012; Bledsoe et al. 2012; Clayton and 
McGuire 2012; Ossorio 2012; Zawati and Knoppers 2012; Biesecker 2013). In larger, 
public health contexts (as facilitated by biobanks) rather than the clinical setting, some 
authors stress that returning results should be strictly limited (Stjernschantz Forsberg et al. 
2009; Berg et al. 2011): “Only clearly deleterious mutations in genes known to cause a 
high risk for preventable disease should be routinely reported. This differs from the public 
health pursuit of newborn screening, for example, in which sensitivity is maximized at the 
expense of specificity” (Berg et al. 2011: 500). 
Early on in the debate on the provision of genetic information to participants in research, 
non-individual forms of consent and consultation have been proposed, in particular group 
or ‘community consent’ as a result of the ethical quandaries in particular with research on 
ethnic or cultural minorities (cf. Foster et al. 1998; Dickenson 2004; Widdows 2009; 
Widdows and Cordell 2011b). 
Concerning the particular structural and organizational features of biobank research, the 
application of traditional consent forms is limited by the impact of informational insecurity 
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or openness that is, at the same time, the rationale and aim of the whole endeavour (Greely 
2007; Mascalzoni et al. 2008; Beier 2010). Biobanks, as Shawn Harmon pointedly 
remarks,  
are an exercise in the unknown; they are future-oriented and optimistic; although we believe 
they will contribute to high-powered future research, new understandings, and the discovery 
and generation of new therapeutic products and processes, we really do not know what their 
ultimate value or their social risks/consequences might be. 
  (Harmon 2009: 31) 
The platform character of biobank means that we must conceive of biobanks as research 
resources rather than a research project. It is, in many cases, envisioned that samples will 
be networked and shared with other research institutions and databanks. As a consequence, 
new potential uses of the resource material, i.e. the tissue and data, seriously limit the 
possibility to define research protocols and inform participants, but even ethics review 
boards at the time consent is sought. This is further complicated by the fact that 
possibilities of data storing and the technological tools for analysis improve rapidly 
(Mascalzoni et al. 2008). 
Since these research infrastructures are projected for future, continuous and repeated use, 
unknown or uncertain factors abound. At the time of collection, when consent is required, 
it is not possible to anticipate the identity and/or location of all the (potential) users; the 
specific ends to which the research will be put; the eventual (but presumably therapeutic) 
outputs, if therapeutic or of other kind, the governance structures of the particular location 
or locations where the materials are to be used and the lifespan or security of the biobank 
(Harmon 2009: 31). The ‘scope’ of information stored and perpetuated clearly is also a 
matter of technical development (e.g. data-mining, cloud computing, whole genome 
methods) and consequently informational risks are underspecified at the time of consent 
(Kaye et al. 2010). This can have an effect on the validity of the consent insofar the 
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protection of confidentiality should be covered through it, which in turn raises the question 
if participants should know details about access to data and security measures (cf. Tavani 
2004; Mascalzoni et al. 2008). As Greely (2007; 2010) discusses, tying up the demands 
and scope of consent almost exclusively with the protection of privacy interests, as has 
been explicitly the case in the United States, is therefore both ethically and pragmatically 
highly problematic. 
Generally, it can be concluded that it will be difficult to secure transparency concerning the 
exact research in relation to evolving projects. Under which circumstances then should 
donors or participants re-consent and must be updated? Some authors assume that it is in 
the interest of participants to be re-informed only of what researchers or ethics review 
boards would consider substantive changes to the research agenda and governance 
structure (Steinsbekk and Solberg 2011; Stjernschantz Forsberg et al. 2011). Steinsbekk 
and Solberg (2011) specifically discuss whole-genome sequencing, data sharing and 
commercial utilization as the currently most likely cases in the international biobank 
research scene that will demand careful consideration of re-consenting to research (within 
a model of ‘broad consent’ to be explicated below). 
In some cases, participants may want to make use of the right to withdraw from research 
which traditionally is a correlative of the requirement of informed consent. Due to the 
increase and networking of data generated from tissue research it is, however, not clear that 
this right can be respected in the original form as applied to clinical research (cf. Widdows 
and Cordell 2011a; Holm 2011). This seemingly very strong right is justified by appeal to 
autonomy and bodily integrity, but in its absoluteness and unconditionality also by the 
power difference between researchers and participants. In the traditional form, it has five 
key components: it is absolute, unconditional (requires no explanation or justification), is 
immediate, complete and non-tradeable or inalienable. These features do not 
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straightforwardly translate to the context of large-scale biobank studies (Holm 2011: 271). 
Holm argues that unconditionality can be qualified for the biobank context since there are 
no imminent risks and the power situation is different. One potential consequence is that 
researchers could be allowed to give general information about the implications of 
withdrawal, which would be wrong according to the traditional scenario in clinical 
research. The completeness condition of withdrawal can and should also be qualified, 
alternative options being e.g. the anonymization of tissue samples with or without 
additional generation of data from the existing samples, consenting to specific research 
projects, or more demanding options such as the formation of a “donor committee” that 
represents its interests in the relevant research ethics committee (ibid.: 278). In any case, 
the concrete meaning of withdrawal and how realistic the possibility of withdrawal is 
should be specified.
26
  
Moreover, it is not possible to stop data being used in subsequent studies which build on 
the results of previous research done based on biobank samples and information. To offer 
this as a realistic possibility in the process of a one-time consent will be difficult and is 
certainly scientifically undesirable as the value of stored samples increases over time due 
to additional generation of data. Data may also be kept by sponsors or oversight bodies for 
verification and have entered aggregation and data pools already published or to be used 
for further research. Even if different forms of withdrawal are specified, a complete stop of 
data flow may therefore simply be impossible (cf. Mascalzoni et al. 2008; Widdows and 
Cordell 2011a; Kosseim and Jospe 2011). 
If the potential non-adherence to completeness of withdrawal that seems to follow from the 
configuration of biobank research is indeed ethically problematic is, however, a matter of 
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 UK Biobank, for instance, communicates the options of ‘no further contact’, ‘no further access’ and ‘no 
further use’, the latter being qualified as destruction of samples where possible in entirety, though data are 
kept for archival purpose, and from data analyses already undertaken (UK Biobank Ethics and Governance 
Framework 2007). 
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debate. Søren Holm suggests that changes to the strict requirements of the right to 
withdraw from research in the clinical research context in larger-scale genomic research 
can be justified by comparing the desire to withdraw with other situations in life that are 
similarly low-risk, but where the continued existence of the overall project might have very 
important social goals: “Participants can effectively break off any future engagement with 
the biobank. This seems analogous to many other kinds of social cooperation where 
participants can stop future engagement without having a right to retrieve their past 
contributions” (Holm 2011: 280). Eriksson and Helgesson have argued for the stronger 
position that withdrawal must be conditional and should only be allowed in case there is “a 
sufficient argument for doing so, out of consideration of fairness and a duty to contribute to 
the continuous development of public health resources” (Eriksson and Helgesson 2005: 
1076). 
A further issue which has become questioned in applying the traditional informed consent 
to biobanks is how commercialization and potential profit from donated biological material 
and data should be communicated and dealt with in a research ethics model that relies 
primarily on the tool of consent. This does not only concern the question if commercial use 
of tissue or commercial collaborations of the biobank must be disclosed. As will be 
discussed in more detail below, it also engages more conceptual questions that seem to 
have a large impact on how the ethical sub-structure of biobank governance is thought of 
and organized. In fact, what does consenting to future and likely broader, unspecified 
research use imply concerning potential property interests of donors? Is informed consent 
the mechanism of a – complete? – property transfer, or are donors rather participants with 
morally justifiable continuing interests in ‘their’ material? (cf. Høyer 2008; Widdows and 
Cordell 2011a; Ursin 2010b). 
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2.1.3 New Functions for Informed Consent 
 
2.1.3.1  From Presumed Consent to Informed Authorization 
Biobank research on the one hand might be considered to complicate the recruitment of 
donors under the circumstances of uncertainty, while indeed the very nature of research 
organization raises the appeal of a blanket, broad or presumed consent. This has raised 
concern and sometimes heated debate. Should we accept what converges on “carte 
blanche” as functional and justified, or at least a good enough proxy to ‘true informed 
consent’? But then, what would be ‘true informed consent’? (cf. Malinowski 2005). 
These kind of questions are indeed what caused the first wave of bioethical discussion, the 
controversy that arose following the presumed consent of the Icelandic population to the 
project of deCODE that became a model for reflection on “how not to develop a biobank” 
(cf. Rose 2001; Rose 2006; Winickoff 2003; Pálsson 2007). 
The Icelandic population in this case presumably was willing to participate in deCODE’s 
studies, meaning that they would have their tissue and data available in the health sector 
database, which then gives access to deCODE, including its commercial partners, unless 
there is an explicit request for exemption. Following intense public and academic debate, 
the applicability of informed consent in large-scale research databases and the 
internationally developing biobank projects became investigated, that should later centre 
around the idea that a classic consent does not fit here, since it is not informed anymore 
(Kaye and Martin 2000; Greely 2007; Hofmann 2009). In a similar vein, Harmon 
concluded that “the “informedness” which underlies proper, ethical consent cannot be 
fulfilled, making any claim to having obtained consent as we wish and need it to mean in 
the clinical and research setting a fallacy” (Harmon 2009: 32). 
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In fact, some commentators in particular in reaction to the Icelandic case argued that the 
concept of informed consent cannot be stretched to accommodate genetic research based 
on large-scale tissue and data collection and should be substituted with a different format – 
a so-called ‘informed authorization.’ The concept denotes “an explicit written 
authorisation for participation in database research based on general knowledge about the 
database and the research purposes and practices” (Árnason 2004: 44). This proposal of a 
middle way between standard and presumed consent derives from the recognition that the 
use of informed consent for research participation which is not specified is misleading, and 
the distinct and open question “whether it is wise to require informed consent for all 
secondary research purposes” (Árnason 2004: 42). The second question, I take it, refers to 
practicality in terms of temporal and financial resources as well as limitations due to the 
organizational structure of tissue and database-based research.  
Authorization would imply the provision and understanding of “at least” the following: 
o which information about her/him will be placed into the Health Sector Database; 
o how privacy will be secured (without going into technical details); 
o how the information will be connected to other data; 
o who will have access to the information; 
o in what context the information will be used and for what purposes; 
o how consent for genetic research will be obtained; 
o what are the foreseeable risks and benefits of participation; 
o how research on the data will be regulated; and 
o that the individual has the right to withdraw the healthcare data at any time. 
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As in the traditional scenario, these last right of withdrawal remains the most important 
part of respecting and protecting research participants (Árnason 2004: 45/46). Árnason 
assumes that though different from informed consent, this model remains faithful to its 
original spirit. However, as the above list of the minimum (!) of information provided and 
understood shows, it is not clear how authorization is indeed an adaption to the new 
context rather than merely more linguistically appropriate because openness and 
indeterminacy of research seem less concealed (cf. Beier 2010: 59).  
Timothy Caulfield et al. also suggest a type of authorization model which should help to 
overcome the difficult policy choice of abandoning the prospect of biobank-based genomic 
research versus abandoning informed consent. More concretely than Árnason, they stress 
that a more appropriate model should not only not conflict with the ethical principles and 
rights underlying what so far has been considered legally valid, but to find ways to 
accommodate continuing interests of control in their donation, especially since large-scale 
genetic research has different characteristics than more traditional clinical research. 
Accordingly, we must find ways to take into account these continuing interests (e.g. in 
specific research uses and if commercial use of tissue and data is accepted). This 
authorization model thus anticipates the transformation of informed consent into an 
“ongoing consent process” (Caulfield et al. 2003: 2). After an initial, still largely traditional 
informed consent for the collection of genetic material and health information, a “pre-
authorization” could be instituted through which it is possible to pre-specify uses which 
will or will not be acceptable in the future. Moreover, different levels of choice could be 
offered, including ‘blanket consent’ (ibid.: 3). Clinging to consent in applying a fiction 
precludes not only being really informed, but also the possibility to exercise at least a basic 
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interest in controlling what happens to tissue and data as part of the traditional model 
(Caulfield 2002; Kegley 2004).
27
  
Hofmann concludes that although understanding risks, benefits and circumstances of 
research as part of informed consent can be seriously impeded in biobank research, 
“consent has become an ethical device for making research morally acceptable”, and this 
presumably without any adequate justification. While the concept of an ‘authorization to 
research’ forces us at least to face the challenges of biobank research head-on, the 
insistence on consent suggests legitimacy of research that might actually be contentious as 
concerns its subject and organization and therefore rather mask these challenges (cf. 
Hofmann 2009: 128).  
 
2.1.3.2  Broad, Broader, Open Consent? 
In particular the assumption that the amount and specificity of information are central to 
enable respect for what is taken to be the main justification for the requirement of consent 
– safeguarding individual autonomy – is denied by a number of commentators. They 
advocate what has become known as “broad consent” to biobank research (Clayton 2005; 
Wendler 2006; Hansson 2009, 2010, 2011; Hansson et al. 2006, 2013; Otlowski 2009; 
Sheehan 2011; Stjernschantz Forsberg et al. 2009; 2011; Steinsbekk et al. 2013a). 
At first sight, broad consent means that potential donors could be asked not to participate 
in specific research projects, but to take part in as yet unspecifiable usages of ‘their’ 
biological material. The emphasis here is on the unknowns, while some authors specify 
that the notion of a “broad consent” designates a wide spectrum of providing information 
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 In a later article, Caulfield states explicitly “In the realm of biobanks, autonomy is largely about the 
maintenance of control over something that implicates personal integrity. It implies that the research 
participant should retain a right of control over their genetic and personal information” Caulfield 2007: 223. 
Neither Caulfield not Kegley specify why or in which sense these continuing interests are part of the 
traditional model, but see Chapter 3, infra. 
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on research from rather specific to very generic, sometimes referred to as ‘blanket consent’ 
(Hansson et al. 2006: 268; Broström and Johansson 2011: 240). In the more specified case, 
commentators at times highlight the ethical justifiability of a variety of consent regimes 
according to context.
28
 Others assume more generally or in addition that offering less 
information can be justified by reference to participant expectations and wishes concerning 
their ‘informational involvement’ with a particular biobank and/or the potential practical 
difficulties and costs that e.g. re-contacting and updating participants would cause (Hanson 
et al. 2006; Wendler 2006). 
Indeed, it has been urged that the scope of consent must be broadened to “permit the 
creation of robust biobanks, which will facilitate the type of research needed to reap the 
fruits of genomics” (Clayton 2005: 20), while the “strict interpretation of consent 
requirements is lowering the scientific value of studies, limiting their capacity to provide 
new medical knowledge that would be beneficial for patients” (Hansson 2010: 1172). This, 
in conjunction with the assertion that regulations for patient consent do not allow for 
effective international collaboration in biobank research, leads Hansson to advocate a 
“minimal ethical framework for biobanking” (Hansson 2011). He contends that  
there is no need for a top-down superstructure of detailed rules and guidelines to be imposed on 
biobank researchers. […] Taking into consideration the low risks for sample donors associated 
with biobank research, something most participants in the discussion seem to agree on, the 
current efforts to create long and complex lists of “principles” and “best practices” looks like 
trying to kill a mosquito with a baseball bat.        
(Hansson 2011: 40)  
In this perspective, although there are some risks involved in taking part in biobank 
research, these are all risks that can be handled mainly through adequate information and 
security management, or so it seems. Presupposing that it remains possible to withdraw 
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 Hansson insists that there is a well-established and approved practice to select different information and 
consent procedures for different research protocols and refers to the example of national cancer registries 
which would not require individual consent (Hansson 2009). 
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from research, and an ethics committee approves new directions of research and changes in 
legal or ethical authority in the overall governance framework, Hansson et al. argue that 
forms of broad consent are hence “ethically valid” (Hansson et al. 2006: 266). Against 
criticism of Árnason’s and Caulfield’s type Hansson et al. insist that appropriate 
information as underlying the validity of informed consent is simply information covering 
“all aspects relevant for a person’s choice” (Hansson 2009: 10). The ethical ‘validity’ of 
this appropriateness is explained as to be witnessed by the factual appearance of large-
scale biobanks in several countries.  
It remains unconvincing though that the fact that “it is possible to inform about the 
importance of these research platforms with only general purposes describable” can be 
traded off against presumably perfectly stable and inconspicuous risks and clear benefits 
such that “general information on these studies may be sufficient for the donor of the 
sample to make an informed decision” (Hansson 2009: 10). It may be, but it may also not – 
and in any case a general appropriateness of this thinner concept of informed consent as a 
fait accompli in biobank-research conflates what is the case with what might be morally 
desirable. Beier appropriately designates this as a ‘strategy of evasion’ if not begging the 
question in the face of the particular characteristics of biobank research. In this light, 
Hansson and others take as safe premises exactly what seems particularly doubtful in this 
context: data security, adequate safeguarding of individual rights, and exceptionally low 
risk (Beier 2010: 54, cf. also Caulfield 2007 and Hofmann 2008; 2009). 
Hansson claims, however, that balancing the specificity of consent with risks and scientific 
value and benefit is a matter of an “expanded view of autonomy” necessary for 
epidemiological research. In fact, “acceptance of broad consent and future consent implies 
a greater concern for autonomy than if such consents are prohibited” and generally “less 
  
34 
 
restriction on the types of consent allowed implies increased respect for autonomy” 
(Hansson 2006: 267/268). 
If the requirements of consent are too strict so that they might not be realized in practice 
this might lead to an inhibition or even stop of research projects (cf. Hansson et al. 2006). 
Ethics review should ensure that their work is not turned into a contradiction in terms in 
the sense that patients and research participants could be harmed by not having the 
possibility to do their part for the advancement of these projects. Asking for consent then 
“undermines the possibility of participating in the development of medical science, and if 
this is one interest at stake the participant is more likely to experience a lack of respect 
from being asked” (Hansson 2010: 1173). 
Although a certain amount of ‘balancing’ might be unavoidable in transferring the 
traditional concept of consent to the newer, larger-scale, and in particular genomic research 
contexts, it should be stressed that Hansson is simultaneously advocating a much stronger 
reform of the consent regime. He and other authors are implicitly redefining participant 
interests in autonomy as interests primarily, uncontroversially and/or rationally to be 
expected interests in the advancement of science (cf. also Hansson et al. 2006: 267; 
Helgesson et al. 2007: 974). This line of thought eventually yields – at least as part of the 
rhetoric – the unethicalness of even asking for consent tout court, a result of a rather 
different magnitude than the mere balancing of individual with scientific and public 
interests. Hansson’s position derives from the conviction that there is actually nothing 
significantly new or challenging in biobank research as an endeavour of public health, and 
therefore the concept of informed consent can be stretched quite far or even abandoned.  
The most extreme form of consent – if this term still applies – that has been proposed in 
reaction to the impracticalities and data insecurity in biobanks is “open consent”. 
Defenders of this kind of reconceptualization start from the premise that confidentiality 
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and the right to privacy are key to the question which forms of consent to research are 
ethically acceptable. The main point then is that since there simply can be no promise of 
anonymity, confidentiality or ‘privacy’ in the emerging research contexts anymore, radical 
openness towards participants about this circumstance is the appropriate answer. This 
implies that the common emphasis on autonomy is qualified as being primarily a matter of 
‘veracity’. Similar to Hansson and colleagues, the more or less implicit justification of 
potentially curtailing the protection of individual rights is an appeal to everybody’s interest 
in the benefits of genomic research (Lunshof et al. 2008; Lunshof, Chadwick and Church 
2008). 
Another indirect way of relaxing the protection of individual rights including privacy and 
eschewing a substantially informed consent is Arthur Caplan’s support of the proposal (by 
the US Office for Human Research Protection in 2004) to enlarge the definition of “non-
identifiability” of specimens or information: In Caplan’s words, this would mean 
essentially that “if researchers are required to hand all data to trusted third parties that, 
following international standards, can encrypt, anonymize, and link them, then biobanking 
can be put on a firm, universal, and practical ethical foundation. Researchers must agree 
that they will not have access to the codes used to anonymize data. Third party 
organizations can maintain identifiable links to specific persons. But researchers 
themselves will only receive coded, anonymized information unless the trusted third party 
entity agrees that there is a reason so powerful as to break the code (i.e., discovery of a 
drug that can benefit those with a certain genotype)” (Caplan 2009: 30/31; cf. Elger and 
Biller-Andorno 2011). Overall then, 
This proposal provides a way to protect those in biobanks without creating the illusion that 
consent can do so. […] This is because there is no way harm or wrong can be done to 
individuals. It is of course still necessary to obtain general consent in order to gain access to 
tissues or DNA samples simply to respect each person’s right to privacy but if the information 
garnered from the acquisition of biological materials will remain unidentifiable to those doing 
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the biobanking research then no further consent ought be required since there is no prospect of 
harming someone by the release, intentional or inadvertent, of sensitive medical information 
about them.  
                                                                                                    (Caplan 2009: 30) 
 
In line with the title of his contribution, Caplan simply assumes “what no one knows 
cannot hurt you.” The final result is similar to Hansson’s and Lunshof et al.’s 
argumentation: “ If high standards of anonymization can be created and strictly enforced in 
the biobanking community then the need to invoke informed consent for either 
retrospective or prospective biobanking can be eliminated” (Caplan 2009: 30; cf. 
Stjernschantz Forsberg et al. 2013).
29
  
Alternative consent models of this type remain, however, contentious. Even though some 
commentators have been asserting confidently that there is a consensus emerging and 
recommendable (Knoppers 2005a; Hansson 2009; Cambon-Thomsen et al. 2007) on the 
need for broader forms of consent, others remain skeptical (Maschke 2006; Casado da 
Rocha and Seoane 2008; Caulfield and Kaye 2009; Hofmann 2009; Widdows and Cordell 
2011a). 
In the traditional legal and governance framework of research ethics that forms the 
conceptual backbone of the discussion of consent also for biobanks, circumventing specific 
informed consent is accepted under certain conditions, but this does not imply that 
alternative consent such as ‘broad’, ‘open’ or ‘collective’ are legally recognized (cf. 
Hansson 2006: 267; Sándor et al. 2012),
30
 certainly not for biobank governance as a still 
emerging new field of application. As yet, as Sándor et al. point out, a general moral 
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 Surprisingly, in an earlier article co-authored with Bernice Elger, the enlargement of the notion of “non-
identifiablity” is discussed with more precaution, and results as only second-best to adopting a standard 
policy of ‘general’ consent, the right to opt out and IRB approval, also because “one might question the sense 
of a solution whose main goal is to escape existing regulations so that most biobank research can take place 
without further surveillance” Elger and Caplan 2006: 665. 
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 An exception is the Estonian Human Genes Research Act. 
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acceptability of broader consent and the legal compatibility with the old framework should 
be “considered more as the researchers’ wishes projected into the realm of ethics” (Sándor 
et al. 2012: 349).  
 
2.1.3.3  Recovering the Foundations 
Karlsen et al. 2011 note that remarkably little has been achieved conceptually in a two 
decades spanning debate that produced “a mudslide of research papers, policies, and 
guidelines” (572) which advocate consent models seemingly based on diametrically 
opposed underlying moral concerns vis-à-vis the interests of individual and societal 
interests in biobank research. Commentators overall seem to accept a continuity of biobank 
issues with medical research and the transplantation medicine model. A neglect to ground 
the debate in the complex scientific and societal advances that make genomics possible, 
and the reordering of the normative order for individuals, institutions and societies 
supports a curious conflation of contexts. In combination with a rhetoric of autonomous 
choice of technological progress, it has been suggested rather emphatically that biobank 
research exemplifies a new age of public health in the common interest, the final chance to 
overcome the age of medical paternalism:  
 
Could it be that we are finally moving away from the privatization of the sample, from persons 
as owners of the “property” of every cell, to citizens participating for public health, for the 
public good with no immediate personal benefit? Or, will paternalistic ethics committees 
“protect” participants from consenting “broadly?” Isn’t such consent with authorization for 
future unknown uses an expression of their personal values and autonomy; that is, improved 
research outcomes? 
         (Knoppers 2005a: 12) 
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Here, I will argue that this is part of a likewise paternalistic tendency deriving from an 
insufficient appreciation of the larger scientific and social project that biobanking 
expresses. Moreover, concerning the conceptual and normative debate, there is relatively 
sparse attention to the clarification and redefinition of potential harms, risks and benefits 
which would be commensurate to the long-term orientation of the relevant research 
projects and infrastructures.  
In a nutshell, and contra Knoppers, initially it might therefore equally seem that “the 
interests of research biobank donors tend to be debated as if they were identical to the 
interests of research subjects and patients in a medical context” and thus that 
the fundamental interests of so-called donors are too readily being defined for them in order to 
facilitate scientific and technological progress, often by bioethicists and legal experts kept on a 
leash by their own fantasies of biomedical utopia. 
                                                       (Karlsen et al. 2011: 572/573)
31
 
While there is a spectrum of risk perception and assessment (Hofmann 2008; Trinidad et 
al. 2011)
32
 also the more precautionary commentators tend to remain within a conceptual 
horizon in which informed consent is not only the keystone of ethical approval, but also the 
exclusive centre of normative gravity. On this background though, the graver distortions 
are caused by linking consent to some direct way of respecting, protecting or enhancing 
“autonomy”. 
Indeed consent has come to dominate contemporary debates with respect to the donation of 
human material, albeit without any shared or unifying vision what would constitute 
‘consent’, and the respective interests it is designed to protect (cf. Høyer 2008). 
In the field of research on human beings and human tissue more generally, this can 
probably be explained by the fact that consent was established as a reaction to the 
                                                          
31
 Cf. Hofmann 2004. 
32
 For some problems of conceptualizing and assessing risk in this context cf. Hoppe 2011. 
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instrumentalization of persons and their bodily material for research purposes, and 
incidents of the kind continue to appear and sometimes stir public controversy.
33
 Not 
asking then remains the crucial disrespect, but the specific content and function of consent 
and the role of information still have to be elucidated for biobank research.  
On the one hand, authors focus on the protective function of consent and advocate 
precaution, also with reference to historical precedence:  
biobanks depend on scores of individual donors who are generally unlikely to be direct 
beneficiaries of the commons created. In light of the commercial and research interests 
involved and the fact that laudable objectives for biobanking may be twisted into 
rationalizations for questionable practices, donor participants in biobanking must be protected. 
This need to protect is underscored in an era where an individual sample will generate 
voluminous information – surely more than we can appreciate presently. As is true with 
biomedical research in general, where the potential collective gains are treatments and perhaps 
even cures for now fatal and otherwise life-debilitating diseases, there is immense temptation to 
sacrifice individuals to achieve them. History cautions that this temptation must be checked 
through the enforcement of reliable safeguards to protect human subjects.  
(Malinowski 2005: 59) 
 
On the other hand, traditional informed consent as default plus assumption of beneficial 
use (Gillett 2007)
34
 leads to a more or less implicit undermining of the moral foundations 
of informed consent. Defenders of the hypothesis of a priority of research are then lead to 
rhetoric moves of the following kind:  
(1) How much can the ethical and legal requirement of informed consent be expanded and 
strengthened before the socially beneficial research done by geneticists, pathologists, 
epidemiologists, and other investigators is seriously impeded?  
 
(Weir and Olick 2004: 49/50, emphasis in original) 
                                                          
33
 Cf. for instance the recent upheaval concerning the publication of the HeLa cell line genome (Hudson and 
Collins 2013). 
34
 Gillett explicitly states that respecting donor rights seems to impede research. We should move to a 
presumed consent system, justified by what he calls the ‘common clinical endeavor’ - argument involving the 
immorality of disallowing one’s tissue to be used, and a ‘presumption for beneficial use’- argument. Cf. also 
infra 3.2.6.  
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Many bioethical commentators, suspicious of the idea of stretching concepts to cover new 
contexts, have then asked:  
(2) Can broad consent be informed consent?  
As I will argue below, they focus on the abstract conceptual features of informed consent 
rather than the potential dis-analogies of context. The next step might be the question  
(3) What is the relation between the general concepts of ‘informed consent’ and the 
value of autonomy?  
Both are obviously perceived as central in research ethics across fields of application and 
as an underlying justification for the requirement of consent. Eventually, following this 
reconstruction of the debate, one might ask:  
(4) What does this mean more concretely for the context of biobanks (given we can 
abstract?) 
An analysis of the debate, however, suggests there was rather an implicit assumption that 
consent quite generally, if it does not promote “autonomy”, is nonetheless somehow ‘in 
accordance’ with it. Broström and Johansson, for example, enlarge the perspective by 
asking “whether so called broad consent, where the individual authorizes research usages 
that are specified only in rather broad terms, may morally legitimize the relevant research.” 
Their analysis results still in only negative assessments, presumably caused by the 
assumption of a continuity with an older model and its moral power which leads to the 
previous impasse: “And if it can, will it be able to legitimize research in the same way, and 
to the same extent, as traditional informed consent?” (Broström and Johansson 2011: 
237/238). 
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The debate, in brief, is in an impasse, oscillating between informed consent as the ultimate 
means of protecting and legitimizing participants’ and societies’ moral rights and interests 
and hence the relative dispensability of consent (and other safeguards?) in the interest of 
general societal benefits. 
In what follows, I first recapitulate some answers that have been given to question (2). 
Answering this pivotal question in the affirmative opens the possibility of acknowledging a 
wider spectrum of consent as prima facie legitimate. I do not wish to deny this as a general 
idea – on the contrary, it is important to be clear about why this must the case in abstracto. 
The reconstruction requires to shed some light on the epistemological and morally relevant 
relation between consenting, the value of autonomy and the role of provision and 
understanding of information (question (3)). Secondly, and more importantly in terms of 
the larger picture of governance, where should we move from there in a more 
contextualized ethical perspective? (question (4)). ‘Anything goes’, after all, does not seem 
to be the solution for the disrupted field of biobank ethics and governance. This will lead 
us back to reflect on the overall importance of the concept of autonomy and the primacy of 
consent.  
Mark Sheehan, in preparing to answer his initial question if broad consent can be informed 
consent, defines ‘broad consent’ as “giving permission for someone else, usually in the 
form of the governing body of the biobank, to decide how to use that sample or data” in 
future research (Sheehan 2011: 227). This covers consent to a general framework of 
governance, including potentially some specific institutional values, and to a general 
research programme or research goals. According to Sheehan, deciding to consent broadly 
to participate in biobank research is perfectly analogous to many other situations in life 
where we autonomously refrain from making particular choices with ‘full’ information 
about the consequences, delegate decisions or even accept that a choice might lead to 
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future restrictions of ‘liberty’. Examples of these situations reach from deciding for a dish 
in a restaurant, delegating the choice to someone else, or deciding to give up some 
autonomy for a long-term commitment such as marrying or deciding to buy a house. If 
these cases are all encompassed by broad consent, then they also all do seem to raise quite 
different scenarios, with different implications in comparison with consenting to research 
participation.  
The first case is the most straightforward one, indeed its epistemic conditions seem to be 
universal: in any given context of choice, if a certain piece of information is available, it 
will be either relevant for me and a potential autonomous choice (that is, it must then be 
integrated with further requirements of autonomous choice, my values and convictions 
etc.); or else it is irrelevant, and will not change anything concerning my choice. Thus, 
having more information is always in a loose sense better than less, but nothing more can 
be said in general terms about how consent relates to autonomy without adding contextual 
considerations. Specific information, in other words, must not be ‘operative’ in the 
justification or motivation for what conceptually and intuitively qualifies as ‘informed 
consent’ (cf. Cohen 2011). 
This simple observation is in line with Sheehan’s prima facie conclusion from his 
assumption of analogous situations of choice in everyday life and research participation:  
On the face of it then, there is nothing in the justification of the requirement to obtain informed 
consent that implies that the nature of the choice must be limited or restricted. There is certainly 
nothing that requires only specific consent – indeed, the idea that it could require such a thing 
looks unintelligible.  
(Sheehan 2011: 229) 
In fact, apart from the epistemic puzzle, i.e. – what would be truly informed consent – the 
limits of the paradigm of providing information as the primary enabling condition for 
respecting or even enhancing the consenting person’s autonomy have been critically 
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discussed in various real-world medicine and research contexts for some time (e.g. O’Neill 
2003; Corrigan 2003; Manson and O’Neill 2007; Felt et al. 2009). 
Ulrik Kihlbom, for instance, argues that in many medical contexts, we should actually 
more correctly speak of a “negatively informed consent”, and that this is also absolutely 
compatible – or even better – as concerns respect for autonomy (Kihlbom 2008). 
According to Kihlbom, in the traditional model advocated by Beauchamp and Childress, 
the requirement of informed consent as being in line with the exercise of respect for 
autonomy means that a patient is entertaining “positive belief in the methods, means and 
risks concerned, and that they concern what the, for example, methods amount to.” 
Accordingly, an informed consent has been given when the patient: 
a. is competent, and 
b. has the capability of understanding the information 
c. has received information of: 
1. purpose of the treatment 
2. period of time 
3. methods and means 
4. all the significant difficulties and risks that are likely to occur 
5. that the treatment is voluntary 
6. that the consent can be withdrawn at any time, and 
d. on the basis of this information gives his/her voluntary and explicit consent to undergo the 
treatment.         
(Kihlbom 2008: 147) 
Kihlbom believes that there is a general overemphasis on positive beliefs in the medical 
context, and that to exercise autonomy it is not necessary to “to know how your ends are 
realized, given that you have good grounds to believe that they will be realized. You might, 
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instead, have a number of well-founded negative beliefs, beliefs about what will not 
happen to you. The corresponding negatively informed consent has been given when the 
following conditions are fulfilled:  
the patient: 
a. is competent, and 
b. has the capability of understanding the information 
c. has received information of: 
1. Purpose of the treatment 
2. That it is possible to receive more information if wanted 
3. That the treatment is voluntary 
4. That the consent can be withdrawn at any time 
 
d. has well founded beliefs that the physician will choose the treatment that best promote 
his/her values 
e. has well founded beliefs that the physician will choose the treatment, the risks of which are in 
accordance with his/her attitudes towards different kinds of risks. 
f. on the basis of this gives his/her voluntary and explicit consent to undergo the treatment and 
express his/her voluntary and explicit wish not to have more information.  
         (Kihlbom 2008: 147) 
 
Instead of having been provided with knowledge and the possibility of understanding of all 
the likely risks and difficulties, there are the new conditions (d)-(f). If this is true and can 
be applied to research, we can see that a certain ‘broadening’ of consent, as it has been 
proposed for biobanks, is acceptable only when there are also adequate relationships that 
enable confidence in delegating decision-making (d). Interestingly, reformulating condition 
(e), we might notice some limitations in stretching the analogy between medical context 
and large-scale research too far: researchers will not choose research that is in accordance 
with his/her attitudes towards different kinds of risk, rather, the whole spectrum of 
different risks larger study populations might have and might develop as research goes on 
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is a limiting condition of the research undertaken. As Caulfield formulates: “We ought to 
use a research participant-centered approach to determine what counts as minimal risk in 
this context […] The question is not whether a REB35 or a researcher believes that biobank 
and cohort research is minimal risk, but whether a research participant is likely to see it 
that way” (Caulfield and Weijer 2009: 55). 
What I try to suggest here goes beyond that in that it is not only desirable – a favor, so to 
say – to empathize with participants and their differing risk perception, but a matter of 
respecting their right to a comprehensive idea of personal integrity. This means that 
although it can be useful to assess people’s attitudes and concerns about genomic research 
of this kind, the results cannot justify relaxing the legal and moral standards of research 
protection rights – unless, and as I will suggest in later parts, everybody involved and that 
will be affected have decided this as an expression of their common will. Moreover, a 
positive commitment to public rather than individual and private interests– in conjunction 
with the negative commitment not to jeopardize individual rights – seems to entail that 
research decisions must be derived from a much broader basis of stakeholders and a 
representation of their interests.  
Going back to Sheehan’s analogy, the second case – the delegation of decision-making – 
given that there are some risks, minimally requires that my fundamental interests will be 
represented by somebody I can trust. However, the acceptance of ‘broader consent’ or 
some form of ‘negatively informed consent’, as Kihlbom’s considerations show clearly, 
require additional circumstances to be in place, namely a “substantive patient-doctor 
relationship of confidence or trust” (Kihlbom 2008: 148/149). In addition, and as the 
author anticipates, negatively informed consent should not be misused as an easy way to 
withhold information. This objection is rejected on the grounds that the point is not a 
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 REB= Research Ethics Board. 
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concealment of information. Instead, all the relevant information must be there if wanted. 
As I have emphasized, this is another kind of limiting condition in the application to 
future-oriented research that is made possible by long-term storage of human biomaterials 
and related information. Equally, the ethical acceptability of condition (f) – withdrawal – 
in Kihlbom’s scheme hinges on the de facto availability of information.  
Generally, we can conclude that the epistemic problems in combination with the fact that a 
relationship of trust and confidence between participant and researcher cannot be taken for 
granted as the norm can undermine the ethical acceptability of at least some forms of 
broader consent. We should instead, such as in a Rawlsian ‘original position’,36 expect 
reasonable disagreements about risks, harms and the benefits we envision. Yet, insofar the 
process of consent remains to be applied on an individual level by definition, reconsidering 
the potentially changing normative role of respecting autonomy in this new context is an 
additional step. ‘Respect for autonomy’, given an analogy with the clinical context, is 
threatened or potentially undermined, and cannot be traded off with other competing 
interests unless we abandon the framework of informed consent.  
Nonetheless it seems intuitively clear that for the most part, an appeal to a more 
substantive account of autonomous agency in e.g. Kihlbom’s or Caulfield’s sense will play 
less of a role in participating in larger-scale research projects, or at least its content will 
probably be contentious. Is an experiment done using my donation of tissue and DNA 
years afterwards in the relevant sense part of an ‘aspect of my life’ or ‘has anchoring in the 
person?’ (cf. Law 2011: 264). But this is relevantly different from undermining the content 
of consent implicitly by trading off the provision and/ or availability of information with 
                                                          
36
 In the Rawlsian scenario, an agreement about the essential interests of free and equal citizens in a fair 
society must be reached by individual parties behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, in which every individual is 
unaware of their social position, endorsement of a religious, philosophical or moral doctrine, and information 
such as race, gender and natural endowments. Cf. Rawls 1993. 
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even a minimalistic and generic notion of respect for autonomy, and autonomy with risks 
as if they could be measured and compared in neutral, non-question-begging ways. 
Let us consider again the last case Sheehan discusses as part of his analogy. While I might 
autonomously decide to buy a house, which will restrict my freedom of movement, the 
analogy to biobanking, given that there is a risk of violating the right to privacy and other 
important interests, shows that the analogy is dangerously flawed. Broad consent then 
seems to cover open consent, and the envisioned acceptable forms of consent are at least 
on the verge of a contradiction in terms: should it be possible to consent to a possible 
violation of my fundamental interests and rights if respect for and protection of my 
fundamental interests is made contingent on the possibility and willingness of maintaining 
confidentiality? 
Although lack of information is endemic to situations of choice, we simply cannot 
conclude from a generic situation of not being perfectly informed or not being omniscient 
when making decisions that a very wide range of broad consent will be acceptable in the 
context of biobank research. In the case of marriage, the idea of consent presupposes that 
the terms and conditions are reasonably clear, in particular what would violate my 
fundamental interests in sustaining the overall endeavour, and the ensuing consequences. A 
case of known adultery will in various cultures be considered to at least lead to a necessary 
re-negotiation (cf. Steinsbekk and Solberg 2011: 238).  
The case of research with tissues tied to sensitive data, however, and unforeseen research 
developments, is different: It will be rather unclear and maybe impossible under these 
conditions to determine and anticipate what would violate participants’ interests, with very 
different interests and sensitivities. The concept of informed consent makes only sense 
with reference to a reasonable amount of information – subject to context – which will 
enable all the consenting parties to make informed decisions in line with their potentially 
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wide scope of reasonable interests. The contextual factors render the determination of 
reasonableness not only a matter of two or few people involved, and therefore, of their 
individual autonomy, but a matter of hundreds or thousands of people, and even future 
persons. For all these reasons, it is important to stress that 
o generally, how consenting to any interaction relates to individual autonomy is 
strongly dependent on the relevant definition of autonomy and the context 
o the requirement of informed consent, as conceived for the context of medical 
interventions with bodily risk in a situation of general epistemological confidence 
and/ or a trustworthy relationship between an individual patient and the medical 
expert, can only be applied in the research context with careful attention to the 
differences from the medical model; and, insofar individual autonomy is still of 
special relevance, to the conditions that are key to respecting it.  
 
We should thus be careful to promote uncritically the idea that a general concept of 
autonomy can be considered justificatory for informed consent and also the main ethical 
reference in the context of research biobanks. The ethical demands that flow directly from 
respect for ‘consensus autonomy’ (that is, neglecting the contestedness of the concept and 
contextual conditions) are limited, though not negligible: providing participants with a 
reasonable amount of information, and not coercing them into donation/ participation.  
A more substantive invocation of autonomy in the sense of self-determination in 
biobanking is not straightforward, except for turning the reference to autonomy into a 
dubious justification for broadening or rather ‘diluting’ consent requirements while 
narrowing down participant interests (cf. Steinmann 2009b; Karlsen et al. 2011).  
As Iain Law makes clear, this ‘weakness of autonomy’ should not be as surprising and 
worrying as the debate in relation to biobanks suggests, because there are other ways apart 
from disrespecting ‘autonomy’ in which we might not live up to treating the people 
involved well and rightfully. Not respecting autonomy is not, at least not in any obvious 
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way, the only true form of all wrongdoing, in biobanking or elsewhere. If, for instance, the 
development of a genetic test based on donated genetic material reveals that a certain part 
of the donor population has an increased disease risk or risk to be affected by a particular 
medical condition, the putative duty to inform is not necessarily based on respect for 
autonomy if this was not part of the initial agreement, but could be based on a duty of 
avoiding harm or perhaps even a duty of gratitude (Law 2011: 267). 
Which other concepts are of ethical importance then? Sheehan argues that the relevant 
ultimate justification for consent in the research context is not the protection from harm, 
rather, “informed consent most clearly functions precisely to enable individual participants 
to choose to take on certain risks for the sake of the possible benefits and according to their 
own plan of the course of their lives. Thus in research, the requirement to obtain informed 
consent is not primarily justified by the need for protection from harm or risk of harm, but 
by the requirement that we respect autonomy” (Sheehan 2011: 228). If we would really be 
concerned about harm, Sheehan maintains, we often would not ask people about their 
preferences precisely because their behavior, in particular their health-related behavior 
(diet, smoking, alcohol consumption, etc.), is often harmful. 
These considerations, as I have tried to outline, are misleadingly reductionist, because they 
presuppose an analogy to general decision-making and/ or medical context individual 
decision-making in the interest of a substantive form of ‘autonomy’ which is dubious 
because unacknowledged and secondly suggests that there is some kind of trade-off 
between protection from harm (and thus, the safeguarding of fundamental rights and 
interests) and an empowerment of patients or research participants through this medical-
context ‘respect for autonomy’. Asking for consent also in biobanking would then tend to 
be either paternalistic or else lead to a kind of automatic empowerment through free 
choice.  
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Although it seems correct to assert that consent functions in the research context as a 
signifier of potentially free choice, this says little about the relevant moral justification in 
this context, and less about a function that one might deem ethically satisfactory. There is 
indeed a danger that this reference to ‘autonomy’ becomes instead assimilated only to an 
undefined ‘free’ choice, and – in case very little information is available and required for 
acceptable consent – to the technical possibility and willingness of researchers or managers 
of the institution to safeguard privacy and perhaps other participant interests.
37
 This 
condition is only exacerbated by the fact that research is reaching out into the future. A 
narrow concern with free choice (or else ‘respect for autonomy’ uncritically adapted from 
the medical context) is also evident in the definition of consenting as ‘giving permission of 
use to somebody else’, which does not take into account the possibility of continuing 
autonomous agency that we can reasonably expect at least some people will value. 
A more plausible primary justification for the requirement of a reasonably informed 
consent in this broader, social and dynamic context of research seems to be the following. 
Asking for consent is neither only a direct protection from harm nor respect for various 
forms of decision-making or substantive autonomy, but a general commitment to respect 
not only the bodily, but rather the (sphere of) personal or moral integrity of the individuals 
who are participating.
38
 Only then, the requirement to ask for consent can enable and 
protect choice, including different varieties of ‘informed’ or ‘autonomous’ choice (cf. 
Wilson 2007). 
                                                          
37
 As Árnason pointed out in a critical discussion of the Icelandic database project, coding samples and 
asking for consent cancel each other out, leading to what seems indeed a contradiction in terms: Presumed 
consent. The mistake is the assumption that coding and consent can be traded off: “technical secrecy must not 
be confused with, and hence cannot replace, the requirement of consent. While technical secrecy protects 
important interests of individuals, obtaining consent shows respect for their moral status” Árnason 2004: 37. 
38
 I am not attempting here to outline an ultimate justification for the requirement of informed consent or 
indeed the moral primacy of the value of integrity/ dignity, which might well require referring back to 
(Kantian) autonomy, cf. e.g. Kristinsson 2007. 
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We can make this point clearer by referring back to the way in which the traditional 
account of informed consent and the standard reference to its justification of respect for 
autonomy in Beauchamp’s and Childress’ sense continues, and in which way the genomic 
research perspective might have to reach beyond it. Interestingly, concentrating only on 
autonomy as a moral reference for biobanking can lead to radically opposed outcomes if 
we draw some attention to the sources of the Beauchampian model, Kantian and Millian 
ethics.  
For a Kantian, the moral duty to act autonomously is based on the potential for rational 
agency residing within every human being. A truly autonomous action is one which can be 
equally accepted by every rational being. If the only reason for asking consent were respect 
for Kantian autonomy, then the requirement to obtain an actual, well-informed consent 
hinges on the condition of the de facto rationality of the consenting party. Therefore, in 
theory, if it could be shown that people’s decisions are irrational, we might be justified in 
replacing standard consent with some relaxed form of hypothetical or presumed consent 
(Häyry and Takala 2007: 24; 26/27; cf. Häyry 2005: 646). While for a Kantian, autonomy 
is primarily the metaphysical aim of all human endeavour and therefore remains abstract 
(cf. Gracia 2012), applications of the Kantian notion are not atomistic or excessively 
individualistic as they would seem to presuppose agreement of the relevant standards. 
Even Hansson, who insists in a series of articles on the practical necessity and ethical 
justifiability of broad consent, has stressed the important social dimension of Kantian 
autonomy for the ethics of biobanks:  
Respect for people’s autonomy entails […] a respect for their capacity to participate in the 
formulation of the moral principles that every human being would wish to endorse. Making 
autonomous decisions […] thus involves taking into account of the well-being of others through 
a judgment of how one’s own decisions affect other people’s ability to act in a morally 
responsible way and to attain their own goals […] with the implication that the working out of 
legal protections for self-determination and privacy in association with biobank research must 
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simultaneously do justice to both the research subject’s independence and to this individuals’ 
dependence on others for fulfilling mutual interests such as new biomedical knowledge and 
new treatment opportunities. As a consequence, several information and consent procedures 
may be available, which all are legitimate. […] From the perspective of the Kantian view on 
moral autonomy where the individual is called upon to take also other individual’s interests into 
consideration (for example, future members of society), it may be sufficient if there is a 
democratic instrument available that ensures the individual citizen insight into how the biobank 
is organised and that principles for balancing of interests at the ethical review boards take all 
relevant interests into account. 
(Hansson 2009: 9) 
As will be argued in more detail below, these latter reflections are indeed key – rather than 
“sufficient” – to what should be concluded from rethinking the invocation of autonomy for 
an ‘ethical’ governance of large-scale biobanks. The conceptual and practical 
consequences of this, however, have not been unpacked in the bioethical debate. There is 
instead a significant tendency to interpret autonomy one-sidedly and without closer 
scrutiny for the pursuit of general social goals of ‘public health benefit’, and also Hansson, 
in my view, relies too much on technological and social ‘self-organization’ in this respect. 
Moreover, the Kantian potential to autonomous action crucially confers to subjects the 
status of ‘end in themselves’ that appears in the ethical debate as dignity and, less often, as 
(moral) integrity. The intertwinement of autonomy and dignity, which will resurface in the 
discussion concerning ownership of human tissue, might then not give rise to action-
guiding prescriptions and still be of non-negligible ethical importance.  
In a Millian perspective, the actual, uncoerced individual consent of people who give their 
tissue and genetic information to a biobank would be of overarching relevance. The stress 
here is more on de facto freedom of choice rather than on a metaphysical or actual and 
substantive realization of autonomy through rational action. Individuals must nonetheless 
be free to exercise ‘autonomy’ under the condition that innocent third parties do not suffer 
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any harm – the famous harm principle (Mill 2009). Consequently, the Millian choice must 
not necessarily be accepted by anybody else (cf. Häyry and Takala 2007: 24; 26/27). 
 
2.1.3.4  The Frailty of Autonomy 
The difference between these approaches is that while Millian-inspired autonomy-as-
liberty is concerned with the negative but concrete function of defense against unconsented 
intrusion into the private sphere, Kantian-inspired autonomy has a positive and double 
moral function: It concerns both the proximal potential for individual rational agency as 
well as the distal aim of implementing self-determination as abiding by the metaphysical 
construct of the moral law. 
We can now appreciate better why Sheehan, for example, encourages a liberist 
overinterpretation of ‘autonomy’39 while simultaneously downplaying the strict non-
negotiability of individual, in particular minority interests in the face of external authority 
that Mill stresses. In contrast, I am trying to show here that according to the underlying 
justification and rationale of consent in the tradition of human rights, autonomy and liberty 
are mutually reinforcing. We should not expect that people will want to take risks in some 
‘common’ or ‘public’ interest in line with their ‘autonomy’ (“informed consent most 
clearly functions precisely to enable individual participants to choose to take on certain 
risks for the sake of the possible benefits and according to their own plan of the course of 
their lives”), we must instead as default respect their will, however risk-averse, morally 
sensitive for various personal or cultural reasons and ignorant to vague ‘possible benefits’ 
he or she may be (cf. Steinmann 2009b: 288; Rehbock 2011: 526). 
                                                          
39
 In a related vein, Hofmann – in reply to Helgesson – criticizes the latters’ “fallacy of confusing autonomy 
and liberty” (Hofmann 2008: 979). 
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I consequently suggest that actually the Millian consideration has a certain 
(‘phenomenological’, not necessarily moral, recalling the importance of both aspects) 
primacy in biobanking in comparison to a less directly social and political decision-making 
context affecting an individual or a small number of individuals. Also, a general reference 
to autonomy based on, for example, invoking the Beauchampian ‘central dogma of 
bioethics’ does not provide for more specific direction concerning the scope of consent, or 
other relevant ethical ‘tools.’ In any case though, an overemphasis on autonomy in that 
model could be tempered by balancing with the other principles of beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice. 
Overall, this reexamined reference to autonomy considers it a higher-level, and yet not 
secondary moral category in relation to respecting the integrity and dignity of research 
participants. We have, with the latter, identified a limiting condition of research uses by 
which one can avoid the temptation of a ‘trade-off’ between information provision and 
risk-benefit assessment deriving from the idea that autonomous choice is often less than 
‘perfectly’ informed. While this latter informational opacity is indeed the rule rather than 
the exception in a wide spectrum of decision-making contexts, it does not justify 
disregarding or circumventing a baseline of respect in the face of donors’ and research 
participants’ values and aims, i.e. their moral integrity. This is the more basic 
consideration, focusing on ‘negative autonomy’ and liberty in the combined Kantian/ 
Millian model.  
The higher-level and more complex consideration is that even though from this re-instated 
human rights perspective
40
 individual interests and the protection against harm must 
remain crucial, at the same time, the interests of larger entities, from families, new 
biosocial entities such as disease communities, to ethnic and cultural groups, become 
                                                          
40
 Strangely enough, it is seldom explicitly appealed to in the bioethical literature on consent. See, however, 
the more legally and politically informed debate in Andorno 2007; Brownsword 2003, 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 
2013; Harmon 2009, and Meslin and Garba 2011. 
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important in genomic research. Part of respect for participants’ dignity and a pre-condition 
for enacting autonomous agency is attendance to potential moral harms (which we might 
call wrongs) which certain kinds of research, methods or collaborations could inflict on 
research participants (cf. Beskow 2001; Andrews 2005; Eriksson and Helgesson 2005; 
Malinowski 2005; Rothstein 2005; Elger 2010; Sterckx and Van Assche 2011).  
This has been shown compellingly for instance by the case of the Havasupai Indian tribe, 
which concerns the question of the scope of consent for future, and possibly unrelated use 
given initial considerations and possible ethnic discrimination. Researchers of the 
University of Arizona used the Indians’ blood samples and their findings were in disaccord 
with what the tribe had believed to be the main disorder to be studied – diabetes. The 
samples were indeed also used to study schizophrenia and inbreeding, which raised severe 
concern of possible stigmatization.
41
 Nonetheless, moral harm is frequently neglected or 
even downplayed by a majority of commentators, in particular in favor of ‘informational’ 
risks.  
In short: “The potential donor must have the opportunity of ascertaining whether the 
proposed use of the material for research is contrary to her moral values” (Sterckx and Van 
Assche 2011: 255).
42
 Groups can be wronged if ‘used’ for research due to being in a 
position of weakness or limitations in being able to show disapproval and also, as Eriksson 
and Helgesson remind, “when treated unjustly, if they are systematically excluded from the 
benefits of research” (Eriksson and Helgesson 2005: 1073).  
Clearly, the traditional ethical horizon around informed consent instead focuses on 
‘visible’ risks, harms and benefits to identifiable individual research participants. But even 
                                                          
41
 In addition, research uncovered facts concerning the origin of the tribe contradicting their traditional 
ancestral story. Revelations about these unanticipated uses lead to a $50 million law suit, settled partly 
successful for the tribe members in 2010 (Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona 2004; Mello and Wolf 2010; 
Beauchamp 2011). 
42
 Sterckx and Van Assche also propose a coding system allowing for stratified research use, e.g. for 
inclusion/ denial of commercial use (Sterckx and Van Assche 2011).  
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though non-physical, in particular informational harms such as misuse of data and/ or 
psychological and economic harm due to genetic discrimination or stigmatization are 
discussed, however, less so the important larger social consequences this could incur. For 
example, genomic research tends to be organized around perceived susceptibility to 
particular conditions. This can lead to a reinforcement of stereotypes and stigmatization or 
discrimination even when disease risks for a particular individual turn out to be very low 
(cf. Beskow et al. 2001: 2318). While this is a point that concerns genetic and genomic 
research generally, I want to stress how the organization of long-term research resources is 
proceeding without sufficient attention to both individual and group interests. 
Again, we face a large degree of uncertainty and also what could be termed ‘invisibility’ of 
the risks, harms and benefits in biobank research which seem to point beyond relying 
solely or primarily on informed consent. I have argued that rather than trying to unravel 
these challenges towards a more conclusive normative proposal, a significant part of the 
bioethical discussion is more or less directly reducing participant rights and interests via 
reference to ‘autonomy’ to a vague idea of choice for an almost equally vague research 
benefit in the public interest. Before discussing how research participation could include 
also possibilities of the more positive autonomy that should remain at the core of ethical 
research governance, we will have to understand better how the concept and requirement 
of consent interacts with the idea of protecting confidentiality and privacy in healthcare 
and research, and how this relates to the large conceptual domain of potential ownership 
interests and rights in tissue, genetic/ genomic information and research data. Thereafter, I 
will revisit the issue of appeals to public goods and interests as a justification for curtailing 
individual rights and interests. This, in turn, will make it possible to clarify how the 
observable deflation of consent is to be evaluated and might, perhaps, be overcome. 
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2.2 Confidentiality and Privacy 
 
2.2.1 The Peculiarities of ‘Genetic Privacy’ 
As part of the respect for persons protected by the requirement of informed consent, 
information about the research participant or tissue donor is to be kept confidential and 
‘private’ unless the source of the information consents to its divulgence. Via consent, a 
donor or participant should be enabled to choose if he or she wants to accept the risks to 
privacy that might be entailed.  
While in general personal data may be processed for research purposes according to the 
EU Data Protection Directive (if the processing is technically secure and will be limited to 
a specific purpose), the processing of personal health data requires a person’s specific 
consent (Data Protection Directive 1995; Bovenberg 2006). This requirement, however, is 
subject to important qualifications, in that processing for research in the public interest or 
an undue burden on part of the researchers exempt from asking for consent. Nonetheless, if 
consent is required in the standard scenario, one would expect that the data subject is 
provided with sufficient information to understand what kind of data will be passed, to 
whom, as well as the purpose for which data will be processed (cf. Shickle 2006). 
How the application of the various legal and conceptual categories of privacy, 
confidentiality and personal data anonymization and coding applies to biobank research 
with its specific scientific needs is an intricate matter. Though there is large spectrum of 
terminology applied to the various forms of coding and anonymization of data and 
samples, it seems that the existing legal categories do not map the complexity of 
genetic/genomic information, or rather, the demands of confidentiality and privacy as well 
as scientific needs (Bovenberg 2006; Elger and Caplan 2006; Beyleveld 2007; Elger 2010).  
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A DNA sample is always potentially identifying, depending on access to other samples or 
information from other repositories (Lowrance and Collins 2007). In most cases, there will 
be some form of coding or reversible anonymization. This, however, leaves open if the 
data-sample thereby should become ‘personal’ and if the term ‘anonymization’ can still be 
used in a coherent way, i.e. such that it would represent the technical and institutional 
facts, as what is ‘anonymous’ depends on who has legitimate access to a code and/or 
dataset.  
Thus, while there is a strong tradition in most countries of medical confidentiality and the 
more general right to privacy considered an unquestionable achievement of democratic and 
liberal societies,
43
 genetic information – as sample and/or data – still sits rather 
uncomfortably between the traditional categories of confidential information in the small-
scale medical context and the technical possibilities that genomics makes use of in the 
name of public health. Condensed:  
Paradoxically […] it is the development of a public interest in the welfare of individuals that 
has proved to be one of the greatest threats to individual privacy in the last century. […] The 
provision of health care is of primary importance among these; […] Hence, while individual 
interests are given more importance in democratic communities, public interests are, at the 
same time, afforded greater weight.  
                                                                                           (Laurie 2004: 9/10) 
 
The extent to which genetic information indeed should be considered sui generis has been 
discussed extensively. The thesis of a so-called “genetic exceptionalism” has by now lost 
appeal for most commentators, but it would still seem reasonable to insist on the 
                                                          
43
 “ARTICLE 8. Right to respect for private and family life: 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others” (European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms).  
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peculiarity of genetic information due to a number of factors combining genomics and 
technology: From minute samples large quantities of stable, predictive information of 
potentially supra-individualistic relevance can be derived, and the location and uses or 
misuses can be exceptionally hard to pinpoint in digitalized contexts (cf. Manson and 
O’Neill 2007; Casado da Rocha and Seohane 2008; Krajewska 2009). 
In addition, the specifications of the confidentiality and privacy envisioned by traditional 
policy and law are rather vague and notoriously heterogeneous. Graeme Laurie 
summarizes that the traditional duty of medical confidentiality is inapplicable to the 
contemporary health care and research contexts. The duty is “amorphous and ill-defined” 
and “compromised by its twin roles of protecting both the confidential relationship and the 
confidential information which arises from that relationship. Moreover, to the extent that 
the duty of confidentiality is solely concerned with keeping confidential information out of 
the public sphere, it says nothing about the duties that might be owed within the 
confidential relationship towards the subjects of the information so as to ensure, inter alia, 
that the personal interests of these individuals are not treated with a lack of respect by 
unwarranted uses of information with regard to the subjects themselves” (Laurie 2004: 3). 
There is also little agreement on the notion of “privacy” that would allow for 
straightforward guidance in relation to biotechnologies. Laurie distinguishes at least two 
senses of privacy, the more commonsensical idea of ‘spatial privacy’ as a “state of non-
access to the individual’s physical or psychological self” and ‘informational privacy’, as a 
“state in which personal information about an individual is in a state of non-access from 
others” (Laurie 2004: 6). Manson and O’Neill, within their theory of rethinking informed 
consent in bioethics, advocate a diverging interpretation of informational privacy as 
“requirements on communicative transactions, rather than as requirements that certain 
types of information be kept inaccessible” (Manson and O’Neill 2007: x; Chapter 5). 
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Alongside informational privacy and local privacy we might consider a third basic 
category of ‘decisional privacy’ – concerning all ‘private’ actions and decisions e.g. choice 
of lifestyle (Rössler 2001). Since privacy is determined by cultural and social context and 
sensitivity of genomic information is relative, it must be decided within a particular context 
what exactly is of only private interest, which in turn can have implications for the 
specificity of the requirement of consent (cf. Ursin 2010a; 2010b).  
Which forms of ‘confidentiality’ and ‘privacy’ are at stake for a subject participating in a 
biobank project, even disregarding the issue of as how sensitive genetic information should 
be classified? Data protection legislation concerns mainly the technical and institutional 
security of information and therefore prima facie informational privacy. Yet, it is not 
obvious that not also ‘spatial’ or ‘decisional’ privacy are of moral importance in this 
context. While subject to exceptions of public interest or, respectively, public health (e.g. 
in the case of an epidemic), the human right to privacy as applied to healthcare and science 
is much wider than the concept of confidentiality, involving clearly spatial privacy to 
protect the whole of ‘private life’. Undoubtedly then, anonymization and confidentiality 
cannot protect this wider-dimension privacy (cf. Laurie 2004: 243).  
At the same time, the right to privacy remains elusive and under-specified in regard to use 
of samples in biomedical research. This leads to a curious situation in which there is, as 
some authors suggest, somehow both too little and too much ‘privacy’. Despite the fact 
that data protection legislation is very strict, it might not be appropriately equipped to face 
the moral and technical challenges of protecting personal interests in genomics, because it 
merely distinguishes between ‘anonymous’ data and sensitive personal data, so that the 
actual research use in which there is an overlap of sensitive and ‘normal’ data and which 
requires linking and sharing of personal data is not envisaged (cf. Laurie 2004: 296; 
Bovenberg 2006; Sándor et al. 2012; Santosuosso 2013). 
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To overcome the problem of overprotection vs. no or merely ‘formal’ protection, these 
conditions need to be appreciated. Accordingly,  
the systemic post-genomic approach suggests that the reason for protecting subjects donating 
samples for research is not that their DNA is a ‘future diary’, […] but that, in order for samples 
to be meaningful, the data extracted from them must be linked with other sources of 
information. […] the need for ethical safeguards, so that the confidentiality and integrity of this 
information can be respected, remains as high as ever, and so does the concern with social 
stigmatization or discrimination by employers or health-insurance companies […]. 
(Casado da Rocha and Seoane 2008:443) 
 
A more useful concept to connect technical with deontological aspects might be 
“informational self-determination”, which hints to a parallel or overlap between the sphere 
of ‘privacy’ and that of ‘autonomy’ (cf. McLean 2010; Taupitz and Weigel 2012).44  
As a consequence of this overlap, the application of general confidentiality and data 
protection frameworks to govern biobanks to some extent mirrors the one regarding the 
requirement of informed consent. Beneath the surface, even the general concepts are 
strongly contested, and it remains uncertain if the practice of research and the advancement 
of technology is not stretching the concepts to its limits. Again, this is true in terms of the 
potential long-time effects of research participation and the seemingly diminishing role of 
individual rights and interests, as genetic information is not only relevant for an individual 
source. On the other hand, the protection of the private sphere of autonomy of a tissue 
donor or study participant is the indisputable priority according to the human rights-based 
fundamentals of traditional research ethics.  
 
                                                          
44
 Informational self-determination is part of the personality rights protected by the German constitution. 
Ingrid Schneider mentions recent efforts to spell out this concept as a right to ‘bio-informational and bio-
material self-determination’. Cf. Schneider 2008.  
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2.2.2 Exceeding the Private? 
The challenges to accepted wisdom concerning confidentiality and privacy in the evolving 
biobank infrastructures can perhaps best be illustrated by the parallel trend of personal 
genomics companies, genealogical databases and ancestry tracing which have been 
flourishing in the last years. These developments have an impact on trends in research, 
though it is unclear if it will be favorable (cf. Kaye et al. 2010). People are providing 
voluntarily personal information to this services, to an extent that it has been anticipated 
that future healthcare will come to rely on these ‘health information altruists’ (Kohane and 
Altman 2005). 
In both areas – ‘public’ research and direct-to-consumer services – larger and larger 
amounts of fine-grained, digitally stored individual-specific information is generated with 
the costs of sequencing falling and increasing use of whole genome methods (Kaye et al. 
2010; Kaye 2011; 2012; Presidential Commission for Bioethical Issues 2012). These ‘big 
data’ cannot be assumed to remain within narrow areas of use and within national borders, 
which has created concern that privacy governance frameworks will be unable to keep 
pace with the developments of disappearing boundaries in cloud computing and the 
phenomenon of ‘converging technologies’, as parts of the traditional public health 
registries are digitized and linked to biobanks, including emerging platforms of e-health 
which can provide a wealth of potential sources to be mined (Tavani 2004; Majumder 
2005; Mandl and Kohane 2008; Schadt 2012). 
It is also becoming easier to draw conclusions about the origin of de-identified samples, a 
topic that has drawn considerable attention by the public and appeals for action by 
prominent scientists (McGuire and Gibbs 2006; Lowrance and Collins 2007; Homer et al. 
2008; Gymrek et al. 2013; Rodriguez et al. 2013; Bohannon 2013; Brenner 2013). As 
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absolute anonymity is illusory, some commentators have also insisted on the need to think 
about potential misuse of data by people “with scurrilous motives” (O’Brien 2009: 201).  
A related concern that has been observed critically, e.g. in the UK, is the expansion of 
forensic DNA databases (cf. Brownsword 2007b; Campbell 2007; 2009). What would 
happen if research databases were to merge with databases initially established for other 
ends is not a science fiction or merely scholastic scenario, since there have already been 
instances of using data obtained in a research context to convict suspects. For example, in 
the 2003 case of the murder of the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh, a 
research biobank provided the police with information to identify the culprit (Campbell 
2007: 238; Wendel 2007: 115). 
Sharing of data in voluntary form, in any case, is a crucial part of the philosophy of 
Personalised Medicine, and increasingly encouraged by funders. One can speak of an 
emerging norm that data are to be shared to enable data-driven medicine (Kaye et al. 2010; 
Knoppers 2010; Fortin et al. 2011; Friend and Norman 2013; Larson 2013).  
Yet, it remains unclear if and to what extent different kinds of coding, especially in case 
there will be a rise in interoperable and interconnected systems with uses beyond direct-
research or treatment contexts, will prove reliable and can be effectively harmonized 
internationally. It has already been proposed to eliminate the terms “anonymized”, 
“anomymous” and “non-identifiable” altogether in particular from policy documents to 
avoid misleading the public about the viability of these differentiations and the possibilities 
of sustaining perfect anonymity (Schmidt and Callier 2012).  
Governance reactions to these developments in relation to consumer-oriented genomics 
focus on self-management rather than top-down regulation limiting the willingness of 
“health information altruists” to share and which also biobanks might have to rely on (cf. 
Kohane and Altman 2005; Editorial Nature Genetics 2013). As a consequence, the 
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implementation of ‘open data’, it has been claimed, must be coupled to open consent. The 
initial consideration towards this turn is the abandonment of traditional views on 
confidentiality and privacy:  
Transporting the traditional idea of confidentiality into the protocols of large-scale genomics 
research and biobanks, is misleading. The accessibility of data in a databank will become the 
endpoint of a chain of unsustainable promises of privacy and confidentiality that once started 
with the Hippocratic ideal in mind, in a doctor’s office.                                        
 (Lunshof, Chadwick and Church 2008: 2) 
 
The concept and promise of absolute anonymization should be dropped since it cannot be 
guaranteed and also for moral reasons, as it precludes re-contact of research participants 
for potentially significant future personal medical discoveries which might benefit them. 
Consent forms, in view of that, should explain that confidentiality will be sincerely 
attempted but cannot be guaranteed (O’Brien 2009: 205).  
As we have seen, some authors anticipate that this state of affairs has mainly positive 
effects, relying on technical possibilities, the regulation of third party access, as well as the 
belief that dangers of data misuse should not be exaggerated. In this vision, the post-
genomic approach to privacy can, in contrast, help to demystify genes and their supposed 
deterministic relation to the prevalence of common disease (Knoppers 2010; MacLeoad, 
quoted in Ursin 2010a). Changing to open consent would be momentous, but then again it 
seems to be implied in biobank research almost by definition given that it must violate the 
traditional idea in data protection of trying to avoid data accumulation (cf. Data Protection 
Directive 1995).
45
  
Overall, there is an evolving pressure in the ethics and governance fields to reassess the 
pre-eminence which had been accorded to privacy and personal autonomy, in particular as 
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 This principle is also known as “data reduction” or “data minimization”, cf. Beier 2010. 
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smaller and larger-scale genomic research and genetic testing can be assumed to be 
converging to some extent. This has first been articulated in the area of small-scale family 
genetic testing and in relation to emerging ‘duties’ of information sharing and the ensuing 
discussions on the ‘right to know’ vs. the ‘right not to know’. On this background, 
community-oriented or ‘communitarian’ notions challenging individual privacy have first 
been reintroduced (cf. Sommerville and English 1999; Callahan 2003; Laurie 2004).  
The ethical demand – besides the acknowledgement of the both individualistic and supra-
individualistic interests touched upon – seems to be a functional conceptualization of the 
aim of privacy protection in research. While guidelines applied to biobanking make 
reference only to general coding and information policies, bioethicists and legal scholars 
are refocusing their normative accounts. A corollary of the community-orientation applied 
to these issues is the relativization of privacy advocated for example by Helen Nissenbaum 
as ‘contextual integrity’, guided by norms for different areas of life – one of the problems, 
however, seem to be a converging of contexts of use to which data subjects might not have 
the chance to transparently agree on (Nissenbaum 2010). 
There is also a more general renewed attention to the factors sustaining the relationships 
and forms of communication that protect a sphere of privacy rather than the other way 
round, by conceptualizing ‘the private’ as a technically manageable, abstract object 
(Manson and O’Neill 2007; Ursin 2010a). This latter view leads to a thin notion of 
‘privacy’ as mere data protection. In contrast to the enthusiasm of some authors with 
respect to a future of ‘health data altruism’ in a social network style, legal commentary has 
been wary of these developments as they might imply reducing the persons involved to 
‘pure information’ or what might be called ‘data persons’ (cf. Laurie 2004; Tallacchini 
2005; Simon and Robienski 2010; Macilotti 2013). 
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This ‘informational human being’ or in Personalised Medicine perhaps primarily 
‘statistical’ human being is in stark contrast to the respect for persons underlying the 
traditional consent norm, which would seem to entail a form of decisional privacy, or so I 
will argue. Nonetheless, the challenge for research on tissue is how to spell out what might 
be needed for a more substantive version of privacy than what is achievable through 
technical fixes, without leading back to traditional or even stricter forms of consent. The 
latter, as I have suggested, do simply not capture scientific and technological reality, and 
neither are adaptable to individual and supra-individual rights of research participants as 
potential future patients with the need to access genomic information. 
Graeme Laurie’s position – to which we will return in due course – is that a paradigm shift 
might be initiated by exposing the weaknesses of the medical context notions of 
confidentiality and privacy, and strengthen them with aspects of the rights that ownership 
and property confer. This view, however, is not the most obvious route to follow, also 
owing to a strong tradition of altruistic donation of human bodily materials the main tenets 
of which will be introduced in the next section.  
 
 
2.3 Ideals of Altruism and Non-Commercialization  
 
2.3.1 The ‘Gift of Life’ and the Tissue Economy 
The transfer of bodily material in the medical area has traditionally been surrounded by a 
strong normative discourse of gift giving, personal altruism and social solidarity. This is 
most spelled out in the so-called ‘transplantation model’, meaning that in particular solid 
organs should be isolated from any associations with market commercialization, while the 
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voluntary, uncompensated ‘gift’ of an organ to a stranger is valued as a virtuous act (cf. 
Marshall et al. 1996; Tutton 2004). This idea is – in general terms – codified in the law of 
many countries, in that human body parts, as a matter of human rights, shall not be traded, 
and in particular not be sold in their natural form:  
Chapter VII – Prohibition of financial gain and disposal of a part of the human body 
Article 21 – Prohibition of financial gain 
The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain.
 46
 
 
A similar formulation can be found under Chapter 1, relating to the protection of human 
dignity, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: 
 
Article 3 
 
Right to the integrity of the person 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity. 
2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular: 
o the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the procedures 
laid down by law, 
o the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of 
persons, 
o the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial 
gain, 
o the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.
47
 
 
 
 
 
The model of the gift for life and, related to this, altruistic participation in research, is 
inspired by a long tradition of separating the commercial from the morally pure – for 
instance in Christian thought – and has been adhered to in modern healthcare systems, in 
particular the European ones which are largely sustained by public money. This framework 
                                                          
46
 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine [Oviedo Convention]. The second article in this chapter of 
the Convention is dedicated to consent. The interesting conceptual relations between these two articles are 
investigated  in section 3.3.3, infra. 
47
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
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is bound to particular norms and societal expectations, as Steinmann recalls, as “we do not 
give our organs or our blood to just anyone, but only to those in need, and we presuppose 
that those who receive our gift are really those who need it most. Altruism is a moral 
concept that entails a certain obligation we feel towards others” (Steinmann 2009a: 1). 
While an expression of free, uncoerced and virtuous agency, there is an unspoken 
expectation that the well-intentioned gift will be reciprocated with respect, at least as much 
as physical risks are excluded, and the will and wishes of the donors are taken into account 
(cf. Steinmann 2009a).  
A common reference undergirding this discourse that is also brought up commonly in 
relation to the more recent development of burgeoning tissue banks and genomics is 
Richard Titmuss’ influential 1970 study “The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to 
Social Policy”. Titmuss, starting from concerns about the impact of increasing 
‘marketization’ of health care systems, compared different aspects of two blood ‘donation’ 
schemes: the British system, based on voluntariness and altruism, and the US American, 
which involved commercial aspects. His aim was not only a socio-political study, but also 
to draw more general conclusions concerning the concept and function of altruism in 
healthcare as well as the overall societal effects of different ‘donation’ schemes. Both the 
moral and practical implications of a market approach to the provision of blood for 
healthcare purposes are devastating in Titmuss’ analysis. The influence of financial 
compensation and market thinking devalues the altruistic gift, which is also an important 
factor of social cohesion. Moreover, the altruistic system also results as superior in terms 
of blood quality, and under considerations of safety, efficiency, and cost (Titmuss 1997). 
According to a recent discussion by Peter Sýkora, however, it has been shown empirically 
that both a commercial and a non-commercial approach of blood provision can result in 
misadministration, contamination and inefficiency (Sýkora 2009: 21). He also points out 
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that although Titmuss is referred to as the main proponent of an altruistic tissue and 
transplantation system, what he seems to have actually intended is charity, independent 
from the reciprocity of whatever indirect or implicit kind that is attached to gifts and 
donations (Sýkora 2009: 38).
48
  
Notwithstanding these ambivalences, general non-commercialization and pro-altruism 
policies exert a strong appeal in policy and public debate, as witnessed for instance in the 
Nuffield Council report “Human Tissue. Ethical and legal issues” of 1995 and the recent 
Nuffield Council-commissioned report on the concept of solidarity in bioethics (Nuffield 
Council 1995; cf. Indech 2000; Prainsack and Buyx 2011). While defenders of quasi-
unlimited accounts of personal rights of autonomy and liberty have always considered 
these policies on the verge of a paradox if not immoral – in particular as the scarcity of 
donor organs is increasing
49
 – there are clearly strong deontological and consequentialist 
considerations in support of these policies. Besides safeguarding the dignity and autonomy 
of the person, rewards or incentives for tissue donation or research participation were 
generally outlawed in order to ensure that no coercion or pressure was put on the 
volunteers. This could undermine the quality and validity of consent by way of, for 
example, concealment of health risks, a consequence that might disproportionately affect 
poor and disadvantages sections of the population, which in turn could skew the population 
of donors considerably (cf. Schneider 2010: 168/169). 
Evidently though, the last decades have seen an expanding process of market mechanisms 
entering more and more sectors of life (cf. Sandel 2012), and in science and research there 
is a steep increase of corporate forms of research and merging of public university sector 
research and private enterprises (Nelkin and Andrews 1998; Rothstein 2005; Waldby and 
Mitchell 2006). This is particular apparent in the United States, with, however, ‘spill-over’-
                                                          
48
 Indeed reciprocating the ‘gift’ of an organ such as, for example, a kidney, seems impossible to fulfill. Cf. 
Marshall et al. 1996. 
49
 Cf. for example Taylor 2005, who argues for a market in human organs. 
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effects in Europe (Geuna and Nesta 2006). The boom of biotechnology industry from the 
1970s onwards lead to some keystones in policy which enabled and incentivized 
universities to seek commercialization and protection for their research through patents. 
There has been a large extension of entities considered patentable including genetic 
sequences
50
 and even whole organisms since the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty – 
concerning the patent on an engineered micro-organism, leading to the proclamation that 
‘anything under the sun made by man’ is patentable subject matter – decided by the US 
Supreme Court in 1980 and the Bayh-Dole Act of the same year, which allowed patents on 
federally funded research (cf. Malinowski 2005; Sampat 2006; Williams-Jones and 
Ozdemir 2007). As for genomics, the Human Genome Project preceding the establishment 
of systematic biobanking efforts is indeed a case in point, as a public and a private 
enterprise were competing fiercely for the sequencing and patenting of the research 
involved (Sulston and Ferry 2002). 
More generally, the hunger for tissue that has been observed (cf. Anderlik 2003; Womack 
and Gray 2009) finds a sociological counterpart in descriptions of the life science industry 
as “tissue economies” and “biovalue” (Waldby 2000; Waldby and Mitchell 2006), and 
even the constitution of post-genomic life in its entirety as “biocapital” (Sunder Rajan 
2006).  
Waldby’s and Mitchell’s tissue economy “is a system for maximizing this productivity, 
through strategies of circulation, leverage, diversification, and recuperation” of tissues 
donated for the benefit of the health of others which where once “biological substrate of 
the self, the condition of viable human life” (Waldby and Mitchell 2006: 31). A particular 
characteristic of the tissue economy as a systematic pursuit is that it is infused with 
manifold, overlapping and morally charged connotations and valuations, such as a ‘use 
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 The pervasiveness of sequence patents of the human genome – though not the overall effect on innovation 
– is well documented, cf. Rosenfeld and Mason 2013 and Graff et al. 2013. 
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value’, relating to health purposes and saving lives, social values such as the creation of 
trust, inclusion, and equity, but also the commodity value of objects with a market price 
(ibid.). 
Sunder Rajan’s ‘biocapital’ similarly refers to “circulations of new and particular forms of 
currency, such as biological material and information” (Sunder Rajan 2006: 17). ‘Tissue 
economies’ in particular in the form of genomic research epitomize features of the 
bioeconomy and informational economy in that they aim to not only represent, but to 
conceive of life in informational terms according to Sunder Rajan. On the one hand, this 
occurs through a paradoxical “materialization of information, and its decoupling from its 
material biological source (such as tissue or cell line)” (ibid.) and on the other hand 
through a valuation of the “felt possibility of future productivity or profit” due to the 
generation of large amounts of data that could all potentially be very valuable in terms of 
both therapy and profit. These phenomenon also explains the overarching importance of 
intellectual property and the desire of strong patent protection as part of the philosophy of 
Personalised Medicine (Sunder Rajan 2006: 16/17; 42/43).  
While increasing need of patentability and the potential for profitability of life science 
research have generally been accepted as an inevitable standard form of innovation policy, 
at the margins there has been moral upheaval that sometimes engaged the wider public. 
The patentability or non-patentability of basic research (tools) such as sequences, whole 
organisms (the Oncomouse case) and applications for diagnostics (Myriad), for example, 
have led to long-term lawsuits, in particular in the US (cf. Nwabueze 2007; Graff et al. 
2013). In Europe, which allows for moral or ‘public order’ considerations to preclude 
patentability, there is an ongoing controversy surrounding stem cell patents and their 
potential immorality (cf. Caulfield and Ogbogu 2012).  
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Tissue banking and indeed the ‘tissue industry’ came into renewed focus in the UK in 1999 
with incidents of unconsented removal and storage of deceased children’s organs at the 
Alder Hey Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital and the Royal Infirmary in Bristol (Mason 
and Laurie 2001; Parry and Gere 2006; Nuffield Council 2011). 
While these cases prima facie engage rather with the issue of consent and the moral 
interests and rights of donors, patients and research participants, questions connected to 
‘appropriate’ research uses including patentability of potential research products and use 
for commercial research are closely related. A famous case engaging all these themes is 
also the one of the HeLa cell line (Holm 2006; Skloot 2010; Feldman 2011; Hudson and 
Collins 2013). The indignation raised by these known mistreatments and moral 
controversies testify a multiplicity of values attached to human tissues between scientific-
clinical and personal cultural views (cf. Schweda and Schicktanz 2009), and some authors 
state a general crisis of public trust in relation to bioscience as a consequence of these 
developments and incidents (Nelkin and Andrews 1998; Laurie 2004; Parry and Gere 
2006). 
The US have also seen a number of lawsuits touching upon the issue under which 
circumstances potential property rights in tissues derived from the public and ‘donated’ 
should be considered to be given up. The paradigmatic case concerning a potential 
exploitation of ‘sources’ remains Moore vs. Regents of the University of California, in 
which property figures both as a form of innovation policy, but also brought again 
attention again to the question if individuals can de jure own ‘their’ bodily material and 
which legal and philosophical concepts should guide these decisions. The plaintiff John 
Moore was a patient diagnosed with hairy-cell leukemia. During the long course of his 
treatment, researchers observed peculiarities in cells derived from his spleen, from which 
they developed a cell line. Moore, however, was not aware of these developments. When it 
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turned out that the cell line was to be patented and seemed a very promising investment, 
while Moore was asked to relinquish any further interest in his tissue via consent, he 
became suspicious and brought suit against the researchers for conversion
51
 to protect 
possessory interest in what he claimed his personal property.  
However, Moore was eventually not granted a property right in the tissues which had been 
used in the research. He could, for one thing, not share in the researchers' profits. It was 
reasoned that giving rights of this kind to Moore would be inconsistent with the patent. 
Moreover, the court stated that recognizing a property right in excised cells was not 
elementary to protect a patient’s privacy interests. It was recognized, nonetheless, that the 
researchers were guilty of breach of fiduciary duty and improper procedure of informed 
consent models, which would have required full disclosure of the economic interests of the 
researcher and all facts that could be in conflict with their professional responsibilities.  
Interestingly, it was indeed recognized that the case made by Moore for a property right in 
his biological material engaged more fundamental matters and so was better suited to 
legislative than to judicial resolution. But even so, many commentators have argued that 
research subjects should not be compensated in cases of this kind, because the researchers, 
through their work only, create a marketable product, while Moore had not invested these 
efforts leading to improvement (that in particular intellectual property requires) and that 
any property would depend on the investment of creative labor of this kind. One might 
contend, yet, that Moore had had a property right before the cell line was developed, and 
that consequently he should have been compensated for his contribution to the 
development of the specialized cell line by indeed providing its basic ingredient (cf. Boyle 
2002; Sethe 2004). 
                                                          
51
 “Conversion” in common law refers to wrongful acts towards things deemed to be inconsistent with the 
ownership rights of the person holding title to it.  
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The line of reasoning sustaining the abandonment of tissue by donation and the creation of 
property interests by scientific work prevailed. The overall effect of the decision in Moore 
has been a strong presumption that patients, when they voluntarily dispose of parts of their 
body, forfeit any further interests in these, even in case the purpose for which they are used 
is not or not adequately disclosed to them (cf. Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California 1990; Laurie 2004; Nwabueze 2007; Price 2010).  
Other high-profile cases illustrating different aspects of property issues related to human 
tissue in material form and genetic information are Greenberg and Catalona that will be 
briefly reviewed. In Greenberg vs. Miami Children’s Hospital, a group of families and 
non-profit institutions founded the Canavan disease (a neurodegenerative disorder) 
registry, recruited tissue donors and provided substantial funding for research into the 
genetic causes of the disease, entrusted to a particular researcher. The researcher indeed 
isolated a particular gene and filed for patent protection of the sequence and applications. 
His institution also began negotiating exclusive licensing agreements and charged high 
royalty fees, and thereby restricted the public accessibility of Canavan disease testing 
which the donors and funders had envisioned. The Greenbergs sued for conversion and 
unjust enrichment.  
Again, no property interest for the body tissue and genetic information voluntarily 
transferred without, as was reasoned, expectations of return was considered. Yet, it was 
observed that in this case clearly the investment of time, work and financial resources 
applied equally to the patient group which seemed to entitle them to some compensation. 
In the end, a claim for unjust enrichment was indeed upheld, at least partly redressing the 
inequity between patient group and the researchers (cf. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s 
Hospital Research Institute 2003; Weir and Olick 2004; Bovenberg 2005; Hoppe 2009). 
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In Washington University vs. Catalona, the U.S. District Court for Eastern Missouri 
decided against patients seeking control over tissues that they had donated to William 
Catalona, a urologist who was formerly at Washington University. Catalona had, through 
decades, accumulated a large tissue collection for research, including over 4000 prostate 
samples and 250.000 blood specimens from approximately 36.000 men. These specimens 
were collected under informed consent, and stated explicitly that “participation is voluntary 
and you may choose not to participate in this research or withdraw consent at any time.” 
When Catalona wanted to move to another institution, he informed the patients of his plans 
and requested permission to relocate the samples. Several thousand of Catalona’s patients 
demanded the samples to be released from the university for transfer. Washington 
University, however, refused with the justification that the collection had been maintained 
with university funds. The subsequent lawsuit resulted as in Moore and Greenberg, by 
confirming that patients had relinquished their rights to the samples (cf. Andrews 2006; 
Schmidt 2006; Piccolo 2008; O’Brien 2009). 
All these cases, limited though their function for guidance in other settings and 
jurisdictions may be, converge on the position that tissue, voluntarily transferred to a 
research project or institution, will become property “by mere reduction into the possession 
of a third party” (Price 2010: 253). The question if property for the sources existed before 
it ‘emerged’ in a research or clinical context, is not addressed in depth by the courts, in 
which policy arguments rather than moral or conceptual considerations seem to prevail.  
A number of commentators criticize that the denial of property rights to ‘donors’ in these 
common law cases amounts to the application of a double standard, asking if it is fair that 
original tissue sources remain without compensation for the profits that could be reaped 
from ‘their’ tissues (Boyle 2002; Laurie 2004; Bovenberg 2005; Waldby and Mitchell 
2006; Campbell 2009; Steinmann 2009a; Schneider 2010). Tissue donors, however, are not 
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only excluded from financial reward, but also of control about the body material and 
genetic information. There is a perceived conflict between sufficiently protecting donors’ 
interests and the efficient running of the various services which depend on human material. 
A more general notion for this phenomenon might be called the asymmetry thesis: there 
can be asymmetries in terms of reward or commercialization ‘downstream’ (cf. Schneider 
2010), which are fostered by a moral double standard in terms of ‘investment’, but the 
perhaps more decisive asymmetry is one of control and power. For some, Titmuss’ social 
equity programme of anti-commodification and anti-commercialization has accordingly 
turned into a rather dubious practice:  
Effectively, his strategy to make the human body a bulwark against the commodification of 
social life, a strategy now institutionalized in bioethical procedure, has simply rendered the 
body an open source of free biological material for commercial use. 
(Waldby and Mitchell 2006: 24) 
 
Alastair Campbell asks if “this not a hypocritical appeal to an altruism which only one 
party to the transaction is expected to adopt?,” realizing though that “Any answer to this 
question must deal with the central issue of whether, even if my body parts are – in some 
senses at least – my property, they are also correctly viewed as tradeable, that is, as 
commodities in a market” (Campbell 2009: 16). This ambivalence is hindering 
straightforward answers to the moral, legal and policy matters involved, specifically as 
concerns the material, original ‘sources’.  
 
2.3.2 Redrawing the Boundary 
Reconsiderations of the altruistic expectation and a rhetoric of gift-giving start from 
emphasizing the profound changes medicine has undergone in the transition to 
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contemporary biomedicine. Though not all biomedicine is tied to ‘big business’, in 
particular pharmabusiness, it seems that “developments in genetics have brought this 
characteristic to the forefront, and gradually our hopes and dreams in medicine are linked 
up with the rather expensive promises of genetics” (Simm 2005: 34). 
As will be explored below, in biobanking, the appeal to solidaric donation remains very 
strong, but there are also voices who have relativized the strict dichotomy that has 
traditionally been drawn between the commercial and non-commercial spheres. One 
striking example is the recent update of the Nuffield Council report on donation of human 
bodily material for medicine and research, which speaks of the “increasingly 
‘transactional’ nature of dealings concerning the human bodily material” (Nuffield Council 
2011: 64), including not only circulation of tissue for various therapeutic and research 
purposes worldwide, but complex layers of technical and institutional intermediaries.  
Indeed the dis-analogies between transplantation contexts and modern bioeconomies and a 
crucial feature on which Titmuss’ vision of solidarity relied do not apply in the latter: 
donation for a single, clearly defined purpose, helping or saving another person’s life 
directly by virtue of the donated tissue.  
Biobanks cannot respond to the moral commitment of donors because their purpose is 
scientific, not moral, and the recipients are not suffering individuals, or only in very 
indirect ways, but researchers. Perhaps, Steinmann reflects, ‘gift’ and ‘donation’ is just the 
wrong category to refer to in the case of genomics, because there is no serious sense in 
which one can “‘donate’ to something as impersonal as the general progress of science” 
(cf. Steinmann 2009a: 1/2). 
The mentioned Nuffield Council Report now takes a much more reluctant position on the 
moral (or rather pragmatic?) necessity of keeping the spheres of altruism and solidarity 
apart from propertization and commercialization. The suggestion seems to be that the 
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importance of altruism and solidarity are somehow tied to identifiable benefit of particular 
persons:  
Donation for research purposes may differ in important ways from donation for treatment 
purposes. While both forms of donation seek to benefit others, the contribution that any one 
research donor or healthy volunteer makes to the health of any other identifiable person is 
exceptionally hard to pin down. A move away from a primarily altruistic model for research 
purposes may therefore pose a lesser challenge to solidarity and common values than such a 
move in connection with donation for treatment.                                       
 (Nuffield Council 2011: 132) 
 
In the previous report of 1995, the potential commodification of the human body was 
considered as clearly undesirable (cf. Tutton 2004: 22). This had two effects: On the one 
hand, the gift relationship was promoted as morally superior, and on the other hand, the 
gift did not come with ‘strings’, i.e. attached to particular conditions, so that, just as in 
Moore etc. the gift has been abandoned and freed from donor claims. Donors do not have 
“the slightest interest in making any claim to it once it is removed” (Nuffield Council 
1995: 68; cf. Tutton 2004). 
Contemplating not so much control, but rather compensation and/ or payment for the 
donation of tissues, the new report puts forward a conciliatory approach, in which “the 
concern for others implicit in altruism can co-exist with monetary reward. This in turn 
supports arguments to the effect that a contrast between altruism and payment is not the 
stark 'trade-off' of incommensurables it once seemed“ (Nuffield Council 2011: 125). With 
particular view on Titmuss, ‘genetic solidarity’ and biobank research, there is support for a 
new pragmatism on commercialization, “rather than two mutually exclusive black and 
white alternatives, altruistic donation and commerce can be considered to be the opposite 
poles of a grey continuum, with various coexisting donation forms between them” (Sýkora 
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2009: 14). This is a significant relativization of a long-held practice of altruistic donation 
and research as proclaimed by policy.  
It is not immediately clear what effect this will have for the supply-side. Is it in the interest 
of donors that the boundaries are becoming blurry – not only de facto, and politically 
sanctioned – but in terms of rights and duties vis-à-vis research, in particular in genomics?  
Intricate conceptual relations involved preclude easy responses. Scholars sensitive to the 
issue have pointed out that the notion of gift-giving (also legally) presupposes underlying 
property rights or at least some particular interests in the subject matter constituting the gift 
(cf. Laurie 2003; 2004; Ursin 2010b). In fact, as Magnusson notes:  
To hold categorically that human tissue cannot be the subject of proprietary rights suggests that, 
in the absence of specific empowering legislation, such tissue could not be gifted, bought or 
sold, stolen or converted, bailed or patented. In a rapidly developing biotechnological age, a 
legal vacuum such as this would be very curious indeed. 
(Magnusson, quoted in Price 2010: 4) 
 
On the other hand, it has been considered that Moore is an exceptional case and that there 
could be harmonious midway solutions between altruism and capitalism (Boyle 2002; 
Harrison 2002). While this assessment might be correct, it does not follow that there are no 
further ethical issues if consent has been voluntarily given, which is a question of general 
relevance in genomic research based on tissue collections. Can we just rely on other types 
of (human) rights, which protect privacy, dignity and the inviolability of an individual, as 
Campbell suggests? (Campbell 2009: 15). This question is closely related to the problem of 
the contested status of tissue between person and commodity (cf. Radin 1996). Shifting 
attention back to the protection of ‘whole’ persons, however, fails to take into account the 
boundary status of tissue and is likely to lead to the problems of category mistake and an 
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ineffective over-regulation of research projects which might indeed impede scientific 
work.  
At the same time, it is submitted that “debates about key issues which affect the human 
body, such as the controversy over a potential market in human tissue and organs, still tend 
to be dominated by claims that it is irrational to treat the body with any special respect or 
to take any note of our intuitive repugnance at treating the body as an object of trade” 
(Campbell 2009: 4). Yet, this assessment fails to take note of the complexity outlined, and 
makes appeal to seemingly shared intuitions about the moral significance of the body and a 
shared understanding of property as a concept that is actually conspicuously absent, both in 
academic discourse as well as public debate. It is also known that research participants and 
citizens do have concerns about commercialization of the body and in genomics (cf. 
Haddow et al. 2007; Steinsbekk et al. 2013b).  
On the face of it, the more morally suspicious trend hence seems to be one of a strict anti-
propertization and -commercialization in ethics and policy: an often superficial dismissal 
of all things property for the supply side. Indeed Campbell, though lamenting insensitivity 
to the problem of tissue commodification, assumes that ‘altruism’ in relation to biobank 
research can easily be reestablished through something he calls “informational 
interconnectivity” (Campbell 2009: 61). Information and knowledge derived from tissue 
can be potentially beneficial for large groups of people, for instance if research leads to 
more tailored drug responses in a certain group of patients. He continues to point out that 
the new informational value leads to a shift in questions concerning the ownership of the 
biological material to issues concerning the information derived from the material, and “to 
what extent this information should be sequestered for private interests, as opposed to 
being put into the public domain for the benefit of all” (ibid.: 62).  
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However, it is not self-evident that open data should also imply open consent, in fact it 
would seem inconsistent to remain under this circumstances within a framework of 
fundamental individual rights. Another commentator, after asserting the lack of consensus 
on the ownership issue and related rights and responsibilities in genomics, notes that the 
denial of property rights to sources seems to contradict international bioethics principles, in 
particular the stipulation that the interests of science or society should never take 
precedence over the ones of research subjects (O’Brien 2009: 200). The article nonetheless 
finishes with the proposal of an ‘ownership’- model in which the sharing of biomaterial 
and genomic information as well as scientific data has gained priority over a closer look at 
how individual rights might have to be reconceived: 
Four principles to guide ownership or custodianship of biospecimen repositories 
1. Custodianship should encourage openness of scientific enquiry and should 
maximize biospecimen use and sharing so as to exploit the full potential to 
promote health. 
2. The privacy of participants must be protected and informed consent must provide 
provisions for unanticipated biospecimen use. 
3. The intellectual investment of investigators involved in the creation of a 
biorepository is often substantial and should be respected. 
4. Sharing of specimens needs to protect proprietary information and to address the 
concerns of third-party funders.  
(O’Brien 2009: 196) 
 
An alternative approach to these argumentative leaps faces a number of tasks, especially in 
relation to biobanks. The first is a (balanced) reestablishment of the individual person and 
the human body in relation to DNA, because often, contra Campbell, there is not even 
assumed to be any human dimension left in respect to a genetic sample, although the 
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doctrine of consent is applied in biobanking. An asymmetry of interests and entitlements 
persists in this case in a multitude of forms: disembodiment is taken to an extreme in the 
debate when the interests of science are at stake, and the repugnance at commercialization 
is applied asymmetrically to donors and users. Second, it must be clarified what would be 
the moral implications of a loser boundary between commercial and non-commercialized 
‘donation’, which in turn requires a nuanced understanding of property rights and the 
moral problems associated with ‘commodification’.  
Overall, this will require a restructuring of the debate from issues of consent to issues of 
control over biomaterials and their uses. Here, we will mainly investigate the limits of the 
no-property approach for the supply-side and try to understand if property concepts can 
also have a positive function with an eye on the larger picture of governing biobanks. This 
is an important part of the bioethical task involved, as policy is moving to strategies that 
seemingly facilitate research, but perhaps at the price of jeopardizing the trust that 
participants place in it.  
In the next chapter, I show that this framework should be extended in respect to larger-
scale genomic research. While currently research regulations are seemingly built on a 
theory of autonomy that is independent of any property right in one’s tissue (Alta Charo 
2006), there are intimate connections between the pillars of consent, privacy and property 
although the latter have been treated by ethicists in a rather cursory manner. Clearly, 
personality rights are still at stake, but the issue of control looms large behind the sticking 
points that limit the application of the traditional framework: the fragility of appeals to 
autonomy, the de-materialization and/or over-individualization in the discourse on privacy 
and the asymmetries of entitlements in the context of altruism vs. commercialization 
identified. The moral sources of the traditional research ethics model are conceptually and 
morally robust as for the protection of individual rights, if properly interpreted. However, 
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the analysis of the debate on informed consent vs. various diluted versions shows that what 
we need is not so much more protection of the individual, but primarily that the differences 
between research contexts are starker than many authors seem to admit.
52
 Elger, for 
example, provides the following résumé:  
Although the discussion about solidarity and altruism has been ongoing for 20 years, 
community values have not overruled the human rights framework of research ethics. This 
needs to be firmly recognized as deeply reassuring because it increases the trust in the present 
regulatory structures which were able to maintain the protection of research subjects as their 
priority and have so far not been overrun by the pressure of commercialization, commercial 
progress and the worldwide competitiveness of biotechnology research. In the era of modern 
bioethics and post Tuskegee,
53
 the idea that the good of society could sometimes outweigh the 
rights of research subjects continues to be rejected in Europe and North America, so far.  
A few lines below, however, it is acknowledged that  
Biobanks are a sort of trial and error: new ethical questions emerged and different biobanks 
created ethical governance frameworks that were tested in real-life scenarios. Countries and 
their populations responded by legislations and guidelines, and the different solutions continue 
to be tested in practice. In this somewhat Darwinian way, biobank frameworks were created 
and selected because only some ‘passed’ in the long run. 
          (Elger 2010: 252) 
 
To me, there is a clear discrepancy here between the supposed robustness of the individual 
human rights framework and the assumption that what materializes in social and scientific 
reality will necessarily yield the right kind of protection. If that were the case, one might 
doubt that there had ever ‘evolved’ the framework of human rights and human subject 
protection. This tension, in any case, opens the debate to explore some additional 
considerations, in particular the perspective of property which the “research model” with 
its focus on the human person as a single, physical entity tends to exclude or bury under 
                                                          
52
 Cf. Kanellopoulou 2004.  
53
 The ‘Tuskegee Syphilis study’ involved, from 1932-1972, around 400 black males from Tuskegee, 
Alabama, suffering from syphilis who were told that they were treated for ‘bad blood’, while in fact the 
natural course of the disease was observed. At later stages, patients were systematically excluded from 
treatments that had become available. Cf. Faden and Beauchamp 1986. 
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the protection of ‘autonomy’ (cf. Glantz et al. 2008; 2010). But can and should we adopt a 
property model? What would that actually mean? 
 
3. Conceptual and Normative Extensions 
In this part, the common bioethical view of a no-property approach to the human body and 
its parts shall be challenged with a view to the application in biobank-based research and 
the deflationary account of informed consent which dominates the debate of participant 
rights and interests.  
At closer inspection, Kantian considerations often used to this effect do not support strict 
anti-commercialization policies concerning human bodily material, but point to different 
concerns. Moreover, it can be shown that informed consent requirements in the related 
human rights view cover property-like interests, in particular a continuous form of control 
over bodily material if it remains related to its human source. While this property logic in 
terms of the worth of human agency underlying the requirement of consent would have the 
potential to strengthen the interests of donor-participants and trust in research, most 
commentators that have taken up the issue in relation to human body tissue at all focus 
instead on ownership as a form of desert, or a mere market tool. In contrast, it can be 
demonstrated how, without constructing ‘real’ property rights, considerations of ownership 
lie at the heart of a comprehensive picture of participant interests and rights. Moreover, 
reconstructing the debate from this perspective allows clarification concerning the key 
goods involved in genomic research.  
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3.1 A Preliminary Map  
 
3.1.1 The Human Body and its Parts in Terms of Property 
It might not be exaggerated to call the topos of the bounds of the human body and its 
susceptibility to propertization a central if not the most important idea of liberal Western 
thought: How far do the rights over our body extend? And how do they relate to the 
essence of personhood and the value of autonomy? Do property-like entitlements in our 
bodies justify the selling of the same into slavery or for prostitution, a right to abortion, or 
more or less regulated markets in non-replaceable human organs? 
What can be ascertained is that the human body has often been a site of enormous tension 
in terms of what other individuals, powerful entities and the state can do to this perhaps 
‘last undiscovered country’ (Stewart 2007; cf. Karlsen and Strand 2009). In the spectrum 
between the threat of commodification of persons and arguments in presumption of the 
greater good of medical research, the impression that there could or should be an interest or 
right in biological material and the information that can be derived from it – if this material 
has been voluntarily given to a research project – might at first blush seem rather marginal, 
even considering the profound changes that the research context has undergone. This is in 
fact what a large part of the bioethical literature seems to assume, but there are good 
reasons to be skeptical of this position. In particular legal scholars are very aware that there 
are important conceptual connections between the protection of ‘privacy’ and the rights 
that ownership confers, and also between the concept of consent and ownership.  
The rationale of the following exploration will be what exactly is of ethical importance 
about these connections in the context of transferring bodily material from an individual 
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that contains potentially very valuable information to a research infrastructure such as a 
biobank. 
I will argue that there is a significant tension between the more traditional approach of 
‘donation’ and the doctrine of consent from the perspective of property theory. That we 
should apply property theory here, however, is far from clear. Bioethicists have been very 
reluctant in applying even the language of property to the human body. Language also 
inhibits transparency in this case, as property talk tends to be loose or merely technical, i.e. 
using legal terms of art. For starters, ordinarily, property is things, while law describes the 
rights and powers of exclusion property confers. Whereas it seems natural to speak of 
myself as ‘owning my body’, we are or inhabit our bodies, and the legal conception of 
ownership instead assumes property to be transferable and alienable (cf. Calabresi 1991). 
Nonetheless, even the issue of property rights in body parts clearly detached from a person 
is contentious, as there is a spectrum of philosophies to what extent the body, dead or alive, 
and with reference to its parts represents a “substratum of personhood” or an entity of 
special, e.g. religious or cultural value and consideration (cf. Dickenson 2007; Lenk and 
Hoppe 2009; Schweda and Schicktanz 2009; Price 2010). 
Before we can approach the issue in a more contextualized fashion, we need a preliminary 
idea of what ‘property’, ‘property rights’ and ‘ownership’ refer to. By “property” I will 
mean “a legal and social institution governing the use of most things and the allocation of 
some items of social wealth”, an introductory definition by the legal scholar J.W. Harris 
(Harris 1996b: 56). Property institutions have at least two main functions, regulating use 
and distributing power: “It is one thing to say that a society ought to afford to an individual 
the use of some resource. It is another to say that the individual should be armed with 
power over others by virtue of a capacity to dictate the use of the resource” (ibid.: 57). 
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An institution of property consists of trespassory rules – defining the rights and duties 
attached and punishments for violation (trespass) as well as an ‘ownership spectrum’ – an 
aggregate of rights. “Ownership” is akin to a “range of open-ended relationships 
presupposed and protected” by the trespassory rules law enforces, and it is therefore the 
less technical and more morally charged term, in that it connotes the kind of social 
interactions that shall underpin the legally recognized rights of use of things and the 
concurrent powers of ‘owners’ and ‘property holders’.  
Ownership in a normative sense has an ‘expansionist’ connotation, in that full ownership 
of an entity is often considered “the best possible entitlement under the circumstances, 
relative to the nature of the something in question and the entitlements of others” (Hoppe 
2009: 48). While, as also J. W. Harris points out, the content of ownership interests is “a 
function of cultural assumptions” (Harris 1996b: 59), there is a tendency in political theory 
to conceive of these entitlements as absolute (c.f. Singer 2000).  
Analysis of ownership as employed by legal and bioethical scholarship is strongly 
influenced by the work of Anthony Honoré. In trying to systematize how ‘mature’ legal 
systems employ similar concepts of ownership he identified 11 incidents of ‘full liberal 
ownership’. This conceptualization encompasses the right to possess, the right to use, the 
right to manage, the right to the income, the right to the capital,
54
 the right to security, 
powers to transmit, devise or bequeath, the absence of a term to one’s ownership rights,55 
responsibility for harmful use, liability to execution
56
 and rules governing the reversion of 
lapsed ownership rights
57
 (Honoré 1987). This list of incidents does not solve the problem 
of what property essentially is, and has been used both by theorists who defend an integral 
                                                          
54
 Meaning the power to alienate the thing, and the liberty to consume, waste, or destroy the whole or part of 
it (Honoré 1987). 
55
 Absence of a future date or event that would cease ownership (ibid.).  
56
 An owned thing can be taken away in case of debt or insolvency (ibid.) 
57
 For theories which propose less incidents and modifications, and an application to human body parts cf. 
Björkman and Hansson 2006. 
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approach and a deflationary approach of a bundle theory, ‘sticks’ of which can be 
disaggregated and re-assembled. For example  
a person whose estate is subject to an entailment which requires it to descend in the male line 
unless there are no male heirs will still own the estate (it will still be his private property) but he 
will not have the right to bequeath it to whom he wishes. Similarly, a person might possess the 
right to the physical possession of his kidneys, the right to their use and management, the right 
to security in his possession of them, and the right to transmit them by gift or bequest, but not 
the right to transmit them to others by sale, or to secure any income from others’ use of them. 
 (Taylor 2010: 175) 
 
This means that the objects of property and what Harris calls property institutions could be 
distinguished from the relations in terms of ownership to understand how rights define the 
relations not only between an object of property and property holders but also between 
property-holders and non-property holders. Also, it implies that the bundle can be 
disaggregated and reassembled giving rise to a complex of ownership in various potential 
relationships. In a constructivist view of property rights, for instance, entitlements to 
control can be conceptually split from the prima facie more morally contentious rights to 
income and commercial transfer (cf. Christman 1994) and the ‘control rights’ seem to have 
a certain overlap with the personality rights constructed around ‘autonomy’.  
Property rights are also characterized as prototypically alienable rights, meaning that they 
can be given up, waived or traded, differently from, for instance, the human right to life, 
liberty and security, and indeed according to some the right to informed consent in the 
context of healthcare and research (McConnell 2000).  
Another significant characteristic of a general concept of property is that it, traditionally, 
concerns solely material items, not information or ideas. The exception are the different 
forms of intellectual property that are widely discussed in the life sciences, in fact because 
there did seem to be a trend of expanding and reifying intellectual property rights as if they 
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were rights over natural, material things, while in theory, patents are not exclusive rights 
over things, but rather time-limited privileges to exclude others from the use of inventions 
(cf. Nwabueze 2007). “Intellectual property” therefore is in a sense indeed a contradiction 
in terms. This is of interest as part of the asymmetry-thesis discussed above, as to some 
extent, one can probably say that as much as intellectual property is conceptualized in 
ethical and public debate as ‘real’ property, property in bodily material on the supply side 
is denied.  
The traditional view of legal and political theory, in any case, is that property rights require 
physical entities and ‘thingness’. In this view, the human body is not adequately distant – 
both physically and metaphysically – from the human subject to constitute ‘thingness’: 
“biological materials which remain part of the human body are not things because they 
lack the requirement of separability” (Hardcastle 2009: 14/15). The conceptual heart of 
‘property’, indeed, seems to be the more normatively charged notion of ‘alienability’. 
What then is the normative status of tissue? Blood transferred to a biobank is a physical 
entity and a thing, but equally refers back to person as for the genetic information 
contained in it. In the context of a governance-oriented biobank ethics the crucial problem 
seems to be that we have to think about ownership and property claims in a holistic, 
temporally continuous and ‘three-dimensional form’ (Macilotti 2013), i.e. on a spectrum 
from human being to DNA, to sequence data, scientific output – perhaps even a potential 
scientific product such as a cell line to be patented.
58
 While we are dealing with “non-
human subjects-research”, insofar information is implied, it will not be morally neutral 
information. In most cases, links to personal information and a potential for sensitivity of 
the material will remain. The main point therefore is that for a morally and practically 
                                                          
58
 I will refer here mainly to ‘tissue’ because there will be a stronger focus on the donor or the material 
‘source’ side. Consider, however, the particular issues immortalization and ‘conversion’ of ‘donated’ tissue 
raises, as discussed for example in Sethe 2004. 
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adequate grasp on what is at stake in biobank research it is important to conceive of tissue 
for genomic research as a ‘boundary-object’:  
In legal and philosophical analysis, these fragmented bodies have been variously viewed as 
neither persons nor property, leaving them in a limbo that provides few answers as to what 
these parts are and little guidance about what can morally be done with them. Our categories of 
thought in science and the law simply are not able to do justice to the nature of “entities” that 
are neither “things” nor “persons.” It is as if the attempts to stop conceptualizing the world in a 
dualistic, dichotomous way have failed in this case. 
          (Rich et al. 2012: 2) 
In an alternative perspective, for a donor, tissue in its material form is not of any interest 
and will be mostly akin to ‘waste’. Tissue is more like, e. g., a CD, a mere container of 
information and the status of genetic information derived from it, though sui generis, is 
only a matter of legal definition (cf. Palmer 2005; Elger 2010; Stefanini 2010; European 
Commission 2012
59
). In my view, as least as concerns a widening of ethics to include 
governance – or rather, from the perspective criticized here, as concerns governance that 
incorporates ethics – this seems an inadequate reductionism. The problem is that donors 
can have interests in matters that seem more ‘material’ (disposal, sharing, research use) 
and/ or ‘informational’ (disposal, sharing, research use and information that could identify 
them and/ or be of medical relevance for them and others), and they are both prima facie 
morally legitimate.  
Although the reductionist view might seem legalistic, it is legal scholars rather than 
bioethicists who have fostered debate on the normative status of tissue and data in this new 
context, some of which advocate property (or property-like) rights in the material which 
donors transfer to genomics projects and research infrastructures (Mason and Laurie 2001; 
Laurie 2003, 2004; Tallacchini 2005; 2013; Parry and Gere 2006; Dickenson 2007; 
                                                          
59
 European Commission. EUR 25302. 2012. Biobanks for Europe: A Challenge for Governance. Report of 
the Expert Group on Dealing with Ethical and Regulatory Challenges of International Biobank Research.  
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Nwabueze 2007; De Faria 2009; Price 2010; Macilotti 2013). For my purposes, tissue shall 
be considered as ‘three-dimensional’, and not only as a data-container. Accordingly, the 
question will be in which way this tissue for research can or should be subject to more than 
data protection, and more particularly, is to be considered in a wider sense also in terms of 
property and ownership.  
 
3.1.2 Legal Rights and their Moral Contestation 
Both in continental and common law, the body in its entirety is consensually considered 
mainly subject to personality rights. In the continental tradition, e.g. the German law, a 
number of scholars argue that also property-like control rights apply to the human body. 
These would stem from personality rights. Insofar property rights over the body, however, 
will lead to a restriction of personality rights, in particular dignity and autonomy, this level 
of property-likeness is largely superimposed by personality rights, and therefore the body 
remains for most practical purposes overall res extra commercium
60
 (cf. Roth 2009; 
Schnorrenberg 2010: 226; Simon and Robienski 2010: 302). 
Concerning detached body parts the situation is even more complex. Internationally these 
are rather res extra commercium or res nullius
61
 (Laurie 2004; Simon and Robienski 2010: 
302), while the German law again considers that detached body parts are things and 
therefore potential objects of property rights (Simon and Robienski 2010: 302/303; 
Schnorrenberg 2010: 226). Analogously to prima facie ownership over things, detached 
body parts as things become property of the person from which they originate rather than 
being e.g. res nullius or becoming immediately the property of a third party.
62
 Both 
                                                          
60
 Not subject to contract or sale.  
61
 Not belonging to anybody, and free to be appropriated.  
62
 At least this is the common interpretation since there is no explicit rule or doctrine concerning how 
property comes about, cf. Schnorrenberg 2010: 227. 
  
92 
 
property and personality right overlap and continue to do so in the context of detached 
body material, which is in line with the idea that even the whole body is considered the 
object of property-like rights as part of personality rights.  
According to this interpretation, the property ‘as object’ can be transferred, while the 
personality rights of the source of the material delimit the entitlements of a new potential 
owner. Overlap of property and personality rights will depend on the extent to which the 
body material allows for inferences concerning the originator of the material. Only if the 
body material is fully anonymized, this overlap would vanish, and the material is initially 
res nullius or abandoned property. Conversely, if the material is identifiable, the originator 
therefore gains an additional right of use and control over the detached material on top of 
the continuing personality rights (Simon and Robienski 2010: 304/305). Interestingly for 
the context of biobank research, this would mean that “the person from whom the body 
material originates could preserve his or her property rights only in case her or she would 
simultaneously allow for the retention of personal data.”63  
The transfer of property which according to these considerations exists is usually not made 
explicit in the context of consent covering only the removal of the bodily material (ibid.: 
308). Consent to treatment and/or research, however, is not enough to declare transfer or 
that the donor has no further property interests following this conceptualization, except for 
an explicit declaration to this effect. This is because intention to give up any property 
interests is considered primary, and must be affirmed as such. Moreover, an automatic 
transfer of the property or its abandonment would seem to be contrary to an absolute right 
of withdrawal of the material. The right to withdrawal until removal and deletion of 
personal data or use and transfer of data are part of the protection of personality rights, 
while the continuing – unconditional and absolute – right of withdrawal of the biomaterial 
                                                          
63
 “Für den ehemaligen Träger des Körpermaterials bedeutet dies, dass er seine Eigentumsrechte nur wahren 
kann, wenn er es zugleich zulässt, dass zu seinem Körpermaterial personenbezogene Daten gespeichert 
werden”, (ibid.: 319, translation B.S.). 
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would be considered a typical right of property holders (Simon and Robienski 2010: 
316/317). 
Property rights in term of control rights are considered to ‘stick’ rather naturally with the 
person from whom the biomaterial originates as long as the material is identifiable. This is 
an remarkable facet of this approach applied to the context of biobanks, as personality 
rights have a mainly protective, negative function as rights to bodily integrity and 
autonomy, while the rights over things imply (minimally) positive rights of disposal and as 
‘full-scale’ would imply property commercial rights (cf. Schneider 2010: 163). 
Despite the fact that the common law protects invasions of the human body, it has been 
argued that there is, as yet, no principled basis for recognition of property rights in human 
tissue for both sources and recipients and, differently from the continental tradition, that 
there “has been a distinct reluctance on the part of the “common law” courts to address the 
issue of tissue’s susceptibility to ownership” (Macilotti 2013: 147). Exceptions have been 
body parts, in fact parts of corpses, to which ‘work or skill’ was applied, and which 
thereby has been considered to confer rights of possession to the person performing the 
transformation of the body material (cf. Hardcastle; Macilotti 2013: 147/ 148). There does 
seem a change though recently, and in particular in confrontation with the development of 
biotechnology and genetic databases, as scholars are re-considering the possibility to 
develop a normative and principled ground to recognize property rights in body parts 
(Laurie 2004; Hardcastle 2009; Nuffield Council 2011 – with reference to the case of 
Yearworth that is discussed below). 
In particular, the ‘work and skill exception’ is questioned since tissue also as raw material 
has become a de facto valuable commodity even before ascription of any legal rights to 
either sources or recipients: “If in the past mere body parts could not acquire some value 
without the acquisition of different attributes, today, in the biotechnology era, tissue has 
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value per se […] This aspect can change, quite fundamentally, the nature of tissue. 
Property interests related to tissue can therefore be considered as a basis for a “revirement” 
(Macilotti 2013: 148). This shift in legal reasoning is accompanied by a moral debate, 
which provides an interesting entry point to disentangle the more technical aspects of 
potential property in tissue from the moral importance of the concept on the backdrop of 
research use to be elucidated here.  
Hardcastle suggests with particular reference to English law that the following individual 
interests should be taken into account in reconceiving property rights in human body parts: 
interests in a potential economic value, in controlling disposal, use for research, the 
possibility to exclude commercial use, and the possibility to contravene immortalization. 
He argues that legally, the detachment of biological materials provides the most logical 
basis for the creation of property rights in body parts, which “support the creation and 
allocation of property rights to the individual source from whom the materials were 
removed “ (Hardcastle 2009: 20). This line of legal reasoning, it seems, would therefore 
bring the English law closer in line with the continental approach. 
The fact that, by becoming an object through separation from the body, tissue is 
susceptible to ownership is more obvious in the American case. In Moore, the conceptual 
result was not that ownership in the tissue had never existed, but that claims to it had been 
relinquished via consent. The cases of Catalona and Greenberg consider also clearly rights 
in the biomaterial dimension and have indeed been seen as cases of gifts, which, as we 
have seen, presupposes ownership. The prevailing general idea then seems to be that by 
detachment, tissue becomes res nullius, and property in it is created through ‘occupation’. 
For research and the transfer of tissue to biobanks, this would mean that “whoever 
possesses it becomes their owner” (Macilotti 2013: 151), privileging parties that have 
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higher (bargaining) powers, usually the institutions and researchers involved, such as the 
surgeon/ researcher/ clinician, the research facility, hospital or biobank.  
This view, together with the emphasis of the ‘work and skill’-exception, likely explains the 
denial of property rights to the claimants in the American cases. Even if, according to this 
reasoning, donors had property interests, the process of consent is independent from the 
allocation of property rights – a view that shall be challenged here with reference to the 
legal and philosophical traditions informed by strong personality rights that persist in the 
informed consent regime. If this is true, disregarding for a moment the ethical issues with 
ascribing property to tissue, then the only legal or regulatory problem would be the extent 
to which consent-giving is a transfer of ownership in totality or in consideration of the 
‘sticks’ in the bundle of property rights.  
Whatever the exact conceptual nature of property and ownership in any consistent theory, 
it follows even from this basic preliminaries that one cannot start by asking “who owns the 
human body or tissue?” Besides theory, the relations and moral responsibilities of potential 
owners have to be clarified, and this is exactly what is absent in the case of research 
biobanks. Indeed the justification for property rights and how it comes about is a matter of 
long-standing dispute in political philosophy and as already hinted to, ‘property’ probably 
one of the most famous concepts that are ‘essentially contested’ (cf. Radin 1993).  
With regard to the present debate, two kinds of traditions are of particular importance in 
relation to the asymmetry thesis. These are broadly Kantian and Lockean. Kant is often 
used to ‘back up’ non-commodification and non-commercialization of the human body and 
its parts tout court, and Locke, in contrast, to sustain property claims – mainly from the 
user side. More generally, one might say there are ‘property-friendly’ and ‘property-
skeptic’ or ‘property-ignorant’ traditions appealed to in this debate, which in turn represent 
the extreme ends of a spectrum of possible positions. What is more, it seems that they are 
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employed distortedly in discussing developments in genomics and in commercialized 
environments, just as there is a prima facie asymmetry in the entitlements of donors and 
users.  
The property-friendly traditions assume that property, starting from property in the body 
and its works, is in some way a fundamental moral and natural entitlement. It is useful to 
introduce some of these Lockean ideas here, while Kant-based arguments will be examined 
in more detail below. 
Lockean theory, often referred to as a theory of ‘natural rights’, is of pivotal importance 
both in legal and ethical reasoning, and as for the (life) sciences in particular with reference 
to intellectual property (cf. Boyle 1997; Björkman and Hansson 2006). It is taken to be a 
theory that grounds property rights in desert and human ‘labour’, fitting on the face of it 
the common law doctrine of applying ‘work and skill’ which can confer property 
entitlements.  
Locke’s observations on property, however, must be understood in its historical context, 
i.e. as part of a larger project to ground the importance of individual rights in particular 
against political absolutism and tyranny in the pre-Enlightenment period and during the 
colonization of North America.  
§ 27 Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a 
property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, 
and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the 
state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and jointed to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the 
common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that 
excludes the common right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of 
the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there 
is enough, and as good, left in common for others.  
(Locke 2003: 111/112) 
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Independently from a particular authority such as the state then, individuals can acquire 
legitimate and exclusive ownership for instance of a piece of land by transforming it 
through labour and adding value to it. Any kind of excesses are prevented by at least two 
facets of the theory: the ‘proviso’ and the fact that though we can acquire legitimate private 
property, the earth and its fruits in totality are actually a kind of common heritage, held in 
trust by humanity (cf. Locke 2003; Tully 1980; Waldron 1988; Rao 2007). 
It is therefore not particularly evident what the ‘natural’ rights Locke supposedly defended 
are. If the earth and its fruits belong to anybody in a natural way, that would seem to be 
God, and only ‘in extension’ there would be ownership by individuals. Jeremy Waldron 
explains the Lockean theory as primarily a theory with the function to safeguard human 
agency in the service of God rather than the absolutism that seems to be implied in the 
description as ‘natural rights’:  
As a matter of fact, individuals left to their own devices will gain control of natural resources in 
a variety of ways. Some of those ways (for example, being the first to labour on something) 
create relationships between the individual holder and the resources he controls which are, from 
a moral (or perhaps religious) point of view, so important as to impose duties on others to 
refrain from interfering with or undermining that control (either in general or in certain 
specified ways). These duties, then, correspond to natural rights to some sort of exclusive 
control of the resources, in other words natural rights of property. They are natural, not in the 
sense that the individuals concerned are born with them (in one of the ways that, say, rights to 
life and liberty are said to be natural), but rather in the sense that the force of these rights 
obtains and can be recognized as valid by moral and rational people quite apart from any 
provisions of positive law. And they are perhaps also natural in the sense that the sort of 
relationship out of which these rights and duties are generated has important roots in the nature 
of human beings.[…] Natural rights to property are, on Locke’s view, rooted in certain relations 
that some individuals happen to establish between themselves and certain things – in particular 
the relation of labouring on virgin resources.  
(Waldron 1988: 19/20) 
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Notwithstanding these complications, the Lockean account was extremely influential in the 
development of a theory of individual personhood and individual rights, also due the 
objectified relation in which a person can stand to ‘her’ labours and thus as the main 
inspiration for ‘self-ownership’ (cf. Cohen 2008). It might, however, seem more 
appropriate that Locke was trying to ground private property in the products of labour 
rather than in the human body per se (cf. Waldron 1988; Nwabueze 2007). The more 
general appeal to self-ownership, which as we will see exerts a certain influence in the 
discussion on property in human body parts, can be illustrated following the reconstruction 
of the self-ownership argument that J.W. Harris has proposed. It runs as follows:  
1. If I am not a slave, nobody else owns my body. Therefore 
2. I must own myself. Therefore 
3. I must own all my actions, including those which create or improve resources. Therefore 
4. I own the resources, or the improvements, I produce.
64
 
          (Harris 1996b: 68; 70) 
 
Nozicks libertarian self-ownership, for instance, derives from running this argument 
backwards and claiming that most redistributive policies implicitly deny ownership of 
labour, and thereby ownership of the self, which in turn amounts to quasi-slavery.
65
 Is self-
ownership a meaningful concept? Does it have any bearing on the rights of individuals in 
genomic research? Recent scholarship suggests it does, an issue that we will return to. 
 
 
                                                          
64
 Harris distinguishes the liberal, Lockean-inspired version and the Marxist version. For the latter, point 3. 
would read instead “I must own all my actions, including those which produce a use value of any kind” and 
4. is replaced by: “Every service contract into which I enter constitutes a conveyance of my labour power” 
(ibid.).  
65
 In case one would have to partake in redistributive policies, implying the famous claim that “Taxation of 
earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor” (Nozick 1974: 169). 
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3.2 Tissue Ownership and Biobank Ethics 
While legal scholarship – with resurgent interests in property in the body and its parts – 
abounds with property language and rhetoric, including ‘self-ownership’, guidelines for 
genomics and the bioethical discussion remain hesitant to follow suit, although it seems in 
cases such as Moore, property was not denied because of legal dogma, but due to 
controversial policy considerations, as well as economic interests. In bioethics, there is a 
indeed a strong presumption that the human body should not be conceived in terms of 
property at all and that efforts to this effect must lead to a merely ‘material’ perspective in 
which tissues are pure, commodifiable things rather than ‘subjects’ of personality rights. In 
some legal traditions, as we have seen, a potential overlap between personality and 
property rights as applied to the body is more familiar. The following sections explore the 
possibility to sustain argumentatively a breaking up of the dichotomy between these 
approaches. 
 
3.2.1 The No-Property Approach as Default? 
Cordell et al. (2011) take up the issue of developing a firmer basis for the establishment of 
property rights in particular in human body parts, and with reference to the storage of 
human tissue samples and genetic information in biobanks and genetic databases. Their 
considerations start from a discussion of the recent case of Yearworth. In this case, six men 
were undergoing cancer treatment in the UK. They had their sperm stored for potential 
later use in case of compromised fertility. The sperm, however, was destroyed due to 
negligence. Mr. Yearworth sued. In redressing the ensuing harm to the patients, the 
specification of the harm would have to be related to personal injury or loss/ destruction of 
personal property. Indeed the court considered that the men had had ownership in the 
bodily material. The question that triggered legal and ethical debate is whether this 
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recognition of property in bodily material, atypical in the common law, is of ethical 
concern – differently from the other important question of whether and under which 
circumstances potential property can be considered abandoned. 
While the details of this case are peculiar and their potential for leading to ‘revirement’ 
might be limited (cf. Harmon 2010; Hoppe 2010; Macilotti 2013), Cordell et al. argue that 
this recognition of ownership contravenes a ’no property in the body’-principle and sets a 
precedent which is “ethically suspect, as it enhances the tendency towards the 
commodification of body parts”. The ‘no property’ approach, in their view, must remain 
“the default position in cases of detached bodily materials” (Cordell et al. 2011: 747). 
Whereas there seems to be agreement concerning the idea that historically, separated 
human body parts were mostly considered res nullius, subject to exceptions with reference 
to the ‘work-and-skill-exception’, in Yearworth the men were explicitly ascribed 
‘ownership’ of ‘their’ bodily material in the sense of “a specific set of powers over and 
constraints on other’s access that an agent holds regarding some object” (ibid.: 748), i.e. 
some sticks from the bundle of rights ownership would confer, in this case the most 
relevant ones seeming possession, use, and management. In particular a right to future 
usage seems to have been of importance, which the authors do not necessarily wish to 
deny.  
The problem, in their view, is that a compensatory claim could have been established 
without invoking property at all, but their main concern is  
[…] the confusion encouraged between the ‘integral’ conception of bodily property and the 
legal sense of a bundle of rights which supposedly arises from the men’s relation to the stored 
sperm and the duty incurred by the National Health Service to maintain it. There is an intuitive 
temptation to mix the two conceptions, especially when we consider that the intended future 
usage of the sperm would have involved the men attempting to father ‘their’ children. But, as 
underlined by the Judge’s correct rejection of the personal injury claim, once the sperm is 
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outside of the body and is being cryogenically sustained, it is no longer a something that can be 
damaged or destroyed as a bodily material in this ‘integral’ sense.  
(ibid.) 
It would hence be “at best unclear that the men’s legitimate power or right to control and 
manage future use of the sperm should thereby make it an object of their property on a 
legal, transferable understanding: or that whether, if it does, it would then become property 
that was shared or contestable by its sole controller or ‘keeper’, the National Health 
Service. […] even having exclusive use of something and its being integral to the body 
may not necessarily imply ownership of that thing. The air that a person inhales into their 
lungs meets both these conditions but is, nonetheless, res nullius.” (ibid.) Speculating that 
an intention behind the ascription of property to the material might have been to “capture 
and redress the erosion of autonomy that took place with its destruction”, they continue to 
argue that relating these two concepts in any coherent view seems impossible. Autonomy – 
here “recognising facts about the frustration of the men’s significant life projects, and thus 
the infringement of their control over their own lives” (ibid.: 749) – does not need to lead 
to the recognition of property.  
On the only alternative reading, they suggest, property would have to ‘entail’ autonomy, 
but in this case one must instead start from assuming what is to be established since  
Autonomy is self ownership or control, and we cannot establish that the men’s autonomy has 
been compromised by virtue of a violation of their property unless the sperm – now expressed 
and sustained by a third party – is in some sense already assumed to be just that: ‘part of them’ 
or theirs.  
(ibid.)  
This is a puzzling argumentative strategy. Having first suggested that the Yearworth- 
judgement encourages a confusion of the’ integrity’ vs. bundle idea of property, they then 
reintroduce implicitly their preference for the essentialist integrity interpretation: 
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Autonomy and property must either be conceptually identical or exclude each other 
categorically, and thus the recognition of property in Yearworth, in particular with 
reference to autonomy, must be “conceptually inappropriate” (ibid.).  
But why should that be the case, except if, in turn, what has to be established is assumed – 
that the only proper conception of ‘property’ is essentialist? Cordell et al.’s main concern, 
after all, seem to be the consequences of employing a property language to bodily material 
overall – consequences though that exacerbate an intrinsic harm that property language 
seems to convey:  
So the concern is that if there is a precedent set by this judgment, it allows that bodily material 
can effectively be deemed a commodity before any act of sale or transfer. Notice, then, that the 
objection is not that the property judgement sits at the top of a ‘slippery slope’ of legalising or 
decriminalizing more and more commodificatory acts, such as the sale of ova, in the future. 
Rather, in our view, insofar as the Yearworth judgement and such acts are connected, the 
judgement is already squarely at the foot of that slope. For the Yearworth judgement itself 
commodifies a material that was never donated, harvested or stored with any view to it being or 
becoming transferable property, and hence a commodity, in the first place.  
(ibid.)  
One might agree that in the specific case of Yearworth it was not necessary to employ 
property ascriptions. Yet, the generalizing aspects of this argumentation are unconvincing. 
The authors suggest without further argument that the core of the concept of ‘property’ 
applied to the human body is some unspecified tendency of harm due to the idea of 
‘commodification’, an issue that will be discussed in more detail in the next section. In 
fact, for them it seems to be established principle by referring to the French notion of ‘non-
patrimonialité’, according to which property and the human body cannot be subject to 
monetary evaluation and all agreements to this effect are void.
66
  
                                                          
66
 “Le corps humain, ses éléments et ses produits ne peuvent faire l’objet d’un droit patrimonial. Les 
conventions ayant pour effet de conférer une valeur patrimoniale au corps humain, à ses éléments ou à ses 
produits sont nulls.” French Civil Code, quoted ibid.: 750. 
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I do not aim to suggest that rhetoric more generally and property language specifically are 
exempt from potential for harm, but a clearly delineated idea of potential property theory 
and other concepts such as ‘autonomy’ – to be employed in specific contexts – are of 
crucial importance. Cordell et al. have not shown that the default must be the ‘no-
property’-approach because it is not evident that the employment of property rights 
necessarily leads to some way of harming people or treating them unjustly. In fact, one 
might equally claim that the non-recognition of property rights – moral or legal – in the 
human body and its parts violates the liberal harm principle that people should be able to 
perform any self-regarding action which do not cause harm to others (cf. Mill 2009; 
George 2004).  
Rather, they also confuse meta-theoretical ideas about what kind of concept or thing 
‘property’ is with the effects legal recognition or even only property language might have. 
Furthermore, it is implicit in their discussion that ‘property’ does not seem to be a basic or 
all-or-nothing concept. This can be seen from their dismissal of a property model via the 
concept of “self-ownership”. Cordell et al. claim that property is self-ownership, or if it is 
not, then there is no way to relate autonomy and property in a coherent way. What is the 
function of self-ownership in these considerations? Let us recall Harris’ reconstruction of 
the self-ownership argument: 
 
1. If I am not a slave, nobody else owns my body. Therefore 
2. I must own myself. Therefore 
3. I must own all my actions, including those which create or improve resources. 
Therefore 
4. I own the resources, or the improvements, I produce. 
 
(Harris 1996b: 68; 70) 
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As Harris’ and other authors have pointed out, the problem with self-ownership is that it 
cannot be sustained by this argument without further premises. From not being a slave it 
does not follow that I must own myself, or my body. That is, if there is any role for self-
ownership and thereby, perhaps, ownership of the body, which we cannot exclude, it is 
certainly not straightforwardly entailed in this argument. With the help of Harris’ 
reconstruction, it can be seen that the issue is instead how to relate a more substantive idea 
of the moral importance of individual autonomy with the interests and/or rights that 
‘property’ seems to convey. Cordell et al., on the contrary, simply equivocate self-
ownership and control, but only in their dismissal of property.  
The appeal to ‘self-ownership’ is therefore not conclusive as to what ‘property in the 
human body’ could be: If self-ownership is not merely postulated to be identical to the 
morally primary autonomous human being and the strong property rights that some 
libertarians conclude from it, one needs an account of autonomous agency plus a 
specification of relationships with other potential rights-holders to specify what my 
‘owning myself’ should amount to in de facto social contexts.  
As a consequence, this view is prima facie opaque about the purpose of the individual or 
the values that should be expressed through property (rights): It seems to be some kind of 
autonomy, but it remains unclear what the underlying moral rationale is, a problem that 
indeed libertarians are typically criticized to be very weak on (cf. Cohen1995; Mieth 
2007). Again, this does not imply that ‘self-ownership’ in general or specifically applied to 
questions of ownership in human body parts is necessarily nonsensical, as e.g. Dickenson 
holds (cf. Dickenson 2007). It does, however, suggest, that the kind of ‘ownership’ we are 
looking for is not a simple concept, rather there is some overlap with other morally 
important concepts, in particular the realm of autonomy. 
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In the last part of their analysis, Cordell et al. caution against the use of a property 
framework in thinking about the claims of donors and users of biological material stored in 
biobanks. If one would apply a bundle conception of property, such as in Yearworth, for 
instance to the right to withdraw or concerning the uses consent entitles to in terms of 
ownership, then this “could warrant competing claims from a research institution and a 
donor over genetic samples, the donor claiming to retain property rights, and the institution 
claiming that he/she has transferred their property to the biobank, which in turn has done 
so to the research institution” (Cordell et al. 2011: 751). As biobanks serve as a research 
infrastructure that should be accessible for long-term usage to different stakeholders, this, 
they seem to suggest, could inhibit an effective use of the resource, while fostering 
potential conflicts of interest. Excessive ownership and control claims on the side of 
research, however, “could be dissolved by assuming a strict concept of bodily property, 
such that donors to biobanks waive all of their rights to any genetic material transferred. 
Perhaps, but then in that case it would appear that a much wider range of donor’s rights 
and control over their participation in biobank research would dissolve along with it. […] 
such potential dangers of adopting the property model tell against the Yearworth ruling” 
(ibid.). 
This discussion, contrary to their intention, then plainly confirms the necessity of a critical 
evaluation of the pros and cons of invoking a framework of property claims and rights, at 
least from an ethical perspective: Why would it follow from the fact that there seems to be 
some conceptual problem here that invoking property is ‘dangerous’, and what exactly 
would that entail? Their perspective here, indeed, suggests a continuity of donor interests 
the concrete relation of which with the notion of (informed) consent and the language of 
property rights and interests still has to be illuminated. 
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It might be agreed that one should not “head down the proprietary route” prematurely in 
the case of biobanks both considering their being fit-for-purpose and a legal application to 
the human body and its parts more generally – and still insist that we need a much more 
fine-grained conceptual and ethical analysis of potential property claims involved. Having 
established that no-property as default is at least as dubious and opaque as self-ownership – 
these are the alternatives the analysis puts forward – we can try to understand better what 
the moral problem with even a general evocation of property language for some authors in 
these debates seems to be.  
 
 
3.2.2 Commodification Concerns and Kantian Concerns 
While some commentators recognize that property could be a means to deal with the 
challenges of a commercialized research environment also for participants, further 
thoughts tend to be brushed away by short-hand appeals to commodification. Ursin, for 
example, contends that “granting property rights of tissue to Mr. Moore or to biobank 
participants requires the bold step of blurring the line between a person and an object” 
(Ursin 2010b: 221). Clearly, however, tissue containing identifying, perhaps sensitive 
personal information is just this kind of blurry entity or border-object: an object, and 
treated very much in research and medicine as an object, but equally undeniably and un-
reducibly of human origin and potentially of great individual and even communal 
significance. In this perspective, thinking about tissue in terms of property does seem 
everything but bold, only adequate to context. 
As I have pointed out, however, in bioethics this is a minority position. Cordell et al. hint 
at the other extreme of relating property with central conceptions and values of human 
identity, which is commonly considered as broadly Kantian. As in Ursin’s comment, it 
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seems to derive from the idea that there is a fundamental difference between a thing and a 
person, in Kant’s terms: 
Man cannot dispose over himself, because he is not a thing. He is not his own property – that 
would be a contradiction; for so far as he is a person, he is a subject, who can have ownership 
of other things. But now were he something owned by himself, he would be a thing over which 
he can have ownership. He is, however, a person, who is not property, so he cannot be a thing 
such as he might own; for it is impossible, of course, to be at once a thing and a person, a 
proprietor and a property at the same time.  
                                                                                         (Kant 1997: 157) 
 
 
Persons have, in virtue of their capacity for autonomous moral agency, the crucial attribute 
of ‘dignity’ (Kant 1998: 43) that elevates them above the realm of things exchangeable and 
replaceable for money. 
In the kingdom of ends, everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be 
replaced with by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all 
price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity.  
(Kant 1998: 42) 
This inner worth, in turn, and the potential for morality “is the condition under which alone 
a rational being can be an end in itself, since only through this is it possible to be a 
lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends” (Kant 1998: 42). The ascription of dignity and 
the inadmissibility of treating human beings as things equalizes people and is therefore of 
major importance for the development of modern civil and universal human rights (cf. 
Lenk 2008: 15). 
But tissue for research containing personal and potentially valuable information quite 
obviously does not fit the dichotomy of persons and things and their relevant attributes 
easily. Moral concerns about a blurring of this line are often referred to in terms of 
“commodification”, as in Cordell et al.’s discussion above. Is it true then, as has been 
contended, that “granting Mr. Moore property rights to his spleen would amount to making 
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commodification of the human body legitimate”? (Ursin 2010b: 221). And if that is the 
case, what exactly is the moral problem involved? 
In the sense of a legalistic ethics or the standpoint of behavioral economics it is indeed 
clear that the granting of property rights to Mr. Moore involves the act of commodification 
if commodification is considered the necessary step before an entity can become part of 
market interactions (cf. Brownsword 2009). In this sense, commodification is a social 
practice and/or legal system, i.e. an actual practice of legally permitted buying, selling or 
renting certain ‘things’. This use of the term can be differentiated from a particular 
commodifying attitude that Margaret Radin describes as consisting of the following: 
“market rhetoric, the practice of thinking about interactions as if they were sale 
transactions, and market methodology, the use of monetary cost-benefit analysis to judge 
these interactions” (Radin 1987: 1859). In a formulation adapted from Ruth Chadwick, in a 
commodifying attitude one might consider the bodies of persons primarily as resources (cf. 
Wilkinson 2000: 191). 
Cordell et al. presumably consider both meanings, though their worry seems to be a 
generally encroaching, commodifying attitude towards the human body, a potential 
devalueing and perhaps ‘objectification’ of entities that become part of market-like 
relationships, including the wider cultural influence this could have. Some ‘things’, 
however, should perhaps not only not be referred to in terms of ‘property’ and related 
interests and rights, and in particular not be part of markets. These might be market-
inalienable entities, i.e. they might be given away or donated, but not sold (cf. Radin 
1987), one of the main issues of contention being a potential market approach to what is 
now mostly organ donation with all the relevant embeddedness in a culture of altruism or 
reciprocity.  
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Stephen Wilkinson discusses how the reference to commodification is used in arguments 
which purport to show that organ sale is to be legally prohibited. While we will not follow 
the argumentation concerning the potential sale of organs in detail, his attempt to clarify 
the invocation of commodification is useful also for the context of various forms of human 
tissue more generally. For Wilkinson, “commodification” involves minimally:  
(1) Denial of subjectivity: the commodified ‘thing’ either lacks consciousness or is something 
whose experience and feelings need not be taken into account. 
  
(2) Instrumentality: the commodified ‘thing’ has only (or mainly) instrumental value. 
 
(3) Fungibility: the commodified ‘thing’ “is replaceable with money or other objects; in fact, 
possessing [this] fungible object is the same as possessing money.” 
 
(adapted from Wilkinson 2000: 193) 
 
Is commodification of the body per se wrong? Wilkinson disagrees in his discussion of 
organ donation, because “the three ‘sub-attitudes’ which make up commodification will 
normally be equally present in both types of organ recipient (those who receive sold organs 
and those who receive gifted ones” (Wilkinson 2000: 194). That is, in his view and perhaps 
not very intuitively, commodifying attitudes are present in various ways also in the absence 
of monetary exchanges and the establishment of markets, and therefore, we might add, 
without the moral recognition of property interests or the legal enforcement of property 
rights.  
The real problem, if this is correct, might then be that the commodification of bodies 
causes the commodification of persons. Commodification of persons, again, seems to be 
wrong because it is incompatible with respect for persons, that is, respect for him or her 
being a person and having certain subjective characteristics that ought to be accounted for. 
Part of this is the Kantian idea that persons should never be merely treated in an 
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instrumental way which is incompatible with the duties they have to themselves and others 
as bearers of dignity and an irreducible potential for moral agency.  
How strong is the link between the disrespect for moral personhood due to a 
commodification of persons and the negative effects of commodifying attitudes or social 
arrangements as concerns the human body and its parts? Can and should they be 
differentiated in moral assessment? After all, as Beyleveld and Brownsword underline, 
“dignity belongs to my person/agency, not to my body, unless I conceive of myself as my 
body” (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2000: 95). To some extent, the body is therefore 
indeed of instrumental moral relevance, “a thing generically instrumental to my agency, 
not my being as an agent or person itself, and not therefore an end-in-itself”(ibid.: 96). In 
the rights-respecting, liberal and empowerment-oriented reading of invoking dignity that 
Beyleveld and Brownsword seem to favour here (against the constraint-reading of 
dignity),
67
 it follows that:  
Whereas to use my body as a mere means to the ends of others would be to violate my person 
as an end-in-itself, for me to will use of my body as a means is not for me to treat myself as a 
mere means, for to treat a person as an end in itself is basically to respect the will of that 
person. 
(Beyleveld and Brownsword 2000: 96) 
 
Importantly then, an instrumentalizing attitude is not always and under all circumstances 
wrong, i.e. it is not intrinsically wrong (‘never as a mere means’, as Kant maintains). 
As also Wilkinson emphasizes, there is no straightforward conceptual connection between 
the commodification of bodies and the commodification of persons and that is why it is so 
hard to draw the line where commodifying attitudes and practices turn into disrespect for 
persons. The ubiquitous practice of selling labour, for example, in most cases likely 
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 For a more comprehensive account of these readings cf. Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001. 
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includes some aspect of commodification following Wilkinson’s definition (cf. Wilkinson 
2000: 197).
68
  
On the other hand, Kant does state clearly that persons are not their property and that the 
powers of disposal over their bodies must be limited:  
Man is not his own property, and cannot do as he pleases with his body; for since the body 
belongs to the self, it constitutes, in conjunction with that, a person. 
 
(Kant 1997: 157/158) 
In other words, Kant stresses the importance of bodily integrity, in particular insofar it is 
relevant for the fulfillment of our moral duties and aims.  
[…] Disposing of oneself as a mere means to some discretionary end is debasing humanity in 
one's person (homo noumenon), to which man (homo phaenomenon) was nevertheless entrusted 
for preservation. 
To deprive oneself of an integral part or organ (to maim oneself) – for example, to give away or 
sell a tooth to be transplanted into another's mouth, or to have oneself castrated in order to get 
an easier livelihood as a singer, and so forth — are ways of partially murdering oneself. But to 
have a dead or diseased organ amputated when it endangers one's life, or to have something cut 
off that is a part but not an organ of the body, for example, one's hair, cannot be counted as a 
crime against one's own person — although cutting one's hair in order to sell it is not altogether 
free from blame.  
 
(Kant 1991: 219) 
 
These duties limit the legitimacy of extracting and transferring (or even destroying) parts 
of one’s body for reasons that might not be unavoidable for self-preservation or in any 
other sense morally considerate (potential duties to assist and help others, for instance, 
such as through modern day blood transfusion or organ transplantation, and perhaps 
donation of tissue for genomic research). Moreover, this passage shows that Kant 
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 Following this analogy, “an individual can realize the value of the body part both as a sale and a gift 
simultaneously just as the worker recognizes the value of their work while earning money from their labors. 
This argument supports the notion that it is possible for commodification and non-commodification 
philosophies to co-exist simultaneously within one system” (Boyle 2002: 67). 
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disapproves of a commercialization even of renewable bodily material such as hair, though 
clearly not for reasons of threatening bodily integrity. In a more modern idiom, the reason 
might be that in however indirect a way, also disintegrating and/ or selling non-integral or 
functional parts of the body could foster a commodifying attitude to the body and thus be 
contrary to the aim of autonomous, rational, dignified human agency. 
We can conclude that a Kantian would generally be suspicious of disintegrating and/ or 
commodifying the human body to the extent that this runs counter the fundamental aim of 
treating yourself and others as ends in themselves rather than means. To this end, in turn, 
bodily integrity plays an important role and should be considered the norm exceptions to 
which must rely on – if not medical emergency – serious moral judgment (cf. Lenk 2008). 
Clearly however, particularly this latter consideration leaves space for disagreement. In 
fact, it is debatable if, based on this Kantian point of view, one should be very 
precautionary in the sense of emphasizing the potential for a slippery slope of de-
humanization in all cases of relating even rhetorically and conceptually property, the 
human body and personhood; or, as Stephen Munzer suggests, the Kantian position more 
neutrally opens for a ‘gradient’ of concerns about body parts as commodities. In Munzer’s 
terms, this second view includes the “derived status strategy”, meaning that “parts of a 
living human being […] can have more or less personal connections with that human 
being. The status of the part has something to do with the status of the whole and its role in 
the whole. A gradient of appropriateness of treatment as a commodity suggests itself, and 
concern about the ultimate use of the part is relevant” (Munzer 1994: 275/276). 
Both these views, if indeed different, are of course somewhat reductionist, and seem to 
invite misunderstandings – in particular the first one, as it can preclude further conceptual 
and contextual analysis. Munzer calls one effect of this the “fallacy of division”: assuming 
that what is true of the whole must be true for its parts. Concerning the invocation of 
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dignity to argue against property rights in body parts, it is then concluded that because 
persons have dignity, human body parts have dignity or can suffer offenses against dignity 
(ibid.: 275). 
In the first instance, the idea of a slippery slope of the harm of commodifying attitudes as 
derived from Kant does not imply that property talk and legal acknowledgement of any 
form of property rights in body parts are per se degrading and/ or violating moral norms 
(as Cordell et al. suggest). Although Kant denies ‘self-ownership’, his point is not directly 
concerned with the property status of an entity or property theory. Not even some forms of 
instrumentalizing or treating the body as a ‘commodity’ that could be related to this are 
wrongs in and by themselves. They can, however, be wrong if and insofar they inhibit the 
aims Kant has laid out for his moral philosophy more generally (cf. Gerrand 1999; Lenk 
2008; Herrmann 20011). As for the second, more neutral view, though it seems to imply 
some relativism in relation to property and similar rights, the acceptable treatments of the 
bodies of persons have an absolute moral limit in the concept of dignity (cf. Lutz 2010). 
The idea of a slippery slope of instrumentalization (rather than directly commodification) 
implicit in Kant is a limiting condition of the ascription of the primary individual rights of 
self-determination or ‘autonomy’. These rights, however fundamental, are restricted by 
direct and potential threats to human integrity, to not treating myself and others as a mere 
means to an end. In research, for example, the requirement of consent is directly based on 
the respect for human (traditionally mainly bodily) integrity and dignity. Equally, the 
general requirement of non-commercialization of the human body is based on a 
precautionary spectrum from direct violations of human dignity in a free market of human 
bodies and body parts to the indirect threat to dignity by an encroaching culture of 
commodification if e.g. human reproductive material and ‘performance’ could be traded in 
markets. 
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On the other hand, it must also be clear that purely Kantian considerations of dignity do 
not have a lot of direct bite as reasons for a general condemnation of commodification 
tendencies in cases of detached bodily material and for instance the research rather than 
direct-treatment cases. This is because, as long as the fundamental requirement of consent 
is respected, additional indirect threats to human dignity and autonomy in theory must still 
be shown to encroach by legitimizing certain practices. The legal judgment in Yearworth 
does – in Kantian terms – not directly and in itself violate dignity. Kant would probably 
nonetheless agree with Cordell et al. that the men did not own their bodies and their sperm 
in the strong sense of having unlimited powers over its use, but he might still agree that we 
have a privileged relation to it that somehow must be acknowledged.  
The fundamental question is then what this Kantian approach – so vital for the foundation 
of human rights law generally and bioethics more specifically – implies for the context of 
the storage of genetic material in biobanks. The body, in Kantian terms, should be kept out 
of the realm of ‘things’ as far as possible to make autonomous agency possible. But this 
dichotomy that leads to what one might now call ‘empowerment’ of the individual does not 
apply well to the case of genetic research on detached body materials. Kant’s teleological 
approach to autonomy is confronted with serious limitations in the age of virtual biobanks 
and highthroughput-sequencing. The embodied individual on the one hand seems to 
disappear as a point of reference in both science and bioethically-approved policy making, 
and on the other hand individuals clearly are also not the only ones at stake, so that an 
empowerment through consent and information seems quite restricted.  
More generally, there is no direct inference from the wrongness of the commodification of 
persons or via invoking dignity or autonomy to the moral illegitimacy of ownership in 
detached human bodily material akin to Cordell et al.’s default ‘no-property-rule’. 
Conceptually and morally, body material can prima facie not only legally but also morally 
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be owned, but its use will have to be limited so as to protect a personal and interpersonal 
sphere that is conducive to a respectful, non-instrumentalizing treatment of human beings 
among each other. Also, the appeal to non-commodification or dignity of the person does 
not by itself demand a purely altruistic or charitable transfer of bodily material, in 
particular if third parties are potentially or de facto dealing commercially with these 
materials (Schnorrenberg 2010: 239). A decontextualized invocation of an unspecified 
harm of commodification as the core tenet of property ascription or property language 
confuses the meta-theory of property with the harms particular social practices might 
legitimize, and is not appropriate to account for the complexity of phenomena to be 
adjudicated in the life sciences (cf. Campbell 2009: 26; Caulfield and Ogbogu 2012). 
Moreover, it bears repeating that the concept and value of dignity still plays a fundamental 
role if properly understood in its relation to the protection of fundamental rights of 
integrity and autonomy. This is important, because the larger part of biomedical research 
uses prima facie morally inconspicuous human tissue containing genetic information, 
while dignity, if not dismissed as only a restricting concept or too vague to give any 
guidance (Macklin 2003), is often considered of ethical importance only in relation to 
specific body parts such as embryonic tissues (Kirchhoffer and Dierickx 2011). 
In what Kirchhoffer and Dierickx call a ‘multidimensional reading’ – both compatible with 
rights-based and pluralistic values – human dignity is not grounded in either an absolute or 
contingent value, but reflects the multidimensionality of the human person and thus should 
not be employed in a reductionist fashion (ibid.: 553). Though a piece of tissue following 
the discussion above clearly does not have dignity in itself, since dignity concerns the 
human person’s possibility of moral agency, it is still implied in manifold ways in 
biomedical research on tissue and therefore also in biobank-based genomics. Kirchhoffer 
and Dierickx distinguish two senses: dignity in relation to an inherent human potential, and 
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dignity in relation to “acquired self-worth”. The first sense covers the potential for human 
identity and identification through genetic information stored in tissue, both as being 
generally of human origin, and as a matter of an individual belonging to particular groups, 
such as female/ male, black/ white skin, healthy/ sick etc. The second sense concerns the 
relations and interactions between tissue donors, study participants and beneficiaries who 
often have a moral motivation to participate in research (Kirchhoffer and Dierickx 2011: 
554). 
In this way, although reference to dignity cannot provide concrete answers as to which 
uses might constitute violations of dignity,
69
 it has high symbolic significance in that it  
points to where the tissue comes from, and the ends for which it will be used. So, when we 
work with human tissue in the research context we are in effect ‘touching’ the human dignity of 
the donor and indeed of humans in general. A person has ‘entrusted’ an aspect of his or her 
dignity to us, both in terms of his or her genetic identity (absolute) and in terms of the values 
that may have motivated his or her donation in the first place (contingent). Moreover, because it 
is human tissue, the research will have potential consequences for all humankind, and thus also 
implicates human dignity in the broadest sense. Therefore, even if the samples are anonymized, 
human dignity is still implicated.  
(Kirchhoffer and Dierickx 2011: 555)
70
 
 
In sum, both this symbolic sense and the rights-respecting character of the concept of 
dignity are morally relevant. However, while from a Kantian perspective non- 
instrumentalizing human agency and relations are crucial for how we conceive of research 
ethics in general, it is still unclear how this translates into the use of consent or alternative 
measures for research use of tissue in genomics or ‘human non-subject research’. More 
specifically, if a property-like dimension of the relation between an individual and his or 
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 Yet, as argued above, because dignity and autonomy ‘enforce’ each other, there seems to be a strong 
presumption that tissue donors should be able and enabled to choose or at least have the possibility to decline 
certain uses or forms of research. 
70
 Cf. Andrews 2005 and Campbell 2009 for similar considerations. 
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her body parts cannot and should not be excluded from consideration, how can it be 
characterized? 
 
3.2.3 A Hidden Property Logic 
Legal scholars Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, for instance, have argued that 
the requirement of informed consent as part of the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine – which can be considered the ruling European position – is not compatible 
with a strict interpretation of the principle of non-commercialization of the human body 
required by the same Convention. More concretely, they propose a reading of the consent 
requirement that presupposes the very idea of a property-like right in the body.  
The requirement of consent is stated in article 22 of the Convention as follows: 
When in the course of an intervention any part of a human body is removed, it may be stored 
and used for a purpose other than that for which it was removed, only if this is done in 
conformity with appropriate information and consent procedures.
71
 
 
“Body parts” is explained to refer to “organs and tissues proper, including blood”. It does 
not apply to bodily products such as hair and nails “which are discarded tissues, and the 
sale of which is not an affront to human dignity” (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2000: 88). 
As concerns “intervention”, Beyleveld and Brownsword propose to interpret it as covering 
both cases of treatment and non-treatment, although the Explanatory Report only specifies 
that body parts “are often removed in the course of interventions, for example surgery” 
(ibid.:89). The report also specifies that “information and consent arrangements may vary 
according to the circumstances, thus allowing for flexibility”. Overall, as pointed out 
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 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine [Oviedo Convention]. 
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before, it is not specifically designed to take into account the contextual features of genetic 
databases and biobanks, and yet, it does represent the central concepts of reference. 
To advance their argument, Beyleveld and Brownsword introduce the distinction between 
two kinds of rights: rights relating to the taking of body parts – labeled “Rights A” – and 
rights that relate to use and control of body parts, labeled “Rights B”. “Rights A” seem to 
be the key rights that the requirement of informed consent protects as based on the right of 
self-determination and bodily integrity. In particular in relation to the challenges biobank-
based research faces, “Rights B” seem of at least potential relevance, as they should be 
protected whenever a post-removal use of a human body part goes beyond what was 
intended at the time of consent: “Rights B under Article 22, in other words, give us control 
over the post-removal use of our body parts, by granting us not only the right to set the 
initial bounds of permitted use but also to sanction any deviation from such initial 
permitted use” (ibid.: 90).  
Are “Rights B” property rights? Alternatively, “Rights B” might protect the cases of 
‘conscientious objections’, for instance to a specific research use seen as incompatible with 
a religious belief. However, Beyleveld and Brownsword argue that the regime of informed 
consent as outlined in the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine does not seem to 
be designed to take into account this purpose. This is because the intention of avoiding 
religious or conscientious harm leads to the recognition of a right to veto specific uses, to a 
list of prohibited uses, as it were, but not to a broader right to control intended new uses 
and deviations from previously established ones: “In a regime designed to avoid religious 
harm, where it is proposed to use the removed body part in a way that goes beyond the 
terms of the original consent, the only question is whether that use is on the prohibited list. 
If it is not, there is no need to obtain fresh consent. Provided, therefore, that the original 
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consent has ascertained the full extent of the religious objection, the requirement of fresh 
consent is inappropriate” (ibid.: 92). 
The insistence on the consent requirement, also in new technological circumstances and 
within biobank research, protects a person’s interests in how his or her body parts are put 
to use, and the specification of this interest does not seem to rest only on the avoidance of a 
conscientious harm. Instead, Beyleveld and Brownsword conclude, it could also be based 
on the idea of a privileged relation between persons and their body parts, including after 
removal. The foundation of “Rights B” in the regime of informed consent is therefore an 
interest that looks closest to a general conception of property that the authors base on the 
idea of the so-called rule preclusionary conception of private property. This strong 
conception of ownership or a property right expresses “the essence of what has 
traditionally been viewed as private property in capitalism”, and refers to “prima facie 
rights to use what one owns (X) for any purpose one chooses and of rights to exclude 
others from access to or use of X, even if the owner’s proposed use of X in any particular 
instance is of no benefit to the owner and access to or use of X is of benefit to others” 
(ibid.: 94).  
Beyleveld and Brownsword hint to the justification of this conception by reference to a 
Gewirthian theory of agency, but do not follow this line of argument, and it is not 
necessary to provide any details of this theory for my present purpose. They anticipate, 
however, that if agency is central to the justification of the institution of private property 
rights, then the paradigm example of what can be owned in the rule preclusionary sense is 
the body (ibid.: 95). 
We can now return to the initial observation that the requirement of informed consent in 
conjunction with the non-commercialization principle is supposed to exclude the body 
from the conceptual map of what can or should be owned. While the authors have not 
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shown that these doctrines are inconsistent in any strong sense, they observe that their line 
of argument points in the opposite direction of what seems to be the current orthodoxy in 
European bioethics, in which “property in our sense (which entails commercial property) 
cannot be had in one’s body. It can only be had in physical objects independent of one’s 
body”. According to an agency-based justification of property “this gets things altogether 
the wrong way around. If there can be property at all there can be property in my body” 
(ibid.). 
“Rights B” as part of the universal requirement of informed consent in medical research 
and therapy, then, minimally, are not alien to many aspects of – indeed – human agency 
such as control ‘rights’ and rights of disposal, use, and exclusion. The non-inconsistency of 
informed consent and non-commercialization principle however is due to their common 
moral source, what I have called safeguarding integrity and autonomy. This in turn means 
that autonomy and integrity delimit how the person and her body and body parts can be 
‘used’, but these concepts could not exclude each other. It is not obvious, for example, at 
which point and due to which internal or external motivational causes a potential organ 
sale is an affront to the person’s dignity or her duty to respect mankind in herself. As a 
consequence, there is considerable space for interpretation where indeed fundamental 
human rights are violated or endangered by particular research practices and where 
commodification or indeed markets in body material should be restricted.  
This has interesting ramifications for an application to research biobanks: Insofar the non-
commercialization principle relies primarily on the limiting power of appeals to human 
dignity, there is a possible conflict with the same moral undercurrents of dignity in the 
requirement of informed consent as also protective (or rather, the enhancement) of 
autonomy. Respect for the human body – the dignity that is implied in it qua relation to 
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autonomous personhood – in this way can overshadow the respect for the dignity and 
autonomy of persons (cf. Elger 2010: 68). 
 
3.2.4 Gradual Commercialization, Constructing Property Rights, and Limitations 
As should have become clear by now, a general norm of non-commercialization of the 
human body and its parts as outlined in the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
is both as a matter of facts and morals questionable and of little use in dealing with the 
challenges of the ever more ‘transactional nature of dealings in human bodily material’ 
(Nuffield Council 2011) and tissue for research (and transplantation).  
In a recent article, Lenk and Beier outline a more appropriate picture, beginning with an 
overview of the situation in various European countries. Their findings can be summarized 
in a gradual model of tissue commercialization with four general categories: 
(1) Strict anti-commercialization: body material cannot be property at all, even against a tissue 
donor’s will. 
 
(2) Constricted use: donor’s or patient’s right to determine further use of samples, possibility of 
excluding commercial use of the sample. 
 
(3) Fixed tissue prices by government: no further control rights of the donor. 
 
(4) Full commercialization of body material: free market prices; no further control rights of the 
donor. 
 
(adapted from Lenk and Beier 2012: 343)  
 
This is in quite striking opposition to what seems at first sight an outright dismissal of 
commercialization tendencies in biomedicine and research according to the non-
commercialization principle respectively the default no-property rule. Levels (1), (2), and 
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(3) are hence compatible with a strict interpretation of the wording of the non-
commercialization principle. This includes the principled possibility of tissue to become 
legal property, the procurement, transfer and trade for “wider purposes” and also 
compensation, though not income or gain from the processing of tissue and body material 
(Lenk and Beier 2012: 343). From this perspective, indeed, it would seem that the main 
question is how the relations of ownership leading to property arrangements and rights are 
organized rather than if there should be any considerations of property or 
commercialization of tissue. So far, I have principally sustained this line of argument, 
mainly by a critical re-assessment of the Kantian position as well as by outlining the 
conceptual fragmentation (cf. Harris 2006a) within property talk and theory. 
In conjunction with the pragmatic assessment of a gradual model of commercialization 
practice, a constructivist approach to property in human body parts and tissue for genomic 
research more specifically emerges. This seems to sit well also philosophically with an 
approach that Björkman and Hansson term ‘social constructivist’ approach to property. It 
can be traced to the utilitarian criticisms of Locke’s ‘natural’ rights view and was then 
developed by legal constructivists. According to this view, property rights originate in law 
making and express historically relative social values and functions. Property is ‘invented’, 
and thus stabilizes and promulgates particular conceptions of individual and social good in 
relation to, for instance, questions of promoting economic efficiency, productivity and 
distributive justice. Its particular forms are created through social decision-making and 
installed by public authority. In contrast to the view that there is an essential link between 
owner and owned entity in the natural rights tradition, the excluding function of property 
rights and the relational aspects in a larger social context tend to be emphasized (cf. 
Björkman and Hansson 2006).  
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Björkman and Hansson propose a general matrix to resolve contemporary questions of 
ownership in human biological material. It consists of 7 potential legal rights (which have 
similarities with Honoré’s list) making up the bundle of full-blown ownership and 5 
underlying moral principles of ‘bodily rights’, which are defined as “a person’s privileges 
with respect to her own body. A bodily right may, but need not, give rise to a property 
right“ (Björkman and Hansson 2006: 212). The guiding moral principles are specified as 
follows:  
(1) No material may be taken from a person’s body without that person’s informed consent. 
 
(2) Under conditions of informed consent, removal of bodily material is allowed as a means to 
obtain significant therapeutic advantages for the person herself. 
 
(3) Under conditions of informed consent, removal of bodily material is allowed as a means to 
obtain significant therapeutic advantages for one or more other persons, provided that the 
removal does not cause serious or disproportionate harm to the person from whom the material 
is taken. 
 
(4) If there is a significant risk that a certain practice in dealing with a biological material will 
result in exploitation of human beings, then that practice should either be disallowed or 
modified so that the exploitation is brought to an end. 
 
(5) The system of legal rights should promote the efficient distribution of biological material for 
therapeutic purposes to patients according to their medical needs. 
 
(ibid.: 213/214)  
 
This framework can then be readily applied to particular types of biological material. 
Generally, differences in treatment between different types of body material stem from 
considerations pertaining to the perspective of the person from whom the material is 
removed such as need, dispensability and replaceability for normal biological functioning. 
Equally though, the perspective of the ‘user’ or recipient and general distributional aspects 
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such as scarcity of the body material in question must be considered (cf. also Douglas 
2012).  
The approach that Björkman and Hansson defend offers flexibility and potential guidance 
that the natural rights approach cannot provide since it “views property rights as an 
indivisible unit that is analytically prior to society” (Björkman 2007: 222). The 
entitlements that property conveys are accordingly decidedly not monolithic, but can be 
adapted to purpose and explain why, for instance, different persons and institutions 
involved in the research process can have different, sometimes conflicting forms of 
‘ownership’ in, for instance, a stem cell line: A patient/ donor might be entitled to certain 
‘control rights’, whereas researchers and doctors might need entitlements of ‘possession’ 
and use.  
While this appears to be an attractive feature of their approach, the application to concrete 
cases reveals that the potential for a nuanced analysis for certain entities might be limited. 
This concerns moral and policy aspects, but also the ontological issues of categorization 
that pertain to biological material of human origin that is sought for mainly because of its 
potentially valuable informational content. Björkman and Hansson mention the example of 
stem cells and stem cell lines. In their view, stem cells are of great need for an individual in 
their natural constitution, which at first sight precludes propertization and potential 
commercialization, but at the same time, they can be duplicated “to the enjoyment of 
many” and thus are neither scarce nor rivalrous72 anymore.  
The person from whom the material originates does not necessarily get deprived of anything—
one of the fantastic qualities of stem cells is that they can be duplicated […] it has been shown 
in numerous experiments that stem cells can be removed from a bodily context, grown in vitro 
and then inserted into both the body they were taken from and into another individual. This 
brings copyrights and intellectual property to mind; transplanting this type of biological 
                                                          
72
 A rivalrous good is a good the use of which by one person prevents simultaneous consumption/use by 
another person and diminishes supply of the good. 
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material does not (necessarily) involve depriving the source in order to enrich the recipient. In 
light of this it seems plausible to argue that e.g. the disadvantages of a market system will be 
smaller, and the advantages greater, for duplicable material such as stem cells and genetic 
material than for non-duplicable material such as complete organs.  
(ibid.: 230) 
 
In fact, these stem cells have become essentially information and as information they 
presumably retain no morally relevant link to the material ‘resource’ of origin. The source 
does not lose anything valuable and others can ‘profit’. This apparently win-win situation, 
however, mixes moral and economic rationality: Need for the donor is defined in terms of 
bodily function, and what is not needed (is ‘redundant’), can be technically replaced or 
duplicated and is assimilated to an economic resource. Also, the informational component 
of stem cells for research and their presumed moral inconspicuousness seems to give at 
least prima facie plausibility to an altogether different issue: the economic effectiveness 
and moral or social acceptability of a potential market in stem cells or stem cell lines.  
Björkman and Hansson, in short, assume that the dividing line between moral value in 
human tissue of various kinds and justifiability of stronger forms of commercialization in 
the form of markets is very thin. The flexibility of the constructivist theory of property 
rights is taken to imply that the moral value of body material can be rationalized and 
‘calculated’ for the most part. Again, a meta-theoretical approach to property, moral 
considerations and policy suggestions tend to be conflated. The moral principles outlined 
do not mention considerations of potential moral limits in terms of the value of autonomy, 
dignity, or instrumentalization, even though a principled basis for ascribing bodily rights, 
grounded in the moral primacy of informed consent, seems to be envisioned. For the 
authors, “the primary normative issue is what combination of rights a person should have 
to a particular item of biological material” whereas “whether that bundle qualifies to be 
called ‘property’ or ‘ownership’ is a secondary, terminological issue” (Björkman and 
  
126 
 
Hansson 2006: 209). However, the analytical usefulness of the constructivist approach 
does not obviate the question at which point property logic might start to serve the 
legitimization of certain scientific and social practices rather than moral argument.  
This implicit assimilation to economic rationality is criticized in a commentary on the 
article by Karlsen et al. aptly entitled “To know the value of everything”. The authors 
stress that it is too far from “the context of the realities of health care, patients, medical 
practice, and research” and instead framed to comply as a mere ‘technical’ issue with 
“modern capitalist societies” (Karlsen et al. 2006: 215). Following this critique, the 
constructivist account can be compatible with concern for fundamental rights of research 
participants. Its real strength, however, is in its potential to focus on and clarify the purpose 
of property entitlements in a larger context. Björkman and Hansson criticize the Lockean 
view as rigid, but in turn construct a matrix of entitlements in which every form of tissue 
must fit, a task that clashes with the ethical necessity to consider the interests of the 
supply-side in a more encompassing way, comprising ‘material’, ‘informational’ and 
‘moral’ aspects and the continuity of the underlying complex of autonomy-dignity that 
does not find mention.  
As can be anticipated, an important consequence might be that strong claims to property in 
body material and information derived from it are hard to justify morally, not only because 
of limitations in individual rights in terms of autonomy and dignity, but because these 
might conflict with the larger social aims they should serve. This, of course, presupposes to 
specify these goods and aims for healthcare and research. Some proposals to this effect 
have been made for biobanks and genetic databases, and will be discussed in section 3.2.6, 
infra. Beforehand, it is useful to illustrate some potential perils of invoking the importance 
of property rights in bioethical debate while not sufficiently attending to the moral 
foundations of the personality rights involved. 
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The constructivist approach can imply concern for the position of individuals and social 
critique in commercialized research environments. Donna Dickenson, similar to Björkman 
and Hansson, is critical of the common reliance on Locke (if not Kant) in these debates. 
She approaches the problem of property in the body from a feminist angle, one of her main 
foci of concern being the exploitation of women’s reproductive ‘labour’ in the context of 
ova donation and evolving stem cell technologies. But she also argues that we need a 
property model to enable the empowerment of donors more generally, including for 
biobank research. Informed consent in its current form, instead, would rather lead to a 
disempowerment, while  
A consistent consent regime […] would also imply property rights for patients far beyond those 
minimal entitlements given by many biobanks, particularly the recently established UK 
Biobank. Personal rights such as consent are not actually opposed to or separate from a 
property rights approach; […] limited property rights for donors and patients will in fact give 
teeth to personal rights.  
(Dickenson 2007: 128/129) 
 
This would increase trust in UK Biobank, since it has been shown that participants are 
concerned about commercial use and it would only be fair to let donors decide on usages 
given that we expect and count on their altruism: “Donors to UK Biobank, however, have 
no right to insist that any products or services developed through their gift should be used 
to benefit the National Health Service rather than commercial biotechnology companies” 
(ibid.: 132).  
Dickenson criticizes the neo-liberal framework of research ethics as a combination of the 
primacy of voluntary and autonomy-supporting informed consent with a mistaken use of 
Lockean theory (ibid.: 38; 43). As we have seen, the libertarian (and Marxian) varieties of 
the latter theory imply that we own our bodies in some substantive sense, an idea only 
recently appealed to again in bioethical discussion. In this model, the realm of autonomy as 
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mere choice is pervasive, and the subject in full voluntary control over his or her body: 
Parts of it can be abandoned, either via informed consent or as we are in ‘full liberal 
possession of our body’ (cf. Quigley 2007). This analysis mirrors the current discussion, as 
the common law assumption of abandonment of tissue is questioned (Quigley 2007; 
Hardcastle 2009; Harmon 2009), but crucially, commentators do for the most part not 
consider non-Lockean, alternative explanations for potential property rights, in particular 
the idea that property institutions and ownership relations might be constructed – from a 
moral point of view – around human agency.  
This is, prima facie paradoxically, also true for Dickenson, because though it is claimed 
that self-ownership is ‘non-sensical’, the labour theory of property can presumably be 
sustained. Property rights, in the end, are mainly conferred by desert or labour, and the 
most legitimate form of property in the human body is women’s property in their 
reproductive tissue. Other forms of legitimate property in different tissue could, 
nonetheless, give rise to limited rights in the bundle of property. Yet,  
Do other claimants than ova and cord blood donors have sufficient grounds to be regarded as 
having some form of property right in the first place, so that the bundle notion can then be 
brought into play? We might, for example, grant biobank donors proportionally fewer rights, 
since they contribute proportionally less labour, but still allow them some of the rights in the 
bundle. The same might apply to people who donate DNA swabs used in patenting.  
(Dickenson 2007: 130) 
Dickenson contends that though politically it would be desirable to have some form of 
property for donors, philosophically there is little space. The reason is that participation is 
almost risk-free, incurs no labour and it also does not seem that a property interest can be 
grounded in ‘genetic identity.’ Rights of donors should be commensurate to risk, labour 
and ‘intentionality’ involved in the body material of concern, and these are minimal 
compared to those in ova donation and cord blood banking. In biobanks, the property rights 
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to be recognized are rights against unauthorized taking, and some more downstream rights. 
These “weaker rights of ownership can be acknowledged through the creation of a 
charitable trust to govern the biobank, enabling them to exercise those rights at a distance” 
(ibid.: 137). 
Is this all to be concluded? In biobank research, the moral problem is that through an 
disproportionate but still often superficial focus on consent, underlying property-like 
interests – and in fact all interests unrelated to physical or perceivable risk – tend to be 
disregarded. The trust model, to be presented infra in Chapter 4, could be a useful remedy, 
however, from Dickenson’s analysis it remains vague what follows for a different form of 
consent that could indeed empower donors.  
Some additional conceptual and practical doubts are worth pointing out. The author hints 
to the fact that donors ‘disappear’ from the ethical debate in favor of research 
legitimization by way of the exclusive focus on consent. Although the bundle theory of 
property is at first glance applied contextually, is the strategy of empowering donors 
through accentuating labour not indirectly undermining the aim of making vulnerable 
donor groups and their interests and rights visible? This is, but not only, because the 
assessment of ‘desert’ seems very complicated and would immediately disqualify for 
example sperm donors and biobank participants in comparison to ova donors.  
The reconstruction of Lockean ideas and the strong, autonomous individual in bioethics is 
eased in a partly Lockean or perhaps rather neo-liberal fashion, by insisting on the nature 
of desert for justifying property. This is likely related to the fact that Dickenson is 
primarily interested in making women and their exploitation in various biomedical and 
biotechnological contexts ‘visible’. It seems, however, a form of reasoning that plays into 
the hands of advocates of strong property rights and commercialization in general, since no 
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arguments explicating the specific moral dimension of property and/ or the larger social 
effects of commercialization in research are proposed or told apart.  
If we were to give property rights to tissue donors ‘commensurate’ to their labour (even 
disregarding what this might practically involve), it still remains unclear what has been 
won from a moral point of view, while the arguably more worrying implications of 
pervasive commercialization have not been questioned. Women’s reproductive labour then 
is ‘equalized’, but essentially the situation is the same. For biobanks, the question of 
‘invisible’ and longer-term risks has not been dealt with, or the question what this would 
mean in practice for the requirement of consent. How can property of this form be 
expressed or enacted through mere consent? Most importantly though, the invocation of 
labour is somewhat misleading in this context, and probably favors the status quo, as the 
real power of labour expectedly would stay with companies and researchers rather than 
individuals.  
In sum, the recent discussion of a constructivist turn to property in tissue gives reason to 
think that the primary moral problem with invoking property terms in this context is its 
spurious relation to some form of human identity and autonomy, which however, does not 
entail its irrelevance. Rather, it seems that a justification of strong private property rights 
will have to establish this connection in particular as regards the human body, as Beyleveld 
and Browsword (2000) suggested. The notion of ‘self-ownership’, however, has not solved 
this problem. The conclusion, yet, is not a retreat to the modified labour model, especially 
not across biomedical and research contexts, as there also seems to be tendency of 
conflating the idea of ‘mixing labour’ with the importance of moral agency and much 
larger questions concerning innovation policy. In the application to biobanks, donors then 
might be at risk to ‘disappear’ again, their purported rights only to be exercised, as 
Dickenson indeed suggests, at a distance. 
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3.2.5 Beyond Privacy vs. Property 
Graeme Laurie shares Dickenson’s suspicion about the inadequacy of consent and the 
ambivalent role of autonomy that might lead to a disempowerment of tissue donors and 
research participants. He approaches the issue from an interest in the limits of the 
traditional idea of medical confidentiality and underdetermined ideas of privacy in dealing 
with the problem of the familial nature of genetic information, and proposes a conceptual 
framework of “genetic privacy” that should help to give patients control and choice over 
genetic information. This novel concept is larger than in particular confidentiality, and 
conceives of privacy as an elementary part of an individuals’ personality.  
For the context of donation of tissue and DNA samples including potentially sensitive 
information to research more specifically, Laurie argues that it seems necessary to 
complement this notion with a kind of ‘property in the person’, which would be “the 
ultimate expression of respect and control over one’s own existence” (Laurie 2004: 301; cf. 
Radin 1996). Since the right to privacy is always just ‘negative’, a protection from 
unjustified invasion into a sphere of only personal interests (including information), it  
suffers from limitations similar to those that afflict the principle of respect for autonomy; 
namely, it does not provide for any continuing control over personal matters once they enter the 
public sphere. Autonomy in the guise of consent reduces control to the giving or withholding of 
that consent, after which an individual is largely powerless to dictate what happens […] while 
her privacy regarding any information derived from those samples may continue to be 
protected, any residual authority depends on the nature of her original consent and, more 
importantly, on the assumption that its terms will not be violated. 
(Laurie 2004: 300/301) 
In short:  
A personal property paradigm could, in fact, serve an all-important role in completing the 
picture of adequate protection for the personality in tandem with other protections such as 
autonomy, confidentiality and privacy. This means that meaningful, legally relevant and 
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enforceable conditions could be placed on any transfer of the property and so ensure that a 
research participant or indeed a community retains a vested interest in samples and in the goals 
and outcomes of any research for which those samples are provided. By the same token, 
restrictions on the inclusion of undesirable clauses by either side could easily be imposed by 
law.  
(Laurie 2004: 318) 
Laurie seems rather optimistic and advocates a new age of, again, self-ownership. While 
many of his concerns are shared in the present analysis, there are two potential problems 
within this vision: one is similar to the criticism in Dickenson’s proposal on the lack of an 
adequately strong normative ground for a paradigm shift in research governance in which 
property is central, while the second is more practical and requires to outline some 
potential conceptual and legal limitations. 
The first point is that though there is even an intuitive link between privacy and property, it 
is not clear that self-ownership is a way of filling it with meaning which could be effective 
to inform research governance in an innovative way, as Laurie suggests. Questions about 
property rights in bodies indeed are primarily about private property. The link is not 
merely etymological though. Descriptively, it stems from the idea of privacy as control 
over the private sphere of a person’s body and information relating to it. In a normative 
conceptualization, the link could be drawn in pointing out that what is subject to privacy 
and what is private property encompasses what a person can justifiably refuse to allow 
others access to without consent. This idea can lead to strong rights of privacy or even 
private property in the person such that “a person’s ownership of something would involve 
not merely that she could justifiably resist it being physically taken from her, but that she 
could justifiably resist other attempts to gain access to it that she does not consent to—
including placing restrictions upon her ability to transfer it to consenting third parties. On 
this normative understanding of private property, then, a person’s property is inherently 
commodifiable should she consent to this condition” (Taylor 2010: 176). 
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We do not have to look for an ultimate definition of “property” or “privacy” here, but there 
is a clear overlap of concept that centres around the idea of protecting fundamental 
interests in the self or human identity, and presumably a sphere of something akin to 
‘autonomy’. As I have suggested before, the notion of ‘self-ownership’ is used in the 
debate on property in the body and its parts vaguely and/or metaphorically. What is to be 
explained seems to be presupposed: the relation between important interests in the self and 
the potentially large spectrum of rights that ownership confers to the exclusion of others – 
including a morally dubious right to commodification. In this roughly libertarian vein, 
privacy rights and rights in the body therefore inevitably converge. 
Contrary to this project, I have suggested that though claims to property in body parts 
cannot prima facie be excluded, there is a normatively strong basis in the rationale of the 
traditional requirements of research ethics that points in a different direction. This can lead 
to a weak position of the research subject in the research context we are looking at, in 
particular if the value of autonomy and integrity as well as the concept of informed consent 
are narrowly interpreted. Also the appeal to privacy cannot redress this imbalance for both 
conceptual and empirical reasons, and is moreover inextricably linked with the requirement 
of consent.  
In the face of the epistemic insecurities and unclear risks of large-scale, data-intense 
genomic research, the most defensible moral starting point seems to be the insistence on 
established rights: a more liberal element of safeguarding autonomous agency through the 
possibility of voluntary, non-coercive, informed choice and a more protective element in 
limiting autonomy by appeal to integrity or dignity. This is the normative baseline to be 
translated to the ethics of biobank participation. Although it is tempting to fall back to a 
narrow concept of consent as a guiding idea, it should be remembered that it cannot be 
scaled up to this new research context. For the time being, we should focus on the two 
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normative elements singled out: the possibility of ‘real choice’ for an individual research 
participant or sample donor, and the integrity of research uses on tissue more generally 
(rather than as concerns a single human being in a treatment context or a clinical trial). 
The proponents of a paradigm shift towards some form of property model instead use a 
language of self-ownership to strengthen the position of the tissue ‘sources’. With the 
exception of the development of conceptual tools to differentiate legitimate from 
illegitimate uses of these powers, an important part of the initial concerns about 
commodification of tissue and general commercialization practices in research cannot be 
addressed on any strong normative basis. The second major problem is the relative 
inconcrete nature of how the envisioned property model could indeed be implemented 
without collateral effects on the baseline model of respecting participant rights. Last but 
certainly not least, the model should also be compatible with a generally defensible interest 
in effective and successful genomic research (cf. Bovenberg 2004).  
Interestingly, there have been various proposals in different legislations that are in line 
with Laurie’s and others’ approaches (though not in Europe). The most concrete plans of 
installing property in the context of protecting the personal right to privacy for sample 
donors were put forward in the US (cf. Purtova 2011). In 1995, Oregon became the first 
state in the country to declare DNA the private property of an individual. After lobbying 
from pharmaceutical industry and representatives of biotechnology research who saw this 
proposal as stifling innovation and investment, long-lasting debate involving also 
stakeholders of the public and healthcare services followed. In 2001, the property clause 
was eventually replaced with a statement relating again to the protection of confidentiality 
and privacy (Everett 2003; 2007).  
Why was that? Withholding rights to property is associated with loss of control in samples 
and data – the ‘disappearance’ of legitimate interests of research participants and their trust 
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in research. The installment of (traditional) individual property rights, on the other hand, 
faces manifold theoretical and practical problems. First, the idea of making consent more 
transparent within the regular consent paradigm as a kind of enforceable contract (cf. 
Dickenson 2007) is inhibited by the problem of a lack of concrete information within 
biobank research. 
In terms of legal construction, ‘property in the person’ in Laurie’s sense can be envisioned 
similar to intellectual property, that is, one could have rights to information from the 
sample similar to copyright protection in an aesthetic work for the creator. This right can 
be abandoned and therewith any future claim to control unauthorised copying of the work. 
Laurie points out that European legislation protects nonetheless moral rights in aesthetic 
creations, the personality of the creator as embodied in the work, so to say. Therefore, even 
after abandonment, ”Inter alia, they protect against derogatory treatment of the work if this 
will adversely affect the reputation of the creator, and they ensure due recognition of the 
creator’s identity whenever the work is placed in the public domain” (Laurie 2004: 325).  
It is thus not enough to counter this proposal by reference to a strict distinction between 
tangible and intangible property aspects that would be a conceptual or legal necessity, and 
assume that therefore there can be no property in samples and information for an 
individual. After all, there are various forms of intellectual property covering these aspects, 
although some of them seem to be more policy tools than personality protection. This 
analogy, however, could also lead us to think of property claims in terms of what kind of 
role we want participants to play in a research process that fosters innovation. 
Matteo Macilotti has used the description of human tissue ‘in 3 dimensions’, that is, 
material, informational, and moral or ‘relational’ as the actual governance challenge, 
because “the distinction between these three dimensions […] is only theoretical, given that 
in nature these three dimensions of human tissue are inextricably linked to one another and 
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the bundles of rights originated from them overlap. Therefore, to understand the rights of 
the human subjects, it is not sufficient to study the characteristics of these three 
dimensions, but it is also necessary to analyse how these dimensions are related to each 
other” (Macilotti 2013: 144).  
More than that, it is necessary to determine the border between person and thing 
normatively, and not rely on a fixed and inherent limit of the law. Therefore, in the 
constructivist perspective, it would also be possible to circumvent the problem of self-
ownership or self-commodification by, for example, innovatively disassembling the sticks 
of the bundle of property and propose a new kind of ‘bio-property’ (cf. De Faria 2009; 
Hoppe 2009) which might avoid problematic consequences in terms of commodification. 
In theory then, one can stick with what would remain essentially a gift model, but with 
more control powers for the individual donor: gifts with particular ‘strings’.  
However, some issues remain problematic as the assignment of property is not an 
assignment of de facto powers:  
The reality is that biological material can be transferred and dealt with in ways which do not 
involve legal ownership, but rather issues of possession and use. Consequently, ownership may 
in fact be far less important than the question of how the party that uses the biological material 
has obtained that material.  
(Otlowski 2007: 137)
73
 
This means that legislation could focus on access policies and restricting using and sharing 
rather than empowering donors via property rights (cf. Roche 2010; Bellivier and Noiville 
2011), even if this certainly would not seem to echo the trend of massive networking and 
data-sharing.  
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 Cf. Janger 2005.  
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What one should not conclude in normative terms taking into account these limitations, is 
that we are then back with privacy, or the ambivalence of autonomy as the only guiding 
normative ideas for governing research. Conceptually and morally, both aspects of the 
privacy paradigm and property-like concepts continue to be of importance. Even though 
the normative border between person and thing is loose, this can be deployed in a number 
of ways. Traditionally, effective and enforceable property seems to presuppose ‘thingness’, 
and the possibility to split the ‘thing’ from, for example, the ‘self’, which some authors 
assimilate indeed with a moral fragmentation via notions of property:  
Property produces a fragmented relationship between the body and its owner, the 
person ‘inside’ the body, in contrast with privacy, which creates an indivisible 
corporeal identity. By uncoupling the body from the person and undermining the unity 
of the physical being, the property paradigm facilitates fragmentation of the body itself, 
both literally and figuratively. […] Privacy theory, on the other hand, forecloses such 
bodily fragmentation by identifying the person with his or her physical presence. 
Hence, privacy shields the individual against corporeal invasion and alteration and 
preserves the unity and integrity of the embodied being.   
       (Rao 2000: 429) 
 
Similarly, Herring and Chau stress the interconnectedness of human bodies (Herring and 
Chau 2007; 2013):  
an important part of the picture of our bodies is that they are giving and taking not only 
from the world around, but also from other bodies. This, we suggest, is part of the 
difficulty in finding an appropriate legal response to the classification of bodies. No 
single model can capture the nuances of bodily life: that our bodies are ours; are in 
relationship with others; are in constant flux; and yet central to our identity of 
ourselves.  
(Herring and Chau 2007: 52) 
However, as Rao adds, property is powerful, and therefore naturally perceived to offer not 
only a shield to invasion into my private sphere, but positive claims against the remover of 
what is ‘mine’, and also third parties.  
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The property paradigm […] alone affords a complete bundle of rights that are enforceable 
against the whole world. In the face of strong property rights on the part of researchers and 
research institutions, the theoretical freedom to contract and the meager interest in privacy 
leave those who supply body parts vulnerable to exploitation.  
(Rao 2007: 380) 
The claims of a right to privacy or bodily integrity, instead, “may only be effective against 
the remover.” This presumption, Herring and Chau clarify, “may however depend on a 
particular notion of rights of autonomy or privacy” (Herring and Chau 2007: 44). This 
consideration brings us back to the underlying property logic of consent, which as I have 
argued is an irreducible and morally important dimension of the complex of rights that 
underlie the universal requirement of consent and the protection of research subjects in 
general. It would need a very refined new concept of privacy and autonomy that could 
incorporate this property dimension and also be effective in confrontation with the hybrid 
entities between person and thing created and perpetuated by life science research.  
The distinction between privacy and property, independently from their concrete legal 
conceptualization and real-world effectiveness, seems even less sharp then many 
commentators propose.
74
 In particular, the notion of property is not only a signifier of a 
disaggregation of the body, an issue that is of particular relevance for long-term research in 
genomics. Ironically, property-like notions and rights are needed to establish continuing 
interests in both selfhood and what has been called (bio-)informational self-determination. 
This already convoluted outlook is augmented since ‘property’, in itself, is conceptually 
fragmented.  
Margaret Radin, for example, in discussing ‘Contested Commodities’, puts forward a 
distinction between ‘personal property’ and ‘fungible property’. Personal property or 
‘property for personhood’ concerns what is quintessential for a thick notion of personhood 
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in terms of wellbeing and flourishing. The human body as a whole, in this sense, will be 
property for personhood. But this normative notion can also cover functional aspects, in 
that material, technical ‘objects’ can be central to this concept of personhood (such as a 
cardiac pacemaker). ‘Fungible property’, on the contrary, can be traded. It is alienable, in 
particular market-alienable, i.e. it can be sold in the marketplace (cf. Radin 1987; 1996). 
Using Radin’s distinction, it is clear that for a donor, a tissue sample containing DNA is a 
multifaceted conglomerate of personal and fungible property aspects. This complexity 
increases as the sample gets involved in the research process and might be transformed into 
other forms or ‘bio-objects’, slides or a cell-line, and as data tied to the sample accumulate 
concerning the donor and the research. The sample is alienated from the source, but still 
retains a morally important link to a person. 
In summary, invoking the notions and quasi-rights of property is a necessary corrective to 
the overemphasis on often thin accounts of patient or donor autonomy and their ill-defined 
and potentially ineffective rights to confidentiality and privacy. Property is also used to 
navigate the question of individual identity and its protection in confrontation with genetic/ 
genomic information and to determine the boundaries or non-boundaries of the self (cf. 
Widdows 2007). As Rich et al. have formulated: “What circumscribes the body-self (i.e., 
where are its boundaries)? What ‘belongs’ to me or is a part of me and what is not? And, 
therefore, what should be considered with some respect of personhood or dignity, or, at 
least, come under my own decision-making control?” (Rich et al. 2012: 4).  
While legally recognized property rights normally presuppose alienability, tissue rights 
would have to point to an extension of the self to familial and new group identities, in 
particular with an eye on their genomic ‘content’:  
because of the nature of genes, it may be argued that genetic information about any individual 
should not be regarded as personal to that individual, but as the common property of other 
people who may share those genes, and who need the information in order to find out their own 
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genetic constitution. If so, an individual's prima right to confidentiality and privacy might be 
regarded as overridden by the rights of others to access to information about themselves. 
(Royal College of Physicians 1991, quoted in Sommerville and English 1999) 
 
However, this is a non-technical usage of ‘property’ that also has its perils, and so it seems 
that new interpretations and implementations of autonomy as a key reference in bioethics 
are at least equally relevant.  
Cautiously contra Herring and Chau it can also be argued that property-like entitlements as 
applied to body parts convey an important sense of ‘territorial integrity’, as Courtney 
Campbell has proposed. She distinguishes three moral meanings or topoi of the property 
paradigm in biomedical ethics: territorial integrity, alienation and empowerment, of which 
territorial integrity seems to have moral priority (Campbell 1992) – in contrast, as we have 
seen, to the interpretation in legal theory, in which alienability tends to be central. For 
biobank research, this again would presuppose that we think of body parts and even minute 
samples to a certain extent in terms of corporeality and not as pure or quasi-pure 
information (cf. Halewood 1996; Parry and Gere 2006). 
The main concrete, and more positive moral aspect of the property framework that should 
be incorporated into the ethics of biobanks is the issue of a legitimate donor or participant 
control interest.  
And what about ‘income rights’? Arguments against remuneration and sale of bodily 
material, including to a biobank, are not of a very strict principled nature, but based on 
interests, in particular interests in efficient use of biomaterial by researchers and product 
developers. This must be kept in mind if, in terms of policy, we decide against the payment 
of participants. The arguments against this policy from the perspective of participants are 
that payment in most cases would not be part of the best justified moral rights of the 
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participant of continuing control – given that the only ‘technical’ or legal ascription of a 
property right does not solve the problem of unequal representation of powers and 
interests.  
Also, insofar the slippery slope problem of commodification of tissues cannot be 
thoroughly banned ex ante, pleading for a widespread remuneration would seem wrong. 
Participants have an interest in an effective and yet respectful use of their material, and 
therefore in limited use rights of researchers, plus, if properly informed, third parties. This 
is a qualified argument against remuneration, based on two considerations, a more 
structural and a moral one. In the structural, the ascription of property is considered 
recommendable if it can be anticipated that this will help to distribute scarce resources 
efficiently. Yet, it seems unlikely that strictly individual rights over single samples can be 
used to help the efficient allocation of resources and information for research. This is 
partly because it is hard to anticipate the valuableness of the material, and partly because in 
the face of this uncertainty individuals would suddenly have gained an enormous power 
over their material that might nonetheless remain only theoretical.  
The more stringent worry seems to be the moral one: there are good reasons to be skeptical 
that we would want markets in tissue samples and DNA that could not only change 
drastically how human beings view bodily material, but also research organization more 
generally if turned into a matter of mainly bargaining and contracting. In contrast to 
control property rights, income property rights of individuals do not sustain basic moral 
rights in the same way control rights would, and they seem to conflict more 
straightforwardly with the shared interests providers and users have.
75
 All of this, however, 
is based on the demanding requirement that there actually is a sense of shared interests that 
                                                          
75
 Potential income rights are to be distinguished from individual benefit-sharing in case of 
commercialization of an invention based on ‘donated’ bodily material. In both cases the individual 
contribution to an end product of knowledge or a pharmaceutical product might, however, be impossible to 
determine. This does not preclude that in special cases such as Moore, contractual agreements could settle 
financial aspects. Cf. Schneider 2010. 
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is transparent for all parties to the research project, and that gives people on this basis 
choices for exercising their quasi-property rights.  
These quasi-property rights that attach to the personality rights of participants insofar their 
tissue remains ‘personal’ has to be made explicit in the context of large-scale research. 
Participants have no particular interests or rights in strictly anonymous tissue, but insofar it 
is not, they have primary rights that are not only ‘technical’ rights pertaining to data flow 
but rights that pertain to moral agency. While the rights over the tissue in itself are prima 
facie strictly individualistic, genomic information, sequencing data etc. can be relevant for 
other individuals and groups, which in turn limits the individual claims to quasi-property as 
an expression of individual moral agency. Insofar we want to look at tissue for research in 
three-dimensional fashion, this significantly complicates a solution to the individual 
control rights through legally recognized property. It would presumably require to clarify 
the question of the right to know and/ or not to know, and will be an issue when the 
distinction between research, diagnostics and/ or treatment has become even more clearly 
blurred. Here, I have concentrated more on the supply side of biobanking, though with 
flanking considerations about the larger effects on biobank ethics and governance.  
For the questions of governance that we will focus on in the remainder, property, privacy 
and consent are all not enough by themselves to provide control, which must also be 
possible to be limited by the claims of others. While there is an irreducible aspect of 
personality and self in every sample that leads to the moral recognition of a quasi-property 
right, researchers have strong claims to possess and use samples within the limits of what a 
donor considers his fundamental interest. As we have seen, making these interests visible 
and giving participants choices in practical terms can seem overwhelmingly complicated 
and therefore appear perhaps neglectable.  
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We might, however, draw some attention from individualistic interests in strong control 
rights to morally defensible uses of large-scale research projects and the fair distribution of 
research ‘resources’. Naturally, these two aspects converge, as can be seen for instance in 
the controversies surrounding patentable organisms and genetic sequences. Often, not 
necessarily patents in themselves are considered problematic, but effects and ‘transaction 
costs’ on research culture, research priorities, and the involvement of stakeholders in 
contexts of great power differences. While this is a topic that cannot be adequately 
introduced here, it is a project that must complement the questioning of donor rights in 
biomaterials and information. If individual rights to property in body parts are limited – 
though actually rather for lack of concepts than moral title (cf. Holm 2006) – then 
certainly, in a further step, we should equally question the strength of moral title users 
rather than providers have. 
The second conclusion is that individual control rights and the more overarching interest in 
research uses and fair distribution as ‘co-owners’ in particular in ‘public’ projects should 
be accounted for in other ways. Currently, interests in control as participation and as both 
individual and communal interests in sustaining the overall endeavour are frequently not or 
not adequately acknowledged. As a consequence,  
people feel disenfranchised from, and disempowered by, the modern machinery of research 
[and] that we face the current public crisis of confidence in research in general and genetic 
research in particular. Individuals who provide samples for research purposes are not, and do 
not feel like, stake-holders in the enterprise. The continued participation and support of the 
public in research activity can only be ensured by a fundamental reappraisal of the relationships 
with the subjects that have traditionally been accepted.  
(Laurie 2004: 311) 
The alternative seems to be sustained by neglecting the conceptual and normative issues 
related to property, “justifying a distorted gift paradigm while fuelling inconsistencies that 
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ultimately undermine public confidence in research” (ibid.: 317). As Laurie hints to 
himself, perhaps property in body parts, tissue, genetic information and research data is not 
the solution by itself, but rather finding innovative ways of relating participants and the 
research enterprise.  
This, furthermore, is not a supererogatory task, a mere advisable option. It is a clear 
demand that arises from the limitations in the protection and safeguarding of privacy, 
property and control rights of the traditional model of one-time upfront consent to research 
participation. The proposers of the research are in charge to involve participants if they so 
want to win their confidence and support and to encourage debate on the goods involved 
(cf. Williams and Schroeder 2004). Notwithstanding the conceptual, moral, legal and 
practical problems that plague the property model, so that donor-participants cannot and 
presumably should not claim strongly enforceable property rights, their moral claims 
remain. In fact, they are implicated in the universal requirement of consent and 
additionally have an expressivist function, since without them, consent might be reduced 
openly to an issue of non-liability rather than protection of personal rights (cf. Porter 2004; 
Ram 2009).  
This deceptively simple conclusion has to be ‘translated’ adequate to the scope of large-
scale research infrastructures in which potential harms and wrongs of research or other and 
future (mis)use are threatened to become invisible. Insofar we stick with consent, 
consistency requires a presumption of primacy of individual rights, and this covers 
property-like rights.  
Some authors would disagree: they infer from the non-conclusiveness of strict individual 
full-blown property rights in bodies and tissue that this primacy is to be questioned, and in 
fact, that what is not strictly private is thereby subject to public interest, and perhaps public 
ownership. 
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3.2.6 Human Tissue in the Public Sphere: A Communitarian Turn? 
In discussing the case of Moore and the potential property rights in ‘his’ spleen as well as 
the cell line produced from the biomaterial, Herring and Chau submit:  
The difficulty is that the property approach might ensure he was over-rewarded. […] There is a 
danger that valuable research into stem cell lines and DNA will be hindered if patients are able 
to claim an interest in the products. […] as our bodies partake of the great giving and taking 
between all bodies, there is an argument that it is only just that a body be made available to 
other bodies, if it holds the key to assisting them. In other words, there could be a moral 
obligation to allow one’s bodily material to be used for the benefit of others. This might even 
lead to a presumption that an individual consents for her material to be used for medical 
research. 
(Herring and Chau 2007: 53-55) 
Thus, if my body and its parts do not strictly belong to me, do they become public in some 
relevant sense? Is there actually not a moral presumption in favor of personal property or 
(misleadingly) self-ownership but rather a presumption that bodies and body parts be 
available, even made available for “the benefit of others”, for instance through research?  
In fact there is a thread in the bioethical literature proposing a link between the ‘public’ or 
‘common’ goods that biobanks and research databases are or provide, and the justification 
of deviations from traditional requirements of informed consent and the individualistic 
ethics it presupposes. Bartha Knoppers, Ruth Chadwick and others have advocated the 
need for a new ethical framework that should be established through a ‘communitarian 
turn’. In this vision, the role of individual autonomy and the related strong emphasis in 
ethics and governance of large-scale research on informed consent is to be corrected by 
innovative forms of gift-relationships and ‘collective consent’ to solidary participation in 
genomic research. In addition to solidarity, also other values such as reciprocity, mutuality, 
universality, equity and citizenry are part of this framework.  
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“Reciprocity” here is associated with the emerging trend of consent as ‘informed choice’, 
as Knoppers and Chadwick explicitly say, and signifies in extension of this development 
“recognition of the participation and contribution of the research participant” (Knoppers 
and Chadwick 2005: 75) in terms of various possibilities of research participation, but also 
in an expanded version “from exchange with the individual or his/her family to the 
community or population.”76 Similarly, “mutuality” refers to the emerging need of sharing 
genetic information with family members in contrast to the traditional emphasis on medical 
secrecy (ibid.: 76).  
“Universality” is taken to relate to the collective sense in which the genome itself, rather 
than particular values in gene-ethics, are universal: “This understanding of the human 
genome at the level of the species has led to the specific emergence of the principle of 
universality in relation to the genome. Often expressed as the common heritage of 
humanity and justifying obligations to future generations, it highlights and reinforces the 
approach of benefit-sharing (also grounded in equity) and of genomic knowledge as 
beneficial to the public” (ibid.: 77).77  
‘Benefit-sharing’ is a concept that stems from other than human genetic research contexts. 
It was applied in international policy to promote equity in access to non-human genetic 
resources, scientific inquiry and its commercial products, in particular patents in the 
biotechnology industry, for example in the UN Convention on Biological Diversity.
78
 The 
UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome states that “Benefits from advances in 
biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the human genome, shall be made available to 
all, with due regard for the dignity and human rights of each individual”79 (cf. Simm 2005: 
30). The concept of “citizenry”, finally, concerns public involvement in genomics through 
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‘citizen science’ and the effects of genomic knowledge on collective identity (Knoppers 
and Chadwick 2005: 77). For most authors in this debate, a turn to community interests is 
necessary as a matter of pragmatism, albeit not in contradiction to ethical principles and 
individual rights. Strong emphasis on individual rights and benefits must, however, be 
rethought given that this framework would provide the key to adapting the different 
principles to incipient scientific developments.  
The concrete normative undercurrents are left somewhat unexplicated, but do nonetheless 
afford strong claims of overcoming the priority of individual rights – in continuation with 
the proposal of informed consent as first and foremost informed choice. As I have argued 
above, this move does imply a serious divergence from the traditional model of participant 
protection, and so it is necessary to illuminate the motives other than pragmatism which 
might ground the novel community-orientation. Interestingly, part of the proposal 
emphasizes the supposed historical contingency of the individualistic approach. 
Accordingly, present thinking in this area is at least in part the result of a response to 
crimes against humanity in totalitarian states which occurred more than half a century ago 
— “a situation with little similarity to present research or the medical uses of databases” 
(Chadwick and Berg 2001: 320). 
Genetic information, however, would be communal, and from this it would follow that 
communal values and solidarity are more apt to genomic research uses. In particular, this 
kind of solidarity is something that is provided or enabled by the health care and research 
system, but must nonetheless start from the individual person. Accordingly, solidarity is in 
actual fact construed as a quasi-duty to participate in research, which would be very strong 
in the case of rare genetic diseases, but seems to extend to research in genomics more 
generally:  
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It is not obvious, however, why a right to refuse to participate in genetic research, when it could 
be to the benefit of others, should be overriding. On the contrary, it could be argued that one 
has a duty to facilitate research progress and to provide knowledge that could be crucial to the 
health of others. This principle of solidarity would strongly contradict a view that no research 
should be conducted if it would not directly benefit those participating in a study.  
(Chadwick and Berg 2001: 320) 
While I will leave aside the issue of historical comparability (recall, however, my 
suspicion of Elgers’ view that the appropriate protections seem to evolve ‘naturally’) some 
differentiations in terms of disease have to be anticipated. The appeal to solidarity in the 
case of specific, rare diseases might be immediately convincing, but we have to look here 
at claims that are made with respect to much more generic forms of research into often 
common, multi-factorial diseases involving different smaller and larger sections of a 
population. From the case of rare genetic disease, however, Chadwick and Berg move to 
the question of general duties of beneficence that they seem to assume are often neglected 
for unjustified or dubious reasons:  
It is questionable whether individuals should be free, from an ethical point of view, to refuse to 
help in an effort to relieve suffering for what could be regarded as trivial reasons, such as 
refusing to allow samples to be reused for research on drug abuse because of the disapproval of 
drug users.  
(Chadwick and Berg 2001: 321) 
Although Chadwick and Berg do not conceal that benefits from genomics could be 
substantial in particular for pharmaceutical companies (ibid.: 319) they assume 
concurrently that the goods and benefits brought about by this research are ‘common 
goods’, referring to knowledge concerning the molecular basis of disease, preparing the 
basis for later and new therapeutic modalities as well as the progress in diagnostics and 
treatment of disease which will accrue to society at large as well as patients and families. 
Can this general appeal to benefits and goods in these proposals with reference to different 
forms of research and different types of disease considered ground nonetheless equally 
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strong duties – in fact, the overturning of a presumably obsolete model of individualistic 
research ethics?  
Certainly this trend is confirmed by the language that high-level policy documents 
employed in particular around the turn of the millennium (cf. Chadwick 2011). In 2002, for 
instance, the Human Genome Organization designated human genomic databases ‘global 
public goods’80, a notion also appealed to by Bartha Knoppers. She suggests to conceive of 
these databases rather in analogy to the ‘public health model’, constructed around the 
problem of epidemic control. Genomic databases then would fall under the category of 
‘global public goods’ since the benefits of genomics are comparable to the non-divisible 
benefits of ‘epidemiological intelligence’, accruing globally (Knoppers 2005b: 1185; cf. 
Thorsteinsdóttir et al. 2003). Chadwick and Wilson, in discussing the relevance of this 
proposal for population biobanks and genomics generally, advise that the notion must be 
understood rather as a strategic, policy-oriented one. But what does this imply in ethical 
terms? 
In their reconstruction, the argument for genomic databases as ‘global public goods’ runs 
as follows: 
(1) Public goods are goods which are non-rivalrous and non-excludable.
81
  
(2) Global public goods are public goods the enjoyment of which is not limited  
to any specific geographical area. 
(3) Knowledge is the archetypal global public good. 
(4) Genomics is a form of knowledge. 
(5) Genomics knowledge is a global public good. 
(6) A fortiori, genomic databases, in so far as they contain genomics knowledge, are  
a global public good. 
(Chadwick and Wilson 2004: 125) 
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According to Chadwick and Wilson, it must be clarified whether a global public good in 
this sense is ‘natural’ or ‘social’, and also what the “global” refers to more specifically, i.e. 
who exactly benefits in terms of socio-economic classes, present and/or future generations 
etc. As a first concretization, the authors propose to look at the economic dimension that 
seems to be implicit in the argument and the policy-driven appeal to label genomic 
databases ‘public goods’. This means, beyond a descriptive level, to consider externalities, 
benefits or burdens including spill-over effects; long-term consequences, or savings in 
healthcare.  
Generally, as Chadwick and Wilson point out, in economic terms “goods are public 
because there is insufficient incentive for the market to provide them publicly. This is 
because the non-excludable nature of an item means that it is not possible to charge very 
much, if anything at all, for it, as persons will not pay for an item they can access for free. 
That is, the property of non-excludability leads to a ‘free-rider’ problem” (ibid.: 127). In 
the case of the Icelandic Health Sector Database, for example, “commercial ownership also 
demonstrates that genomic databases will be provided by the market where there is deemed 
to be sufficient financial incentive to do so, contrary to the economic definition of public 
goods as a response to market failure” (ibid.: 132). In fact, while the knowledge contained 
in the HSD is prima facie non-excludable, full access to the database requires paying a fee. 
Here, Chadwick and Wilson point to a mingling of descriptive and normative levels in the 
general appeal to genomic databases as public goods in which conditions of access are 
downplayed, while benefits that could accrue to the public are emphasized. This works 
since the theoretically non-rivalrous and non-excludable human genome in abstracto is the 
basis for the information held in the databases, and thereby grounds arguments claiming 
that genomics knowledge is a global public good.  
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In the Human Genome Project, for instance, both public and private aspects of genomics 
became very pronounced as a publicly financed and a commercially supported project were 
racing to finish the sequencing efforts first. Now, the sequences are public, but of course it 
remains still true that “each individual’s genome is very much private and ‘rivalrous’ – my 
genome is my genome and cannot be used by anyone else. Similarly, there is a way in 
which the genome is not non-excludable, as currently access to a person’s genome is fully 
excludable, controlled by that person (or perhaps by parental authority)” (ibid.: 130). In 
short, the human genome can be species level ‘common heritage’, but tokens are prima 
facie private. The appeal to the public good of genomics and as genomic databases 
accentuates the species-level of human rights and interests at stake, and the genetic 
similarity of human beings (cf. Kauffmann 2011). 
Notwithstanding these characteristics, the extent to which research knowledge is indeed a 
‘pure’ public good (cf. Stiglitz 1999) is increasingly questionable in particular in relation to 
genomics. There is a certain extent of excludability due to patentability, trade secrets in 
biotechnology etc. This is a complex policy problem, since the excludability or a limited 
access to information and exploitation of a ‘resource’ is morally justified by the 
assumption that overall knowledge increases and will be widely accessible. Certainly, 
‘access goods’ (such as education and infrastructure) as well as social arrangements play a 
role, and can lead to large differences in technologically advantaged vs. technologically 
disadvantaged parts of the world – indeed an issue international organizations have tried to 
draw attention to by promoting benefit-sharing.  
For Chadwick and Wilson, the result for genomics as a ‘global public good’ is mixed:  
Knowledge generally, and in the specific instance of genomics knowledge, is illustrative of a 
continuum from public to private, excludable to non-excludable, along which goods may be 
placed […] Despite some strong global public good characteristics, genomic data-bases as they 
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are currently being developed are generally following a private good model, primarily because 
of the restrictions in access imposed through either financial or technological constraints. 
 (Chadwick and Wilson 2004: 128; 133) 
In particular, commercial research use can seriously delimit non-excludability. As to the 
strategic policy use of what now seems rather a metaphor with vague normative 
connotations, they cautiously remark that ‘end goods’ such as the specific goals in 
healthcare and problems in global justice remain relatively implicit. Yet, given that these 
ends goods have not been specified, it would seem more appropriate to renounce reference 
to global public goods for the time being. 
Chadwick and Wilson assume that the appeal to the public-good nature of genomics is 
equally important for various forms of biobanks. As we have seen, there is undeniably a 
strong tendency of conceptualizing all the relevant ethical issues in terms of access to and 
protection of information, the prototypical public good. Indeed, also the statement of the 
Human Genome Organization has changed the order of priority with regard to traditional 
research ethics, as sharing of data and genomics knowledge is considered primary to the 
“choices and privacy of individuals, families and communities with respect to the use of 
their data.”82  
The large gap between defenders of the ‘public good approach’ – even if they admit some 
limitations – and other voices raising strong concerns is striking and parallel to the debate 
on the viability of high informed consent standards. Some authors have considered the 
supposedly firmly grounded ‘communitarian turn’ part of a more pervasive movement 
towards increasing social control also to be witnessed in other developments such as 
biometrics, so that eventually technological innovation will be linked increasingly with 
public health control and security policy (cf. Rommetveit 2011; Kauffmann 2011). 
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As an example of how individualistic medical ethics adapted to such a trend with reference 
to ‘common goods’, Rommetveit uses the recent set up of the digital Norwegian Health 
Registry. In a white paper concerning ethical questions, in particular privacy, it is 
contended that the four principles of medical ethics – autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice (cf. Beauchamp and Childress 2012) – “ were primarily intended 
for the healthcare context, that is, aiming at treatments for individual patients. Health 
registries, on the other hand, are different, because their primary purpose is aimed at the 
collective level.” Consequently, “the white paper immediately translates the four principles 
into the ‘‘parallel’’ principles of integrity, safety, utility, and solidarity”, while specific 
consent to such an endeavour is devalued as too cumbersome, even meaningless for the 
health registry participants, quite analogous to the case of research biobanks. In a nutshell: 
“the common good is equated with the perceived needs and interests of science” 
(Rommetveit 2011: 586). 
Yet – is this really as problematic as Rommetveit suggests? Some analysts, for instance 
John Harris, have tackled the issue from the opposite direction (Harris 2005; Irving and 
Harris 2007; Chan and Harris 2009).
83
 Harris thinks that there is an unjustified 
presumption against scientific research and medical research more specifically which is 
sustained by international guidelines and recommendations that not only advocate for 
strong safeguards – in particular: informed consent – but assume that people do not “wish 
to act in the public interest.” In effect, “the overwhelming presumption has been and 
remains that participation in research is a supererogatory, and probably a reckless, act not 
an obligation” (Harris 2005: 245; 242). This is wrong-headed, according to Harris, and 
instead there is a positive moral duty to sustain and participate in research based on a duty 
of beneficence and the principle of fairness. A position that, as VanderWalde and Kurzban 
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point out, had already gained a wide appeal in the 1960s at least in the US, before the 
scandals of Tuskegee and others lead to reconsiderations (cf. VanderWalde and Kurzban 
2011: 544/ 545 and Jonas 1969). The public good of medical research has to be sustained 
by public participation, similar to institutions such as mandatory jury service. Harris 
clarifies that 
we are talking of research directed toward preventing serious harm or providing significant 
benefits to human-kind. In all cases the degree of harm or benefit must justify the degree of 
burden on research subjects, individuals, or society. […] Of course the research must also be 
serious in the sense that the project is well designed and with reasonable prospect of leading to 
important knowledge that will benefit persons in the future. […] the argument is restricted to 
research projects that are not merely aimed at producing knowledge. Unless an increase in 
knowledge is a good in itself (a question I will not discuss here) some realistic hope of concrete 
benefits to persons in the future is necessary for the validity of our arguments.  
(Harris 2005: 242) 
 
What do we make of this for biobank research? In Harris’ view it is evident that 
“minimally invasive and minimally risky procedures such as participation in biobanks, 
provided safeguards against wrongful use are in place” (ibid.: 247) are covered by the 
moral duty to participate in research. In contrast, I will maintain here that, as in the earlier 
discussion of Hansson’s, Sheehan’s and Stjernschantz Forsberg’s arguments, this proposal 
lacks sufficient grounding in reality to be of moral guidance. Most importantly, the issue of 
risk is bracketed, and instead benefits taken for granted. Harris’ reasoning cannot 
circumvent this gap, because larger-scale research projects such as biobanks do not provide 
obvious significant benefits without incurring any costs to participation. As I have been 
discussing before, while it is true that the concepts and arguably their interpretation and 
application of traditional research ethics are strongly individualistic, it remains to be shown 
why basic individual rights can literally be ‘risked’, i.e. only be important if they are about 
to be vitiated.  
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This is not, in fact, what Harris is arguing, I am only stressing that this might be the result 
if there remains too little clarification of what is indeed controversial: the specific goods 
and risks biobank and genomics research can provide. Public goods cannot survive if there 
is increasing free-riding, but a general appeal to the benefits of research is far too weak to 
ground a duty to participate in research if clearly there is disagreement about benefits, 
risks, and the adequate safeguards in place. Notably, safeguards for participation in 
biobank research must be considered in a long-term horizon. As we have seen in the debate 
concerning the notion of genomic databases as global public goods, the public aspects of 
this research are in no way ‘natural’, but would have to be strategically fostered.  
Harris argument is therefore, if not wrong, abstract and rather a counter-declaration that 
could sustain Chadwick’s and Knoppers’ communitarian turn if there was some 
clarification of the aims at stake (cf. Holm et al. 2009). He does, however, invoke the 
‘public interest’ of the liberal tradition. This seems to denote the majority interest, i.e. a 
broadly utilitarian summation of choices or preferences rather than respect for e.g. the 
interests of minorities (cf. Bialobrzeski et al. 2012; Simm 2011). As biobanks are planned 
and initiated often by public bodies, it is clear that some form of wider, ‘public’ interest is 
at stake. However, most biobanks and in particular their networking and use as a platform 
for translational medicine and new health products will require close interaction with 
commercial partners. Evidence of this potential and concrete benefits, however, are not 
widely available to the public. One might even consider that these are large-scale, real-time 
experiments with insufficient ‘public’ consent, acting on expectations and promises rather 
than proof (cf. Rommetveit 2011). 
In this perspective, the appeal to a more substantive notion of the common good to be 
created through biobank-based research is useful only if it leads to a debate of the core 
values to be promoted in health research. Both liberal and communitarian ideals will 
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involve some form of public participation in defining and deliberating about essential 
values of society, though these values might diverge in the details. Nevertheless, public 
interest and a more substantive ‘common good’ might be reconciled or brought to 
converge by deliberation (cf. Sutrop 2011; Simm 2011). Public debate, however, is largely 
absent, notwithstanding the Council of Europe’s recommendation “for the widest possible 
participation by citizens in the discussion on the human genome through the involvement 
of the European media and suitable and accurate information by the Council of Europe.”84 
Only few attempts have been made in the philosophical literature to answer the question 
when genomics research contributes to public interest or common good, including potential 
consequences for ethical safeguards and their relaxation. Hoedemaekers et al.’s (2006; 
2007) articles will be used here to give a preliminary assessment. A key precondition of 
their effort is the assumption that privacy risks are under control and that consent can serve 
to control personal data and biomaterial. First, the broad aim of genomics research – health 
– must be related to a generic conception of “common good”. The authors distinguish two 
versions, ‘corporate’ and generic common good: in the corporate conception something 
poses a threat to the common good only if it jeopardizes the continued existence or proper 
functioning of society as a whole, e.g. war, famine, terrorism, in which restrictions of 
autonomy can be justified. As for diseases, this will concern only contagious diseases, 
pandemics, not most common diseases, in which the generic conception of common good 
means that basic and fundamental values, such as well-being, self-realization, and freedom 
of choice will be promoted, while the common good is threatened if diseases restrict 
pursuit of (individual) values of this kind (Hoedemaekers et al. 2006: 420).  
Therefore, the next problem that must then be specified is how individual health relates to 
the common good, to which different values can be ascribed: from intrinsic to more 
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instrumental. By and large, we can assume that “individual health can be seen as 
instrumental for the realization of core values in a society without which the fulfillment of 
these individual life-plans would not be possible” (ibid.: 421). Moreover, diseases are a 
threat to participation in public life, to individual maintenance and deliberation about core 
societal values and of course to economic performance.  
Genomics is supposed to have an enormous impact on healthcare, and consequently the 
relation between the system of healthcare and common good has to be established. 
According to the authors, the necessity of healthcare rests on these main factors: 
restoration of autonomous functioning, social functioning, and effectiveness. Additionally, 
in terms of necessity, conditions with a greater disease burden support stronger claims of 
necessity of healthcare, while generally, “the degree of impairment of individual, 
autonomous, and social functioning is a fourth guiding principle to determine when health 
care services contribute to the common good” (ibid.: 422). 
We can now approach the next level to establish how genomic research might contribute to 
the common good. In this perspective, economic gains are not a practicable point of 
reference yet since there are high expectations of saving costs through the realization of 
Personalised Medicine, whereas currently most research is at a basic stage. The focus 
should consequently be on the research itself and its priorities. Clearly, common complex 
diseases affect large numbers of individuals and so more effective diagnosis and 
interventions could indeed have an immense impact with subsequent health care savings. 
The preliminary conclusion is thus that “genomic research which aims to develop new (or 
more effective) interventions for diseases which seriously impair individual autonomous 
and social functioning will contribute to the common good” (ibid.: 423). 
While this point is crucial in giving some content to the notion of common good – i.e. 
disease burden calculation is crucial – what does this imply for potential individual 
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sacrifices? One possibility, as Hoedemaekers et al. propose, is to try to establish the link 
between the loss of control by donation/participation and loss of autonomy expected from 
not undertaking research, and thereby make sacrifices and benefits in genomics 
commensurable. One could accordingly balance: loss of control that a proposed consent 
procedure involves and loss of control involved in the condition that is the subject of a 
specific genomic study. In case of a serious disease which involves loss of control over 
mind or body, weaker forms of consent that entail a certain loss of control might be 
justified (ibid.: 424). The assumption is that apart from inevitable dis-analogies loss of 
control boils down to emotional distress and can be assimilated on this basis. 
A more complicated problem might be the balancing of imminent harms and future 
benefits. Here, the authors assume that small sacrifices are defensible:  
We can assume that future generations will share our vulnerability to physical and mental 
disease and suffering and that they will be in need of effective medical services. Present-day 
genomic research can contribute to this aim […] from a health perspective there are good 
reasons to include the next few generations in our moral community. The expectation is that in 
the future most genomic research will actually contribute to the relief of suffering of patients 
with serious diseases or disabilities. We now have the possibility (in terms of personnel and 
financial resources) to reduce their suffering and this means that we also have a duty to do so. 
(Hoedemaekers et al. 2007: 349) 
A balancing in terms of loss of control seems a useful guiding principle, however, as the 
authors add, concrete context will be crucial – i.e. which genomic research and which 
forms of consent are practicable.  
The final conclusion is that loss of control might be justified in case the following provisos 
hold: (1) a certain loss of control is necessary, (2) the degree of loss of control involved in 
a proposed consent procedure use is examined precisely, and (3) this is undertaken on a 
case-by-case basis. Importantly: “The burden of proof here is on the researchers. They 
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should propose and defend any consent procedure which diverges from the ideal standard” 
(Hoedemaekers et al. 2006.: 428).  
A point that I have been insisting on, however, and that is not discussed in their 
reconstruction, is that loss of control and expected benefits cannot be made strictly 
commensurable if we stick with the primacy of the protection of individual rights through 
informed consent. This, of course, relates also to the fact that the precondition of 
Hoedemaekers et al.’s proposal is that risks to individual privacy are under control, which 
seems de facto rather uncertain. Informed consent implies the primacy of individual rights, 
and these rights are wider and deeper than informed choice, covering property-like aspects 
in the case of identifiable material. While we might think that all rights are tied to duties, 
there do not seem to be any strict duties to research participation that can in any 
straightforward sense be related to the protection of integrity and autonomy in research.  
The invocation of a public good cannot foreclose the primacy of these rights, or, vice 
versa, the primacy of individual rights and therefore consent are incommensurable were 
the provision of sufficiently ‘public’ or ‘common’ goods is concerned (O’Neill 2003; 
2004b). In the case of biobanking for genomics, the goods and in particular their 
publicness are rather underdetermined. The public is largely excluded from the possibility 
to have more transparent information and/ or involvement in the research, but even if they 
were not, and a biobank project was planned and controlled publicly, there is no specific 
duty that the goods these infrastructures provide must be sustained ‘in kind’, in particular, 
again, if there are risks attached.  
The arguments towards a dilution of rights do not rest on a sufficiently strong normative 
basis. First, while consent can be broader for purely epistemological reasons to some 
extent, the primacy of the individual in the traditional model is quasi-absolute. It certainly 
is in the treatment context, while there are exceptions to privacy protection in the case of 
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emergency etc. Second, limitations to individual interests could be based on a common 
agenda of health research in the public interest or as a common good. Both cases demand a 
certain amount of deliberation, and the definition of aims and conditions of valuable 
research (cf. Christensen 2009). In terms of genomics as providing the public good of 
knowledge, we have seen that this might imply restrictions on intellectual property (cf. 
Spinello 2004). In the more radical or substantive version, biobank genomic research 
would have to promote the common good e.g. in the way Hoedemaekers et al. propose. In 
the most radical version, genomics could be part of a normative regime of a commons, in 
which the aim is more symmetric access to the resources on the ground and the benefits 
that are to be expected from the research.  
This would have considerable implications for sharing of samples, data and knowledge 
derived from research, however, it is to a certain extent implied by the new policies of 
open data and similar trends. ‘Commons’ in genetic resources and information, yet, would 
not be strictly property regimes. In analogy to the sovereignty claims of states in the 
context of global genetic commons concerning e.g. plant genetic resources, the individual 
property-like claims to individual samples and information would remain primary. At the 
same time, access to genomic information relevant for e.g. family members must be 
secured. This would not be possible by strictly individual legal rights. Rather, the 
commons for genomics would be an expanding normative regime of knowledge 
governance (cf. Schmietow 2012). 
In sum, individual property-like rights are an irreducible part of the requirement of consent 
for research participation. This is particularly evident if we concentrate on informational 
and privacy-relevant aspects. Contrary to what many authors suggest, however, the 
perceived tension between individual and society cannot be smoothened through broader 
versions of consent without trade-off effects. The question of governing knowledge flow 
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downstream is a separate one – in the larger picture, indeed, we might rather want to 
overcome excessive property claims based on policy interests.  
While there is no direct conceptual tension between rights and interests – and therefore 
between the moral rights of donors and for instance the policy interests in a patented 
genome sequence, in practice there is a tension because biobank research requires risk-
taking in a long-term orientation, and the promotion of the openness of data proceeds 
without adequate oversight and the recognition of differences in bargaining power 
involved (cf. Porter 2004). 
In the last part, I will illustrate that this discussion, extended to notions of property, 
ownership and the claims of the public must not lead to anti-community oriented over-
rewarding or overprotection of individual participants, but instead helps to outline a more 
comprehensive and balanced picture of individual and social interests in this research. This 
has wide-reaching implications for the property-structures in place, new dimensions of 
consent in large-scale infrastructures for future science and indeed the overall relation 
between individuals, researchers and genomics as a social project. 
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4. Implications for Governance 
 
4.1 The Technical Solution: The Tissue Trust 
 
The property-like control rights of individual participants attach to ‘donated’ bio-material 
insofar it remains ‘personal’, i.e. concerns sensitive information, but also insofar control 
rights are necessary to safeguard uses of research tissue that are in accordance with an 
individuals’ wishes. Therefore, following the legal reasoning of e.g. the German law, strict 
anonymization is not necessary, but this would imply that property interests must be 
accounted for. This means in turn that data are to be held ‘in trust’, as limited ‘real’ 
property and precluding strong ownership, for instance the totality of the rights Honoré’s 
bundle approach lists (cf. Schnorrenberg 2010). 
As for the perspective of property in tissue that has been developed here, participant 
interests extend into the public sphere, so that both individual and communal rights can be 
considered: privacy and property are concepts describing also important relational 
interests, rather than only control over and exploitation of biomaterial and genomic 
information. To maintain individual rights and further the public dimension, what is 
needed is therefore a governance model that is able to bridge these aspects. Contractual or 
commercially oriented models which have been proposed (cf. Porter 2004; Noiville 2009; 
Bovenberg 2005; 2006), in contrast, do not seem suitable to protect donor rights while 
simultaneously maximizing scientific value. It is hence crucial to complement a research 
framework based on contractual kinds of consent alone that might in reality preclude 
further control and in which “when patients agree to donate tissue or blood, they sign away 
their control and oversight. Patients might disagree with a particular commercial or 
scientific use of their material, but they have no right to be kept informed about it.” As a 
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result, the “patient’s right of withdrawal is worth little without a constant flow of new 
information” (Winickoff and Winickoff 2003: 1181). 
In the model of a ‘Charitable Trust’ or ‘Biotrust’ (Winickoff and Winickoff 2003; 
Winickoff and Neumann 2005), the ongoing relation between body parts and person is 
‘institutionalized’, “instead of allowing donated materials to disappear into the 
unaccountable vortex of “research” or the market exchange” (Winickoff and Neumann: 
14). Participants explicitly transfer property rights to an intermediate party under 
conditions of a fiduciary relationship in which a trustee holds title to the property, but is 
bound by obligations to use it for the beneficiary or other specified purposes. This might 
prevent misuse of altruistic intention to provide biomaterial, but it would also have to be 
ensured that the bio-repository has a duty to make the property in human material 
productive, and provide for mechanisms to counter power imbalances between the sources, 
the trustee and the beneficiaries – in particular the public (Andorno 2007: 42/43). The 
Charitable Trust model does not exclude involving private funding but would separate 
functions related to funding and control functions (Boggio 2005). Concerning the bundle 
of rights the trustee is entitled to, emphasis is clearly on use and control, and would 
exclude in particular rights to unrestricted sale. Winickoff’s model aims at implementing 
property-like interests of donor-participants in human tissue in the restricted moral sense 
that has been defended here, which  
is not tantamount to endorsing a full spectrum of alienable property rights, for example the right 
to sell tissue at any time for cash compensation. […] the charitable trust is a legal tool for 
effecting this norm of non-commodification. The structure relies on the recognition of a 
property-like interest in donated materials only for the narrow purposes of creating an 
enforceable trust relationship, one that embeds control of tissue in a managed network of non-
commodity exchange. 
(Winickoff and Neumann 2005: 13)
85
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Hospitals and research institutions accordingly act as stewards, researchers as 
‘custodians’.86 The model can implement also donor control rights, while assuming that 
most donors would participate for largely altruistic reasons, perhaps preferring ‘gifts 
without strings’. The trust as an intermediary would allow for the data flows and updates 
that research on common complex multifactorial diseases necessitates, but the fact that 
donors allow for some openness of this kind does not need to imply that all further 
potential participant interests are ‘signed off’ upfront. Instead, the aim would be a 
rethinking towards more community-driven governance in different genomic contexts, and 
shifting attention to “constitutional powers, control of resources, and public benefit” (ibid.: 
8; 10).  
A trust structure could also facilitate participation of a donor group or community on, e.g., 
a donor committee which has veto powers over research projects, or even in the form of 
serving on the board of trustees (Winickoff and Winickoff 2003: 1182/1183). Based on the 
aim of re-balancing control, Winickoff et al. anticipate recent proposals of ‘dynamic 
consent’ (infra), in which the trust engages with the donors through dedicated websites, 
specifying periods of updating consent or potential withdrawal from particular projects, in 
addition to community consultation, for instance if a particular ethnic group is to be 
involved.  
In its ideal form, this architecture would help foster […] public deliberation and learning not 
only about the use and operation of the biobank, but also about the new genetics and its effect 
on the political economy of health.  
(Winickoff and Neumann 2005: 18) 
As an expression of a ‘third way’ between commodification and inalienability of tissue, the 
trust does not exclude the involvement of commercial partners sustaining funding, 
however, this would have to be transparent to all stakeholders in terms of ‘real’ 
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partnership. In Winickoff’s proposal, “The notion of ‘partnership’ works against the idea 
of exclusive ownership, and at its core connotes a form of cooperative human relations 
with respect to shared conditions and mutual aims” (Winickoff 2008: 14). 
Here, the example of PXE international
87
 is remarkable. PXE (pseudoxanthoma elasticum, 
a connective tissue disorder) international is a rare disease organization which started up 
their own research when pharmaceutical companies would not invest in a disease affecting 
only few individuals. They established their own private biobanks and negotiate access by 
researchers to samples and data such as family histories. In cooperation with researchers, 
they even managed to be named as co-authors on scientific articles and patent applications 
(Rao 2007). Initiatives such as this one represent a new form of ‘biological citizenship’ (cf. 
Rose and Novas 2005) in which lay people indeed seem to ‘co-produce’ and ‘co-own’ 
scientific knowledge and the necessary resources, trying to overcome if not the expertise in 
science, at least some of the asymmetry in the details of setting a research agenda and its 
ethical pursuit (cf. Saha and Hurlbut 2011).  
There seem to be signs that not only smaller-scale, more homogenous study populations, 
but also the involvement of healthy participants, including ‘exploratory’ biobank research, 
can be channeled through digital tools and a bottom-up approach. Saha and Hurlbut take 
the personal genomics companies 23andMe
88
 and PatientsLikeMe
89
 as another potential 
reference: “These companies have achieved trust, while still protecting privacy. The result 
is that participants have chosen to give more than the minimum. They are rewarded by 
witnessing scientific progress in process — including what new knowledge means for them 
as individuals” (Saha and Hurlbut 2011: 313; cf. Kohane and Altman 2005).  
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Coming back to trust structures, these would presumably involve not only digital, but 
physical participation, allowing for accountability. Critics have pointed out that 
transparency and involvement of participants as equal partners in the board of a trust or a 
similar structure, however, might be limited and not representative, since people are 
suspicious of the possibility to eliminate vested interests (Hunter and Laurie 2009). While 
larger-scale governance approaches of this type might be more complicated to implement, 
the normative rationale seems to be convincing even for international collaboration. 
Winickoff and Winickoff early on mentioned the possibility of an international 
organization as a tissue trustee to be created for larger-scale genomic research (cf. 
Winickoff and Winickoff 2003). 
In the UK Biobank, for starters, it seems that some form of a trust model has been put into 
practice (Winickoff 2007; Mullen 2009). Winickoff has analysed the matter in more detail: 
has a substantive partnership approach indeed been realized, or is it perhaps a somewhat 
rhetoric move? On the face of it, public and private interests have certainly been tried to be 
kept in balance. While UK Biobank officially appropriates samples, and it is declared that 
participants will not have property rights in the samples, their use is limited in ways similar 
to what Winickoff’s model specified: 
U.K. Biobank does not intend to exercise all of these rights; for example, it will not sell 
samples. Rather, U.K. Biobank will serve as the steward of the resource, maintaining and 
building it for the public good in accordance with its purpose. This implies both the judicious 
protecting and sharing of the resource. It also extends to the careful management of any transfer 
of parts or all of the database or sample collection. 
(UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework 2007) 
Moreover, in explicit reaction to public concerns about commercialization and 
transparency (and the deCODE experience), an extensive governance framework was 
developed and public consultation conducted (Wellcome Trust 2002). The Ethics and 
Governance Council has the function of independently monitoring, guarding and reporting 
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to the public on conformity of research with the governance framework set out as well as 
potentially advise for revisions when new interests of participants and the public emerge. 
The mere advisory function has been considered as too weak by some observers, since it 
does not include effective veto powers. It could, however, exploit its function as informing 
the public to draw attention to potential issues of concern or controversy (cf. Winickoff 
2007: 445). 
The Governance Council has nevertheless been termed a “toothless tiger” (McHale 2011) 
and public engagement activities as driven by political agenda (cf. Weldon 2004b; Petersen 
2005; 2007). According to Alan Petersen,  
public engagement’ has proceeded as a kind of risk management strategy rather than as a 
genuine attempt to involve publics in shaping the overall aims, direction and management of 
the project or to open debate about the project’s value and implications. […] UK Biobank’s 
‘engagement’ efforts thus far convey the impression that these have been largely about 
managing perceived mistrust and engineering consent rather than creating the conditions for 
trust.  
(Petersen 2007: 37; 40)  
As Winickoff dissects, the terminology and normative reasoning associated with property 
and ownership were for the most part rejected in favor of ‘partnership’. In fact, it has been 
noted by other commentators that since the 1990s the ‘gift’ as a public policy keyword for 
tissue donation started to be conjoined or replaced by the new keyword ‘partner’, which 
can be adapted to a wide spectrum of normative models underpinning governance, 
spanning from pure altruism to a market approach (Tutton 2009; Sýkora 2009). 
Undeniably, the trust structure does not by itself provide solutions to potential ethical 
quandaries such as controversial research uses, concerns about commercial interactions, or 
imply more public oversight and accountability. As a consequence, it must be considered 
only prima facie more suitable for responsible biobank governance. Questions concerning 
the institutional structure cannot be separated from the ethical questions of how the value 
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of different research priorities should be judged, how limited resources for health should be 
used, and what protection of interests and autonomy donors should receive (Mullen 2009). 
Remarkably therefore, though explicitly designed as a novel form of governance in the 
interest of public trust, it seems that also UK Biobank rather evaded some contentious 
ethical issues by way of employing the rhetoric of ‘partnership’. Participant choices in 
terms of consent are limited and participants have no rights e.g. to veto commercial uses. 
Yet, they retain rights to withdrawal – a position that seems both internally contradictory 
and counterproductive (cf. Dickenson 2007; Brownsword 2007a). As we have observed 
above, it seems that the altruism of an imagined participant is taken for granted, while 
potential concerns tend to be circumvented by a kind of preventive ethics strategy. 
If it is correct that people do indeed largely participate for altruistic reasons and so 
immediate benefits to them are not at play, while indeed later public benefits cannot be as 
of now anticipated, it becomes evident that in fact ‘benefit-sharing’ largely functions as 
motivational rhetoric. According to Winickoff, it actually “effectively silence[s] the claims 
of individual property rights in excised tissue and bioinformation that, if recognized, might 
perform a much more radical type of redistributive project” (Winickoff 2008: 5).  
Thus, the trust or trust-like governance structure is only a first step of taking participant 
rights seriously. As a legal and institutional concept, it is rather ‘morally neutralizing’. 
Winickoff’s approach and the initial appeal of the UK Biobank Governance Framework 
proposal of a ‘partnership’, however, might perhaps be turned into something quite 
different – a questioning of the goods involved not only in terms of potential and future 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits, but also in terms of sharing power in genomic 
research governance. This is indeed because Winickoff’s proposal derives from the idea of 
‘translating’ some of the legitimate property interests participants have into a democratic 
reorganization of genomic governance.  
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So far, two kinds of interpretations of realizing this project emerge: a corporately oriented 
structure, emphasizing shareholding,
90
 which would fit with the emphasis on benefits, but 
remains vague, and a ‘partnership’ approach, that can be used for a whole spectrum of 
involvement with participants. Although UK Biobank has emphasized partnership, in fact a 
more radical questioning of an expert regime of biobank governance or genomics does not 
yet seem to be envisaged.  
 
4.2 Governmentality Precluded? New Participant-Centric Initiatives 
Not only theoretical reasons, but also empirical studies suggest that trust is not easily 
achieved via public consultation and proclamation of partnership approaches in genetic/ 
genomic research contexts. Social scientists have expressed skepticism concerning the 
question whether the “expert agenda of policy-makers and medical ethics” can sufficiently 
address participant concerns (Levitt and Weldon 2005: 311; cf. Winickoff 2007: 447; 
Petersen 2005). This expert agenda might persist even if there are ethics committees and 
increasing promotion of ethics institutionalization, in particular if these remain mostly 
within the ambit of the research organization.  
First, is it appropriate for individual biobanks to develop their own ethics and governance 
structures and thereby their guiding ethos independently, or is a more centralized, actually 
public regulatory approach required? (cf. Mullen 2009: 156; McHale 2011: 241). 
Generally, strong public opinions regarding the control of samples would seem to raise 
important questions of donor representation in the distributional decisions of biobanks. 
This does concern not only individual, but also collective interests (Winickoff 2008: 21). 
Facing changes in the political economy of research, the “distributive agency” of biobank 
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managers is amplified. In democracies, as Winickoff recalls, distributional choices would, 
however, tend to be allocated to representational bodies, not experts, because they 
implicate basic values and visions of a good society, not just technical concerns.  
As yet, participants or other societal stakeholders are excluded from  
policies on access and IP [which] will set the balance among the potentially competing goals of 
assuring scientific openness, incentivizing commercial investment in the life sciences, and 
promoting public access to future therapies. Value hierarchies have not been made clear […]. 
The broad discretion of biobank managers is less of a problem to the extent that we believe that 
their actions will align with the preferences of donors. But alignment is unlikely, and the likely 
gap in values increases the probability of problems with recruiting and retention. 
(Winickoff 2007: 448) 
 
The proposed benefit-sharing arrangement in the policies of international organizations 
alone cannot address the principal agency problem of representing donor interests, 
although, “looking at the situation prior to donation and the transfer of entitlement, the 
group of donors as a collective possesses a crucial form of material, informational and 
biological capital that could be used to demand a share of power” (Winickoff 2008: 13). 
Therefore, what is needed is also a translation of participant interest into procedural 
power. 
Winickoff’s ideas are related to the so-called ‘participant-centric turn’ that has lately 
gained attention in the bioethical discussion surrounding genomics. This umbrella term 
refers to governance approaches which employ digital and social media in the public and 
private sphere to improve the process of informed consent, provide information and control 
over data, while simultaneously aiming to permit the pooling of data for upcoming 
research (Kanellopoulou et al. 2011; Kaye 2011; 2012; Kaye et al. 2012; Saha and Hurlbut 
2011; Kuehn 2013).  
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Current practices in managing biobanks tend to see the public as little more than a resource for 
mining data and materials, and as a potential source of resistance. Participants provide 
information or tissues with little or no knowledge of the researchers’ priorities, goals or 
expected outcomes. Barriers are erected. Materials and information are ‘de-identified’ to protect 
people’s identities. Participants neither see how their donations are used, nor what the research 
produces.  
(Saha and Hurlbut 2011: 312) 
PCIs (Participant-Centric Initiatives) instead suggest to empower autonomous decision-
making via user-friendly digital interfaces, tools and projects. Jane Kaye et al. specify that 
a 
key feature of all PCI interfaces is that they are based on the principles of respect and 
empowerment for individuals and are orientated towards participant concerns: patients and 
research participants are located at the center of decision making as equal partners in the 
research process.  
(Kaye et al. 2012: 372) 
 
Already available technologies, similar to direct-to-consumer genetic services are used to 
make efficient use of data for future studies and sustain continuous influx of new data. 
Potential research participants and researchers are connected, communication and 
recruitment is eased, and ongoing interaction between the parties envisioned to be 
established.  
The model is therefore clearly first and foremost a technical development in line with the 
digital infrastructures that co-evolved with biobanking. At the same time, these initiatives 
aim at counteracting shortcomings of the broad consent model and to streamline the 
demands of the scientific endeavour with the new ethical demands that are created by it: as 
data sets and techniques advance, consent has to be made ‘future-proof’ and provide the 
participants with the possibility to get updates on changing research objectives. Digital 
interfaces bind people for longer term interactions into the research process, which seems a 
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moral demand as a matter of control over samples and genomic information. This might be 
relevant for the various aims people have in research participation, both ‘altruistic’, but 
also in case clinically relevant information about them is revealed.  
These initiatives therefore could offer a wide array of flexible options tailored personally – 
just in the spirit of Personalised Medicine – to the needs and wishes of an individual 
participant and in sharing data (cf. Kuehn 2013). At the same time, citizen science is 
implied by participant-centrism, allowing people “to drive the research agenda and to carry 
out their own research projects” (Kaye et al. 2012: 372). Examples include online-only 
approaches such as Registries for All 
91
 by Genetic Alliance, an online portal collecting and 
surveying health information that can then by compared with others. Users can set quite 
specific limits concerning the kind of data they would like to share (Kuehn 2013: 679). The 
system itself can be used for different purposes surrounding patient engagement, e.g. to 
approach people for further research options.  
Another US project tool is Portable Legal Consent, which aims at sharing genomic data 
that participants received through private genome testing for wider research use: “The idea 
behind PLC is that participants’ consent is not tied to a particular study but rather “is 
something that patients carry around with them like organ donation status” (Wilbanks in 
Kuehn 2013: 679). Users of the database created on this basis agree to specific open access 
policies tied to the work to be published from the database material. 
An approach that seems to fit particularly with biobanked tissues and data is the Dynamic 
Consent approach developed in the UK within the EnCoRe (Ensuring Consent and 
Revocation) project, a web-based platform with an interface that allows research 
participants to have an interactive relationship with the custodians of biobanks and the 
research community. It is used for three kinds of biobanks in Oxford, but can be extended 
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for flexible application in different research and healthcare contexts, in particular as these 
are converging. These approaches seem to follow naturally from the digitalization of 
research infrastructures and perhaps will lead to a fostering of long-term and more 
transparent relationships between participants and researchers, a feature that is indeed 
absent and often excluded from consideration in the generic broad consent model.  
But is there also a more normatively informed grounding in the PCI and dynamic consent 
approaches in the sense of Winickoff’s partnership governance, including the 
democratizing effects of understanding genomics in the first place, along with the new 
forms of biological citizenship? What is the function of the appeal to citizenship: are 
participants offered choices, for instance choices that give them a control share or a sort of 
co-ownership in the resource as the trust model would envisage? Advocates have not yet 
been explicit on the ethical implications of indeed putting the formerly passive donor as a 
participant in the centre of attention and also in charge (cf. Levitt 2011). Nevertheless, 
rather trenchant criticism has already been addressed to the model, the discussion of which 
might help to elucidate its ethical function, and the potential to overcome shortcomings of 
traditional informed consent and broad consent models.  
Steinsbekk et al. (2013a) reiterate a line of argument that has been criticized above in 
relation to a premature and often theoretically shaky move towards a generic broad consent 
model for biobank participation. In brief, the authors pose a dichotomy between a broad 
consent model and the new dynamic consent model, and argue that – though initially 
appealing – the latter might turn out to have undesirable practical consequences in terms of 
recruiting adequate numbers of participants. In addition, and more importantly for the 
purposes of the discussion here, they claim that the normative rationale of the dynamic 
consent model is flawed and tendentious, in that it indirectly promotes paternalistic 
attitudes, is prone to illiberal elements and therefore ethically untenable. As a consequence, 
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a broad consent model must be considered ethically superior all things considered 
(Steinsbekk et al. 2013a).  
To my knowledge, Steinsbekk et al.’s article is the first analysis taking issue with some of 
the normative undercurrents of the participant-centric approach and dynamic consent. As I 
have suggested, choices for more information and involvement seem at least part of a 
remedy for some of the conceptually, legally and ethically thorny issues concerning 
autonomy and control in research biobanks. Minimally, it would seem that they can help 
navigate the interests – including property-like interests – of participants, while – if 
adequately supplemented by additional measures towards public engagement and 
‘scientific citizenship’ – limiting excessive control claims, including at later stages the 
ones by e.g. researchers and commercial partners.  
Steinsbekk et al’s outlook, however, is very different. First, they draw a distinction 
between broad and dynamic consent, broad consent meaning that a participant would be 
consenting to a general governance framework, supervised by ethical review, including 
potential re-contact if this framework changes. This is still an ‘informed’ consent in the 
classical sense, according to the authors, while dynamic consent has been proposed “to 
solve the perceived problem of lack of ‘real-time’ specific information about individual 
research projects seen in the broad consent procedure used in many research biobanks 
today” (Steinsbekk et al. 2013a: 1). The focus is on dynamic consent with “active opt-in 
strategies”, and the claim that dynamic consent proponents clearly advocate a moral 
supremacy of this model: “The implication is that broad consent results in passive 
participation, and that this is ethically problematic” (ibid.: 2). The authors identify a 
number of particular ‘claims of superiority’: dynamic consents respect participants’ 
autonomy far more than broad consents, keep participants better informed, increase 
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participation, are preferable since they transfer control to participants, and are necessary to 
enable the return of research results and incidental findings (ibid.). 
Before, we have focused on the first claim, which is the Achilles heel of the debate. Some 
of the others involve empirical claims, in particular as concerns the inclusiveness of e-
governance tools, and their potential to enhance participants’ perceptions on being well-
informed. This also comprises the issue of trust often emphasized as a key factor in 
sustaining long-term relationships in biobanks. Here, I will comment on the claim that e-
governance tools overburden participants, and the closely related claims concerning the 
role of ethical expertise and democratization. 
The argumentation is based on endorsement of the broad consent model I have criticized as 
inadequately justified and contextualized in Chapter 2: 
The fundamental difference between the two is disagreement on whether consent to ‘unknown’ 
future activities, can be labeled ‘informed consent’ and be viewed as an expression of an 
autonomous will. […] we regard many ordinary decisions people make as properly informed 
without having all the specifics – thus they are still ‘perfectly acceptable autonomous decisions’ 
in most people’s minds. The model of broad consent follows such decision patterns. 
And further:  
In the dynamic consent model, participants should always make an informed consent to both 
primary and secondary use of their data. It does not matter whether a new project Y is only 
slightly different from an initial project X. And it does not matter whether it is possible or 
impossible to find any kind of ‘rational’ justification for taking part in X and saying no to Y. As 
such, dynamic consent takes people’s preferences as the point of departure.  
In the broad consent model, on the other hand, people are asked to re-consent only when there 
may exist an ethically relevant difference between X and Y. Participants in such situations are 
asked to re-consent, because a research ethics committee or the biobanks institution believes 
there is something to ask them about, something that matters. 
The difference between dynamic consent and broad consent is then made clearer: In a dynamic 
consent model, participants will be asked for consent continuously, simply because each new 
project is a new project. Thus, they will be asked to re-consent both for trivial and essential 
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reasons, and often the former. In a broad consent model, participants will seldom be asked to 
re-consent, but when they are asked, they are asked for a non-trivial reason. 
        (ibid.:2) 
 
What is wrong here? The idea that there is a direct and general relation between the 
concept of consent and autonomy relies on the concept of a full-blown and perfectly 
informed consent which, however, is a philosophical abstraction. More information will 
generally always be better, but this will strictly depend on context. As a result, Sheehan’s 
and other commentators’ analogies are not really to the point: Biobanking is not like 
choosing, for example, in a restaurant, because a trust-relation of delegating choice does 
not obviously exist, and because there is a primacy of individual rights to be respected that 
has no relevance in the restaurant case. The adequate form of consent cannot be made 
contingent on the technical possibility to safeguard these rights. 
There is, furthermore, nothing in the dynamic approach that would force people to decide 
continuously; more importantly, it could not be like that, because there are still decisions 
about the relevance of information to be made; plus the overall epistemic situation 
concerning future, potentially controversial research uses is the same, if there is a digital 
tool to facilitate information flow or not. Steinsbekk et al. also claim that there is no need 
for dedicated informational or e-governance tools to address shortcomings in information 
provision for participants. E-mail updates and newsletters, as already practiced in some 
biobank projects, would be enough. They make the important observation that the idea of 
transferring ethics largely to e-governance – if implicit in the proposals of dynamic consent 
– harbours its own challenges, as it might involve predominantly persons that have already 
an advanced knowledge concerning biomedical research, access to newest technology etc. 
This typical technology-critical argument of a problem of ‘trickling down’ to the average 
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or even disadvantaged citizen, yet, is not the authors’ real worry and so will not be 
discussed here in more detail.  
The theoretical point that autonomous decision-making and the amount of information 
provided in a consent procedure are merely loosely related has already been granted. More 
critical is the assumption that not the amount, but the relevance of provided information is 
decided by experts, and we can safely assume that this will be in participants’ best 
interests. The main concern that Steinsbekk et al. implicitly express is consequently that a 
dynamic consent model, properly implemented and spelled out, would change the relation 
between a biobank and the researchers and participants in a profound way. It would, 
indeed, seriously question the expert regime of research in general. Nevertheless, the 
authors suggest that this conclusion is unwarranted, because empowerment of participants 
is unnecessary if personal health is not directly at stake and risks due to research 
involvement are very low (Steinsbekk et al. 2013a: 3/4). They seem to concede that 
broader involvement of participants and the public in deliberation and decision-making 
might sometimes be justified, at least in case “there are uncertainties surrounding the 
consequences or outcome of the scientific activity or where values are at stake” (ibd. 4).  
On the other hand, they argue that within the dynamic consent model, real participation 
cannot be achieved, as “the ‘participation’ here is participation inside an already 
established research arena where only minor changes of policy are up for discussion.” 
Further, however: “We do not deny that increased user participation is possible to achieve. 
However, we doubt that there is a moral imperative to try to achieve this within today’s 
framing of biobanks research” (ibid.). In fact, according to the authors, the outlook of 
increased participation of non-experts in biobank governance and genomics is interpreted 
as leading to a weakening of ethical assessment and the danger that unpopular research 
could be inhibited by the mere opinions of lay people.  
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Both the depiction of what is pragmatically envisaged and the normative argumentation by 
Steinsbekk et al. suffer from a number of problems. First, the assessment deliberately 
caricatures both the theoretical and practical implications of implementing a dynamic 
consent or similar model. Second, though suggesting that real participation is actually not 
foreseen in the proposals as of now advanced, this does not seem to be a point the authors 
dare to comment straightforwardly on. Instead, a tendency of utilitarian research ethics is 
applied asymmetrically to researchers and biobanks governors vs. participants: if a 
particular research project is not popular with participants in the imagined scenario, this 
should not be taken as a reason to question the research. In contrast, if benefits – as 
communicated by researchers and funders – are to be expected mainly for the future rather 
than for donor-participants, then the interests and rights of current donors or participants 
appear as neglectable. Third, this is coupled with the uncharitable suggestion that – in any 
case – people are and should not be expected to be able and interested in getting into closer 
relationships with science. Indeed, this could in the end undermine trust in research ethics 
committees and researchers, while becoming a burden for their ‘autonomy’ as “they fall 
short on the implicit demands of participation” (ibid.: 5), and not the least producing 
potentially negative effects on recruitment.  
“Being confronted with the detailed complexity of biomedical research, and being asked 
again and again for an ‘opinion’ (a consent), it is likely that at least some people will 
struggle with feelings of falling short – that their own competence or knowledge do not 
suffice. This could easily be interpreted as a ‘lack of respect’ for the passive participant, 
and result in lower participation as people would rather choose to stay away from such 
studies than face shortcomings” (ibid.: 3). The authors even add that “For most people, we 
suspect that biomedical research is complex, complicated and rather boring stuff” (ibid.: 
4). 
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While Steinsbekk et al. rightly ask for illumination in regard to the way a participant could 
indeed be central in the new governance framework, they also perpetuate a conflation of 
descriptive and normative assessment and the mixture of utilitarian with, it seems, 
implicitly strongly paternalistic ethics. As we discussed in relation to consent, the rights of 
participants cannot be traded off against future potential benefits in a theoretically sound 
argument. Admittedly though, individual rights indeed do not feature explicitly in this kind 
of account anymore, but have been replaced by interests that presumably are just private. 
The idea that an individual participant could be both concerned about his privacy and 
certain research uses and still be convinced that research should be undertaken with 
support by the population – which seems a position that many people might hold92 – is 
becoming inconceivable.  
According to Steinsbekk et al. the implicit preference for private interests in empowering 
participants via dynamic consent tools also finds expression in the movement towards 
returning research results. Also more generally, this could lead to a change in research 
culture including “a cost to the traditional values and feelings, which lie in acts of altruism 
and participation towards common goods. This might then enforce ideas of individualism 
and of ‘what’s in it for me’ even in aspects of human conduct relating to contributing to 
biomedical research” (ibid.: 5).  
In contrast, their line of thought advocates what might be called ‘Research-centrism’, 
though unfortunately with a more worrisome implicitness and tendentiousness than the 
sometimes vague rhetoric of genomic empowerment they rightly lay their finger on in the 
participant-centric approach. While research is ‘boring’ for potential lay contributors, and 
there is no need for ‘biobank exceptionalism’ in the perspective of participants, at the same 
time they claim that there is a need for solid ethical expertise “in a time when evaluating 
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potential impacts connected to this kind of research seems to increase in scope and 
complexity” (ibid.).  
This seems to be, if not incoherent, at least in tendency an anti-liberal and indeed anti-
democratic approach. A potential contributor to a genomic research project would 
accordingly be free to ‘sign off’ further interests via broad or open consent, but not to have 
continuing or more substantive concerns, including interests in public or common goods. 
In particular, it is not apparent how these disinterested individuals should simultaneously 
be motivated by ‘genetic solidarity’ and the altruism the research-centric approach would 
typically ascribe to them. In sum, though Steinsbekk et al. charge the dynamic consent 
approach with implicit paternalism, what they advocate has a stronger tendency to 
paternalism: defining interests of potentially very different participants for them. There can 
be no strong paternalism intended, rather, e-governance tools aim to provide choices: 
including the choice for blanket consent and no further contact (cf. Árnason 2009; Saha 
and Hurlbut 2011). 
The emphasis on choice is important and an improvement over the vague appeals and the 
‘responsibilization’ of donors, and this is continuous with the problem of consent and the 
intermingling of privacy and property-like aspects that we have discussed above. 
Consequently:  
The bioethical principle of autonomy as ‘respect for persons’ should not be narrowly construed 
in the context of biobanking to mean only freedom from coercion — in effect, the right to sign 
a consent form. It should also entail a respect for the ability, willingness and right of 
participants to share in imagining the futures to which research aspires.  
(Saha and Hurlbut 2011: 313) 
The overall normative conclusion from this is that what matters rather than active vs. 
passive involvement, more or less information in and by themselves is that individuals 
have a real choice if they want to, and this is certainly something dynamic consent could 
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facilitate. Again, it is important to underline that dynamic consent, similar tools and the 
related movement of ‘putting participants in control’ should not be artificially opposed to 
the broad consent model.  
A limitation that Steinsbekk et al. not discuss is that the transfer to a more dynamic 
participant-researcher relationship must be put into the context of both rights and social 
aims generally. This is also why dynamic consent is not a genuine new form of consent 
and could not be, and there is more to account for in terms of these contextual features. 
The underlying arguments in relation to rights, and the broader social horizon to be 
anticipated, should be exposed and made clear. In this respect, broad consent still seems to 
be used and advocated in particular in scientific publications as a new ethical gold standard 
that can be interpreted to be in line with ‘autonomy’, securing concurrently the 
advancement of science without the supposed hindrance by more enlightened donors, that 
perhaps will become participants or even ‘scientific citizens’. While admittedly there is 
still lots of clarification to be done, the expert regime of detaching donors from what they 
can and should not be concerned for seems profoundly undemocratic.  
This is especially the case since we know of the concerns people express in relation to 
genetics and genomics, because of their human rights and interests in medical advance, and 
because there are no signs that the knowledge and power imbalance between donors or 
‘sources’ and experts will decrease by themselves. Based on the ethical framework 
underlying my analysis here, however, this strength of combining liberty and 
accountability in using e-governance tools can only be an improvement over broad consent 
under specific conditions. Indeed there does seem to be a danger, that, by offering choices, 
a purely digital approach would collapse into a consumerist model of ‘consent’ or a 
technocratic model that communicates the idea that risks can be technically managed. In 
that case, one would be faced with a re-iteration of problematic approaches already 
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encountered, that “have addressed citizens as individual passive citizens with individual 
subjective concerns – in effect as consumers – given a choice whether to accept a 
participant role or not” (Weldon 2004a: 177). 
Reference to ‘scientific citizenship’ is ambivalent on this. It could be envisaged by the 
approach of a participant-centric movement as not merely some kind of new configuration 
in relation to the current bio-scientific developments described with the broad term towards 
‘biological citizenship’ (Rose and Novas 2005) but also as a normative perspective 
grounded in deliberative democracy or even stronger forms such as a republican ideal of 
responsible citizenship. A more continuous, dynamic view on individual and societal 
interests reinforcing each other might instead overcome the dichotomy between protection 
from (moral) harm vs. material benefits in biobank-based research and bridge what 
Árnason calls the ‘protective view’ and the ‘benefit view’ (cf. Árnason 2009: 138). 
In this perspective, which has been illustrated above specifically in relation to large parts 
of the debate in both ethical and scientific publications, citizenship in relation to science is 
underdeveloped, as the individual is concerned either as a passive patient to be protected, 
or else as a fully independent contributor to and consumer of the population health. 
Importantly, though in particular the latter approach makes strong appeal to the language 
of public goods and benefits, also this perspective sees the individual in research primarily 
as a private, passive person (cf. Árnason 2011). In the extreme then, both positions “do not 
provide reasons for implementing policies that facilitate actions of the citizens in the public 
sphere. In this way they are part of a research culture which contributes to scientific 
illiteracy and disregards the active elements of human agency which are crucial for the 
democratic citizen” (Árnason 2009: 135). 
At the same time, the duties of researchers, the state and the (public) health care system 
fade into the background, which is in fact a typical sign of encroaching governmentality, in 
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which multi-form tactics of governance in liberal societies are accompanied by using the 
ambivalent effects of the stress on ‘autonomy’. Individuals are supposed to be 
‘autonomous’, responsible and self-directing, but at the same time become governed and 
directed through ‘regulated choices’, in the present case to ‘autonomously’ donate and be 
‘altruistic’, but excluded from further involvement with scientific expertise (cf. Rose 1996; 
Corrigan 2004; Ursin 2010b).  
In this respect, the potential of a participant-centric approach should be carefully guided by 
more focus on the institutional and political arrangements as well as research priorities 
(Winickoff 2003, 2007, 2008; Brekke and Sirnes 2006; Hunter and Laurie 2009; Schneider 
2010). A publicly accountable trust structure with common goals means that the aim 
should be the democratization of science with particular stress on more accountability and 
transparency rather than mere ‘empowerment’ of participants as the only possibility to 
“transform the debate from questions of public good versus individual autonomy, cost 
versus practicality to one where the concerns of the patient are aligned with the needs of 
medical research” (Kanellopoulou et al. 2011).  
It also leads back to issues concerning property. More specifically, for the establishment of 
a third way of genomic ‘property’, it will not be enough to appeal to the language of 
biobanks as ‘community resources’, ‘biocommons’ or the promises of benefit-sharing. For 
example, rather than the broad appeal to the anonymity of solidaric donation, the 
involvement of participants in a research structure that is legally bound to charitable 
purpose forces all parties to decide on research priorities. Equally, independent (perhaps 
centralized) oversight will be important to ensure that the project serves goals that are 
considered important from the perspective of public health (cf. Campbell 2007: 242/243). 
The rhetoric of digital empowerment can suggest that there are no risks involved, and that 
the success of research lies only in the hands of participants acting like bio-entrepreneurs 
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rather than co-creators of a public good. Though in dynamic consent and similar 
approaches individuals are given more choices, these choices should not be pre-governed 
by researchers’ or funders expectations. To be an improvement on broad consent therefore, 
the focus on choice must be complemented with the privacy and property rights-based 
discussion, public debate and engagement, sustained by researchers themselves.  
In that sense, the labeling of participant-led research and the immediateness of ‘citizen 
science’ for larger-scale projects might well be an overstatement and diffuse the 
responsibilities of care that researchers will continue to have as part of a consent process. 
Campbell, for example, sustains that “Ensuring genuine participation and partnership is not 
part of the project of protecting individual rights. Rather, it supports and reinforces the 
altruism that motivated the participants in the first place” (Campbell 2009: 68). This, 
however, does not seem to follow if the analysis of the dis-analogies between clinical 
treatment and genomic biobanks is appropriate, because it does not move the debate 
beyond property vs. consent or private entitlements vs. top-down participant protection.  
Campbell himself thinks that Dickenson’s approach of control rights (a consequence of 
endorsing the labour-model of property rights) “seems a surrender to the idea that the 
tissue market is no more than another instance of the need to regulate vendor-purchaser 
relationships, in other words a market like any other” (Campbell 2009: 72). On the other 
hand, the rights of participants concerning ‘their’ tissue and genomic information are more 
than symbolically related to property, and the idea of a continuous, dynamic consent could 
be an attempt to make practical sense of the ownership dimension underlying consent. 
Also, the implementation of this model does not obviate the need to assess what ‘altruism’ 
or, respectively, solidarity might require as for genomic research on banked tissue in a 
common, public interest. The future question, therefore – and the leitmotif in the discussion 
on the property-like entitlements of participants – remains to what extent the traditional 
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model of research ethics with its strong demands on individual freedom and individual 
rights will be overturned by these developments.  
 
 
4.3 The Remains of Consent 
 
Keeping in mind the previously outlined trends, what remains of consent in the application 
to biobanks seems to be necessarily ambivalent. On the one hand, consent will remain the 
cornerstone of ethical approval also in large-scale research networks because it is based on 
the fundamental right to integrity of the person and her private sphere. On the other hand, 
there is the potential that informed consent is on the verge of collapsing either into a 
contradiction in terms or lead to a legal fiction – a form of category mistake with uncertain 
consequences – if certain conceptual and practical limitations are not taken into account.  
The ‘contradiction in terms’- issue is a combination of the argument that choice is crucial 
for autonomy and that the provision of information in a procedure of consent has only a 
loose connection to the safeguarding of individual decision-making. Consent requirements 
can become diluted if information on future research use is limited and important public 
goods are at stake. I have argued that what is ‘reasonable’ information is contentious both 
in legal and ethical terms (and that means there is prima facie a wide scope of what 
constitutes valid consent), but there is an inherent ethical problem with this position in that 
other dimension of autonomy are neglected, in particular a sense of control and agency, 
whereas risks are downplayed in favour of potential future benefits.  
What remains of informed consent is then both too strong an ethical demand and too weak, 
and this tension is indeed the dominating picture in the bioethical debate. It is too strong 
because consent must carry all the ethical weight, while the complicated relation between 
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the procedure, content and the various functions of appealing to autonomy remain 
underdetermined. A liberist focus on choice and information provision tends to devalue 
social context and the concerns of minorities concerning, for instance, moral harms and 
genetic discrimination. 
The ‘legal fiction’- problem is the issue that because the concept of informed consent must 
be coherent across applications in networked genomic infrastructures, the distinctive 
features of biobanks are disregarded or redefined in the interest of coherency. This is a 
formalistic or technocratic approach. The ensuing ambivalences can be ‘hijacked’ by the 
interests that are in the more powerful position. 
Both approaches are problematic in that they misrepresent and neglect the human rights 
underlying the protection and empowerment of research participants. Almost by definition, 
consent in the biobank context is not consent to a specific research project, but is at least 
partly consent to a model of governance (cf. Hansson 2010; Steinsbekk and Solberg 2011; 
Macilotti 2013). If we take this thought seriously, and consider it in conjunction with a 
comprehensive picture of individual and social interests that as I have argued are 
incomplete without the moral and conceptual dimension of property in human tissue, form 
and function of consent are to be converted in the interest of a more socially robust science 
(cf. Nowotny et al. 2005).  
Insofar not only individuals are at stake, informed consent must incorporate governance 
structures and measures of public accountability that mitigate the interests of all 
stakeholders. Here, a certain democratic erosion can be observed to influence bioethical 
discussion. As concerns the notion of the more concrete ethical task of safeguarding a new 
form of autonomy, the possibilities within the conceptual framework of consent (and 
particularly some of the interpretations I have discussed) are limited. Partly this is related 
to internal limitations mentioned above, and partly to external issues that have come up 
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with the extensive scientific use of genetic and genomic information, i.e. since the 
withholding and sharing of it concerns relational autonomy and the specific organization 
of biobanks as open-ended and future-oriented research infrastructures.  
An important ethical constraint in this context is also that the over-emphasis on consent 
diverts attention from questions that require more focus in the move to a public health 
ethics of genomic research and biobanking, in particular as concerns research priorities that 
would contribute to a more concretely defined public or common good.  
Overall, to make consent more future-proof, appeals to autonomy have to be redefined in 
two important ways: they are to be considered less individualistic and more relational, but 
equally as not only concerning informational aspects, but also as reminding the bio-
material basis. Winickoff, who seems to advance a similar position, has coined the term 
‘bio-autonomy’ to combine these aspects (Winickoff 2003: 204; cf. Santosuosso 2013). In 
the perspective developed here, the moral ‘three-dimensionality’ of tissue as material, 
informational and moral is crucial to this (cf. Macilotti 2013). 
Consent, again, is a matter of individual rights, and the loosening of moral demands can 
threaten what Brownsword has discussed in relation to the ‘community of rights’ (cf. 
Brownsword 2007b). In particular, we have observed not only a deflation of consent 
norms, but disregard to flanking contextual and social factors (cf. Barr 2006a; 2006b). 
Instead, if the specificity of consent is tied to the context and social relations that adhere in 
any medical or research context (cf. Ursin 2010b), then this must also be the case for 
biobanks.  
Larger biobanks and networks in which material relations disappear must substitute for this 
lack – there is, in fact, no automatic empowerment of donors. Worse, there can be a danger 
of non-legitimate research. As we have seen, the problem of commercialization, for 
example, is not only a problem because of intrinsic concerns some people might 
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legitimately hold, but because of encroaching conflicts of interests that can disturb the 
content and value of research.  
A mitigation of epistemic indeterminacy and risks might be increased within a largely 
traditional model that provides more options and enhances trust, though this will put 
researchers in charge (cf. Boniolo et al. 2012). In a complementary approach of digital 
consents, e-governance tools have a potential to facilitate involvement, but cannot replace 
public deliberation and further study of the normative implications of a shift towards 
digitalized research environments.  
While reconsiderations of expert regimes are starting to be considered, this movement goes 
hand in hand with the idea that research is just like any other activity in life (cf. Vayena 
and Tasioulas 2013), which should be carefully considered as a rationale for overarching 
and international policies. Similar to genetic exceptionalism, it would seem that 
biobanking and genomic research more generally might not be sui generis in absolute 
terms with regard to their organizational features and risks attached, but still peculiar. In 
this respect, it might be worth recalling with Francis Collins the ”First Law of Technology: 
we invariably overestimate the short-term impacts of new technologies and underestimate 
their longer-term effects” (Collins 2010: 674). 
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Conclusion 
I have argued that the traditional framework of research ethics, specified as comprising the 
three main conceptual pillars of informed consent, protection of privacy and an ideal of 
altruistic, non-commercialized research participation and respective research environments 
faces significant challenges in the application to large-scale genomic research. 
Ambivalences that derive from a misinterpretation of its sources, and a mingling of ethical 
with political rationale in ever-enlarging research contexts lead to a dilution of 
requirements for safeguards in this research which is to be enabled by the spread of 
biobanks. Some of these challenges, however, are not appreciated sufficiently in the 
bioethical debate, which instead focuses on and strikingly often supports deflationary 
accounts of ‘autonomy’ and its role in justifying participant rights.  
My main objective has not been to argue for a return to stronger measures of protection 
and, as a consequence, increasing rather than different regulation, which would be in 
contradiction with the research in the way it necessarily must be done given the particular 
characteristics of global and digitalized genomics settings. The role of ethical reflection, 
yet, cannot be limited to confirm social and scientific developments considered as 
inevitable (such as ‘the end of privacy’), and thus potential adjustments in the framework 
should be based on critical assessment of the status quo and the moral legitimacy of the 
claims of all the parties involved.  
Alas, the topic of governance – the word itself seeming a surrender to the complexity of 
the issues – is too encompassing to be dealt with in one stroke, as all the key concepts of 
research participant protection and also new issues are at stake. In a debate that has been 
dominated by a presumed clash between individual and societal interests, I have, to begin 
with, tried to liberate some conceptual space for a convergence of interests by focusing on 
a topic that, although fundamental, has been relatively disregarded – the moral and 
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conceptual importance of property claims, and here in particular the ones of research 
subjects. 
This choice was strategic towards the aim of underlining the role I think bioethical 
reflection should take, faced with the necessity of an innovative view on large-scale 
projects. It is a subject matter that potential research participants care about in one guise or 
another, and that at the same time is so complex as well as morally and politically charged 
that neither legal theory nor public discourse can easily provide guiding answers. At the 
same time, bioethics has been very reluctant in re-connecting with political and legal 
philosophy and to potentially inform both the academic and public debate on this front. 
While it must be hoped that the benefits of the turn to Personalised Medicine enabled by 
genomics can indeed be realized, it has been argued here that the rights of participants are 
of crucial importance in a research culture based on human rights protection and 
democratic values of liberty, plurality and accountability.  
Research participant rights – which seem to converge more and more with every citizen’s 
human rights as different forms of e-healthcare are being implemented – are insufficiently 
characterized as purely ‘informational’, a conceptual move that is advocated by authors 
which tend to sustain technocratic expert-regimes and inconsistent views on participants’ 
interests. These are considered as merely ‘private’, while tissue donations should be 
performed in the public interest, and yet, donor-participants are not allowed further moral 
judgement or an interest in closer interaction with the evolving research structures.  
In this density, I have tried to elucidate the more specific roles property-like rights in 
human biological material can and should play from the supply side, and also its 
limitations, trying to connect the present debate with some classic sources of political 
philosophy and legal theory. First, by reference to property concepts it can be shown that 
the model of a ‘thin’ autonomy grounding informed consent is flawed and serves to justify 
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societal aims that are, in their innocuous form, not very clearly defined. The adequate 
justification of consent is the protection of the donor or participant against harm, but it is 
also an expression of respect for the person’s moral status. Both the right to withdraw 
consent and the right to veto in the classic consent requirement suggest property-like moral 
control rights for individuals.  
As a consequence, notwithstanding the general reliance on a no-property rule concerning 
human body parts and tissue in genomics, consent seems to presuppose at least some form 
of moral property-like ‘rights’. This is independent from claiming that there is an 
uncontroversial and unlimited, enforceable property right in human bodily material, that 
there should be markets in tissue or similar scenarios. Although there is conceptual space 
to this effect – there could be property and indeed there seems to be a ‘property dimension’ 
underlying consent – moral and practical reasons caution against the commodification and 
commercialization of tissue.  
While a number of authors have discussed these connections for the particular application 
in biobank ethics, implications for governance scenarios should be brought more clearly 
into the picture. A preliminary step has been made, in that e-governance tools have been 
discussed as a possibility to bring science and society into closer alignment. If sovereignty 
over personal life retains an important place in bioethics, both individual and communal 
control rights in human tissue and genomic information will have to be discussed further 
and more publicly, precluding uncritical advances towards the ‘datafication’ of persons and 
their basic rights.  
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